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Abstract 
During the last decade, the global liquefied natural g s (LNG) market altered substantially. 
Significant investments have been realized, traded volumes increased and contracting structures 
gained in flexibility. Various governance forms co-exist, including the poles of spot market 
transactions and vertical integration as well as numerous hybrid forms such as long-term 
contracts, joint ventures, and strategic partnerships. This dissertation empirically investigates, 
based on transaction cost economics and recent extensions thereof, which motivations drive 
companies towards the choice of hierarchical governance forms. First, the likelihood of vertical 
integration and the impact of inter-organizational trust as a shift parameter accounting for 
differences in the institutional environment are analyzed. Estimation results confirm transaction 
cost economics by showing that relationship-specific investments in an uncertain environment 
drive LNG companies to invest in successive stages along the value chain. Furthermore, the 
presence of inter-organizational trust increases th likelihood of less hierarchical governance 
modes. Second, alternative theories of the firm are link d in order to explain the menu of strategic 
positions recently observed in this dynamic market. Estimation results support the positioning-
economizing perspective of the firm. The three strategic choices of target market position, 
resource profile, and organizational structure are int rdependent. Third, the determinants of 
optimal contract length as a trade-off between the minimization of transaction costs due to 
repeated bilateral bargaining and the risk of being bound in an inflexible agreement in uncertain 
environments is discussed. Estimation results show that the presence of high asset specificity 
results in longer contracts whereas the need for flexibility in today’s LNG market supports shorter 
agreements. When firms have experience in bilateral trading, contract duration decreases. In 
addition, countries heavily reliant on natural gas imports via LNG are often willing to forgo some 
flexibility in favor of supply security. Contracts dedicated to competitive downstream markets on 
average are shorter than those concluded with customers in non-liberalized importing countries. 
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1 Introduction 
 
“[T]he problem of economic organization is properly posed not as  
markets or hierarchies, but rather as markets andhierarchies.” 
Williamson (2002, p. 175) 
 
 
When I was a student in industrial engineering at Dresden University of Technology, I had the great 
opportunity to work together with Prof. Christian von Hirschhausen since 2004. After a first excursion 
into the field of investments in nuclear energy in Eastern Europe during my time as a research 
assistant, we soon discovered the global liquefied natural gas market to be an interesting field of 
research. In fact, this became the starting point fr more than four years of exciting and fruitful work 
that included a diploma thesis, workshops, summer schools, conference presentations, and finally, this 
dissertation. In the summer of 2006, I presented th first ideas of my diploma thesis at the European 
School on New Institutional Economics. When Prof. Oliver Williamson asked me a question, I did not 
understand anything. My limited language skills andhis American accent might have been one reason, 
but my very limited knowledge on New Institutional Economics doubtlessly did not support any 
comprehension. However, after two more years of work and three resubmissions, I succeeded in 
publishing a first paper which strongly motivated me to continue; and when Prof. Williamson finally 
was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics last year, my colleagues and I gladly clinked classes of 
champagne. 
1.1 The issue 
The technology of natural gas liquefaction and shipping enables inter-regional gas trade linking the 
formerly isolated markets of North America, Europe-Eurasia, and Asia-Pacific. The past decade has 
seen the global market for liquefied natural gas (LNG) undergoing substantial developments. Driven 
by growing natural gas demand and declining investmn  costs for LNG export and import facilities 
until the mid-2000s, large-scale infrastructure investments have been realized along the whole value 
chain. Export capacities increased from 108 million t s per year (mtpa) at the end of 1999 to 229 
mtpa in 2009 (+112%), import capacities increased from 251 to 462 mtpa (+84%) during the same 
period and the number of operating LNG vessels augmented from 106 to 337 (+218%). New players, 
countries as well as companies, entered the market. Int rnational trade nearly doubled in volume. 
During the early years of the industry, most of the world’s LNG export infrastructure remained under 
state control and private or foreign companies were involved only with minority shares. Inflexible 
bilateral long-term supply agreements with take-or-pay and destination clauses secured the capital-
intensive investments on the one hand and reliable supplies for import-dependent buyers on the other. 
Ship ownership typically was embedded in these contracts. In today’s LNG market, new flexibility in 
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trading patters comes from changes in the structure of long-term contracts. Average contract duration 
and contracted volume are decreasing, take-or-pay requirements are relaxed, options for additional 
cargoes are included in recent contracts, and destination clauses are eliminated enabling the diversion 
of deliveries. These long-term contracts are increasingly accompanied by short-term agreements and 
spot transactions balancing supply and demand in the short- to medium-term. Whereas only 3.8% of 
total LNG trade took place under short-term contracts in 1999, this share increased to 20% in 2007 
(Cornot-Gandolphe, 2005; Jensen, 2009b). The first export projects without having sold total volume 
based on long-term contracts are moving forward. 
LNG suppliers increasingly follow a strategy of forward integration from the upstream to the 
downstream sector. Concluding for a sales-and-purchase agreement with the own marketing affiliate 
and investing at the same time in LNG import capacities, leads to the players controlling successive 
stages of the value chain. Some companies invest in an entire portfolio of LNG export, shipping, and 
import positions, enabling them to conduct flexible trades and to benefit from regional price 
differences. For example, Exxon Mobil in partnership w th Qatar Petroleum controls export capacities 
in Qatar, has a fleet of 27 ships, and invested in importing capacities on both sides of the Atlantic 
(i.e., UK and US). Furthermore, traditional natural g s distributors started to participate in LNG export 
ventures and also electricity companies, forming part of the extended value chain including gas-fired 
power production, entered the market and integrate b ckward from the downstream to the upstream 
sector. In contrast, some new entrants invested in non-integrated LNG import terminals operating 
them as so called tolling facilities, selling the service of unloading, regasification, and storage to third 
parties, or speculating for short-term deliveries.  
The occurrence of such a menu of governance forms including vertical and horizontal integration, 
joint ventures and strategic partnerships, long- and short-term contracts, and spot transactions in one 
and the same industry is very interesting from a New Institutional Economics (NIE) point of view. In 
addition, we observe varying strategies of different companies which are active in similar stages of the 
value chain, and one and the same company choosing different positions along alternative value 
chains. Therefore, this thesis addresses vertical structures in the global LNG market and investigates 
what drives companies towards vertical integration and which external factors determine optimal 
contract duration of long-term supply agreements. 
1.2 Approach 
The origins of transaction cost economics go back to Ronald Coase’s seminal article on the nature of 
the firm. When Coase (1937) asked why there are firms, he could not find an answer in price theory 
but rather argued that there must be some cost of using the price mechanism and that firms are likely 
to emerge when contracting becomes too expensive. However, with every transaction organized within 
a firm, additional bureaucratic costs arise and the entrepreneur’s capabilities of making the best use of 
production factors decreases, limiting firm size. More than three decades later, the field of NIE 
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established. Williamson (1975, 1985) operationalized transaction cost economics discussing the 
determinants of (ex-post) transaction costs and contractual difficulties.  
Economic actors are assumed to be characterized by bounded rationality and may behave 
opportunistically in the sense of “self-interest seeking with guile” (Williamson, 1985, p. 47). In a 
world in which uncertainty about the future state of nature is present, long-term contracts will remain 
incomplete not accounting for all possible contingenci s. As long as there is functioning competition 
among trading partners, incomplete contracts are unproblematic. However, ex-post bilateral 
dependencies, as do result from investments in relationship-specific assets, encourage ex-post hold-up 
by the non-investing party and provide economic incentives to internalize quasi-rents into the own 
hierarchy.  
Transaction cost economics is a comparative analysis studying governance structures under the target 
of economizing exchange relationships with respect to the sum of both production and transaction 
costs. Transactions, which differ in their attributes, have to be aligned with governance structures, 
which differ in their costs and competencies, in a discriminating way. Internal organization will be the 
efficient mode of organization only in the presence of both substantial relationship-specific 
investments and environmental uncertainty where the hazard of post-contractual opportunistic 
behavior by the counterparty would otherwise result in ex-ante under-investment and decreasing 
overall efficiency. Asset specificity without uncertainty allows for the conclusion of complete 
contingent claim contracts. Uncertainty without asset pecificity can be dealt with in exchanges on 
competitive markets.  
Transaction cost economics became prominent during the 1980s. At first glance, this approach seems 
to be an empirical success story with about 900 applications. However, the existing body of empirical 
literature suffers from a number of shortcomings. Several studies are not fully consistent with 
propositions developed within the framework of trans ction cost economics. Often, imperfect proxies 
for key variables have to be employed. Numerous studies ignore the endogeneity of right-hand-side 
variables. Finally, most econometric tests are based on reduced form models and therefore cannot test 
for the theory’s propositions directly. While empirical evidence demonstrates that firms choose 
governance consistent with transaction cost predictions, the performance implications of governance 
choice are less well explored. 
In recent years, researchers have continued to develop and improve transaction cost economics. 
Whereas research on the institutional environment and the institutions of governance have developed 
in disjunct ways for a long time, Williamson (1991b) introduces the shift parameter framework which 
investigates how the optimal choice of governance changes in response to dynamics in the institutional 
environment. Changes in exogenous parameters will shift the relative costs of alternative governance 
structures and, therefore, will have an impact on the optimal alignment of transactions and institutional 
arrangements. Nickerson (1997) develops the positioning-economizing perspective arguing that 
decisions regarding market position, resource investm nts, and governance mode are interdependent 
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and determined simultaneously. A target market position s supported by a resource profile that in tur 
determines the organizational choice of a firm. In addition, a number of authors came up with an 
increasing interest in relational (i.e., implicit or self-enforcing) institutional arrangements arguin that 
transaction cost economics may overstate the desirability of complex long-term contracts and vertical 
integration in exchange settings where a substantial hold-up potential is present.  
This thesis picks up several of the above discussed limitations of existing empirical work. It tests 
transaction cost economics’ predictions and recent d velopments thereof using data on the global 
liquefied natural gas market. First, the impact of inter-organizational trust as a shift parameter on the 
choice of governance mode is investigated. Second, a  empirical test of the positioning-economizing 
perspective is provided. Third, optimal contract duration of long-term LNG supply contracts is 
analyzed accounting for the trade-off between contracting costs and flexibility. Both contract duration 
and contracted volume thereby are considered as endog ous variables.   
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
Chapter 2 provides an introduction to New Institutional Economics and discusses the role of 
transaction cost economics within this field of research. The theory is delineated from other theories of 
the firm. The development of empirical contributions related to transaction cost economics’ 
predictions is summarized and limitations of the existing body of empirical literature are discussed 
before recent developments in transaction cost economics are introduced.  
Chapter 3 is devoted to dynamics in the global LNG market. After a technical introduction to the LNG 
value chain, the historical development of capacities and the role of LNG with respect to a 
globalization of natural gas markets are reviewed. Regional prospects for investments in LNG export 
and import capacities until 2015 are provided. Finally, vertical structures in the industry are discussed. 
Long-term contracts are decreasing in duration and inflexible clauses are relaxed. Short-term and spot
transactions gain in importance. Joint ventures, forward, backward, and horizontal integration seem to 
be promising strategies in this industry. 
Chapter 4 contributes an empirical analysis that exmines the effect of both transaction characteristics 
and the institutional environment on the choice of g vernance in the global LNG industry. Using a 
dataset of 237 corporate-specific value chains, inter-organizational trust is introduced as a shift 
parameter. First, following transaction cost economics, it is hypothesized that specific investments 
under uncertainty provide incentives to integrate vrtically. Second, it is argued that inter-
organizational trust changes the relative costs of vertical integration and non-integration and supports 
less hierarchical governance modes. These economic relationships are tested i) based on a probit 
model to explain the binary choice between vertical ntegration into midstream shipping and non-
integration and ii) based on an ordered probit model to xplain the degree of vertical integration (i.e., 
non-integration versus integration from upstream or d wnstream into midstream shipping versus 
integration along the whole value chain). Estimation results provide broad support for transaction cost
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economics by showing that relationship-specific investments in an uncertain environment drive LNG 
companies to invest in successive stages along the valu  chain. The presence of inter-organizational 
trust increases the likelihood of less hierarchical governance modes. The consideration of a shift 
parameter further enhances the explanatory power of the model supporting the need for empirical 
studies accounting for both transaction cost variables as well as variables capturing dynamics in the 
institutional environment. 
Chapter 5 investigates corporate strategies in the em rging global market for LNG linking alternative 
theories of the firm in order to explain the menu of strategic positions recently observed in this 
dynamic market. In the first step, three alternative arget market positions are defined, each supported 
by an underlying resource profile. In the second step, determinants that move companies towards 
vertical integration are investigated using the datase  of 237 corporate-specific value chains. 
Estimation results of a two-step decision making process confirm the positioning-economizing 
perspective of the firm. The three strategic choices of target market position, resource profile, and 
organizational structure are interdependent. It is shown that national oil and gas companies rely on less
idiosyncratic assets than companies following a flexibility strategy, i.e., investing in a portfolio of 
export and import positions, and that companies following a flexibility strategy rely on less 
idiosyncratic assets than chain optimizers, i.e., companies investing along a single value chain. 
Transaction cost economics predictions are confirmed, too. Idiosyncratic investments in uncertain 
environments have a positive impact on the likelihood f vertical integration. 
Chapter 6 analyses the determinants of contract duration in order to investigate the impact of market 
structure on optimal governance choice. Contract duration thereby is determined based on a trade-off 
between the minimization of transaction costs due to repeated bilateral bargaining and the risk of 
being bound in an inflexible agreement in uncertain environments. Furthermore, this study adds an 
analysis of different dimensions of transaction frequ ncy and their impact on governance choice to the 
theoretical discussion. Propositions are tested using a unique dataset including information on 261 
LNG supply contracts from the beginning of the industry until today. Estimation results of a 
simultaneous equation model accounting for the endogeneity of the contracted volume show that the 
presence of high asset specificity results in longer contracts whereas the need for flexibility in today’s 
LNG market supports shorter agreements. When firms have experience in bilateral trading, contract 
duration decreases. In addition, countries heavily re iant on natural gas imports via LNG are often 
willing to forgo some flexibility in favor of supply security. Contracts dedicated to competitive 
downstream markets on average are shorter than those concluded with customers in non-liberalized 
importing countries. 
Chapter 7 provides conclusions and a critical assessm nt of the analyses carried out. Topics for future 
theoretical and empirical research are identified. 
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2 Recent Developments in Transaction Cost Economics  
2.1 Transaction cost economics in the framework of New Institutional Economics 
2.1.1 Introduction to New Institutional Economics 
New Institutional Economics1 is still a young theory. Having its origins in the s minal article of 
Ronald Coase (1937) on ‘The Nature of the Firm’ (see S ction 2.2 for a more detailed discussion), it 
developed not before the 1970s and 1980s. Major works have been contributed by Ronald Coase, 
Douglass North, and Oliver Williamson amongst others (see e.g., Ménard and Shirley, 2005). NIE is 
an interdisciplinary approach combining research from the fields of economics, law, social and 
political sciences, organization theory, and strategic management; it “is all but an isolated and closed 
paradigm” (Ménard, 2004, p. xv). The literature focuses on institutions and on how institutions interact 
with organizational arrangements.  
Traditional neoclassical economics differs from NIE in various respects. Firms typically are treated as 
production functions transforming inputs into outputs, taking the available technologies as given. 
Market prices contain all relevant information. Indivi uals are assumed to have perfect information 
and to be super-rational (i.e., do not have any problems with memory usage and can formulate and 
solve problems of high complexity). Transactions are realized instantaneously and without any 
transaction costs. Disputes are disregarded because of the presumed efficacy of court adjudication. 
Given technology, input prices and the demand functio , the firm is able to maximize its profits. A 
firm’s size and product range are explained in terms of production costs. Economies of scale imply 
larger firms; economies of scope support multi-product corporations.  
However, “[w]hat economists usually mean by ‘the thory of the firm’ is the theory of production, not 
the theory of the firm as a legal entity” (Klein, 1999, p. 463). Neoclassical economics provides little 
insight into the boundaries of the firm and alternative organizational forms cannot be explained. Cost 
subadditivity implies that a certain output can be produced more efficiently when it is produced within 
one single production plant. Absent any transaction c sts, two independent firms could agree for 
sharing the same facility and jointly produce the effici nt level of output. However, whether the firms 
will integrate depends on the cost of writing and enforcing contracts, i.e., ex-ante and ex-post 
transaction costs, not only on the production technology. 
NIE assumes that individuals suffer from bounded ration lity and that the environment may be 
characterized by uncertainty about the future state of nature. The firm is understood as an institution 
created by economic actors in order to reduce risk and transaction costs. Firms are not regarded as 
black boxes but as possessing an internal structure. NIE went beyond the “conception of the firm-as-
                                                   
1 The term ‘New Institutional Economics’ has been introduced by Williamson (1975, p. 1). Like the ‘old’ 
institutional economics, NIE is interested in social, economic, and political institutions, but social phenomena 
such as corporate culture “[are taken] as explananda, ot the explanans” (Klein, 1999, p. 457). Furthermore, NIE 
does not abandon neoclassical economics. Rather it investigates new questions such as why economic 
institutions emerge in the way they do. 
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production function (which is a technological construc ion) to consider the firm as a governance 
structure (which is an organizational construction) in which internal structure has economic purpose 
and effect” (Williamson, 2000, p. 602) Thus, “organizational variety is not disregarded but located 
centrally on the research agenda [of NIE]” (Williamson, 1986, p. 172). 
Davis and North (1971, pp. 6 f.) define the institutional environment as “the set of fundamental 
political, social, and legal ground rules that establishes the basis for production, exchange and 
distribution.” These rules guide individuals’ behavior and can be both formal, explicit rules (such as 
property rights or laws) and informal, implicit rules (such as norms, customs or social and religious 
conventions). They further define an institutional arrangement as “an arrangement between economic 
units that governs the ways in which these units can cooperate and/or compete”.2 It may be formal or 
informal, temporary or long-lived.  
Williamson (2000) proposes to consider four levels of ocial analysis, corresponding to different time 
perspectives (see Figure 1): The first level represents social embeddedness (i.e., customs, traditions, 
religion, norms, etc.). These institutions tend to change very slowly and are taken as given by most 
institutional economists. Nevertheless, they contribu e to shaping the institutional environment in 
defining rules and supporting the organization of transactions. The second level describes the 
institutional environment containing formal rules. Level three is referred to as the institutional 
arrangements (i.e., governance modes) embedded in the existing institutional environment as well as 
in traditions and norms shaping the behavior of transactors. These institutions may be changed 
periodically in order to reorganize transactions in a production and transaction cost economizing way. 
Finally, the last level focuses on short-term resource allocation and employment (i.e., neoclassical 
economics’ object of investigation) with the firm typically being described as a production function. 
Adjustments concerning prices, supply and demand levels occur continuously. Within this framework, 
first levels impose constraints on the levels immediately following; lower levels in turn give feedback 
to the higher ones. NIE in general is concerned with levels two and three.  
One can summarize that NIE investigates how institutions emerge and operate, how they shape the 
arrangements that support exchange relationships and production processes, as well as how these 
arrangements act in turn to change the institutional e vironment. Klein (1999, pp. 461 ff.) concludes 
that “development is seen as a response to the evolution of institutions that support social and 
commercial relationships. Economic growth thus depends on the degree to which the potential hazards 
of trade (shirking, opportunism and the like) can be controlled by institutions, which reduce 
                                                   
2 Institutional arrangements “must … be designed to accomplish at least one of the following goals: to pr vide a 
structure within which its members can cooperate to obtain some added income that is not available outside that 
structure; or to provide a mechanism that can effect a hange in laws or property rights designed to alter the 
permissible ways that individuals (or groups) can lega ly compete” (Davis and North, 1971, p. 7). 
Ménard (1995) builds on these definitions and further delineates and defines the fundamental concepts of 
‘institutions’ and ‘governance structures’ (i.e., markets and organizations) with the last being embedded in the 
institutional environment.  
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information costs, encourage capital formation and capital mobility, allow risks to be priced and 
shared and otherwise facilitate cooperation. […] Economic development, then, is institutional 
development.” 
Figure 1: Williamson's four levels of social analysi  
 
Source: Own depiction based on Williamson (2000) and Ménard (2004) 
 
2.1.2 Alternative theories of the firm 
Two alternative streams of research are distinguished within the field of NIE. One stream focuses on 
institutional arrangements (‘micro level’), the other deals with the institutional environment in which 
institutions are embedded (‘macro level’). Whereas the former is especially interested in the trade-off 
among governance modes and provides some insights on the internal structure of institutions such as 
firms or contractual agreements, the latter investigates the role of laws and formal rules on economic 
development and growth as well as on transaction costs of exchange relationships. Major contributions 
on the micro level come amongst others from Oliver Williamson, Paul Joskow, Benjamin Klein, Scott 
Masten, and Stéphane Saussier; on the macro level Douglass North is one of the most influential 
authors. The focus of this thesis lies on (empirical) literature on the optimal choice of vertical 
organizational structures. Therefore, the next section provides an overview on alternative theories 
investigating firms’ boundary choices which have developed during the last decades under the 
umbrella of NIE.  
The starting point of a theory explaining vertical integration goes back to Adam Smith, who argued in 
the 18th century that the division of labor is limited by the extent of the market (Smith, 1776). 
According to Stigler’s (1951) life cycle theory of the firm, emerging industries are characterized by a 
small size with the market not being able to supply input, technologies or specialized skills. With the 
expansion of the industry, tasks can be turned overto specialists. Declining industries in contrast, will
again favor vertical integration with the surviving firm re-appropriating functions. However, this 
approach is incomplete as only one cost component (the cost of production) is considered. Competing 
theoretical frameworks within the field of NIE – despite their differing underlying assumptions – are 
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all based on a common starting point: in the absence of any transaction costs, contractual choices, 
organizations, and institutions are of no interest and the way property rights are distributed in an 
economy does not impact the way this economy uses scarce resources (Coase Theorem). In contrast, 
the below introduced approaches explicitly allow for n n-zero transaction costs. 
(1) Transaction cost economics ( ee e.g. Williamson, 1975, 1985, 1993b; Klein et al., 1978) 
hypothesizes that the optimal choice of governance depends on the relative costs of alternative 
institutional arrangements which in turn depend on the characteristics of the transaction at stake. 
Economic actors are assumed to be characterized by bounded rationality and may behave 
opportunistically. In a world in which uncertainty about the future state of nature is present, contracts 
will remain incomplete and do not account for all possible contingencies. This distinguishes 
transaction cost economics from neoclassical economics, where contracts are assumed to be complete, 
probability distributions of all possible future events are known and all relevant future external 
conditions can be considered ex-ante in the contracting stage. 
As long as there is functioning competition among trading partners, incomplete contracts are 
unproblematic. However, ex-post bilateral dependencies, as do result from investments in relationship-
specific assets, will generate ex-post exchange hazards (e.g., maladaptation, opportunistic 
renegotiations). For a discussion of the hold-up problem and optimal alignment of different kinds of 
transactions to alternative governance structures se  Section 2.2. 
(2) The property rights theory developed at a time when transaction cost economics had already been 
confirmed empirically (see e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990). The reason why 
ownership and property rights become important is the incompleteness of contracts. Grossman and 
Hart (1986, p. 691) describe two types of contractul rights: Contractible specific rights and non-
contractible residual rights of control which are not verifiable by any third party. A firm is limited by 
the assets over which is has control.3 The central proposition of the property rights approach argues 
that it is optimal to allow one party to purchase th asset when it is too costly to list all specific rights 
in a contract and that the party which is mainly responsible for the return of the asset should own it i  
order to be endued with the residual control rights. Implications for the real world following Grossman 
and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990), Hart (1995), and Salanié (1997) can be summarized as 
follows: i) highly complementary assets should be under joint ownership whereas independent assets 
should be separately owned; ii) employees doing simple routine jobs will not have control rights since 
their ownership of residual rights would not increas  the firm’s revenue; iii) control over non-human 
assets leads to control over human assets. 
Even though both approaches have a similar point of interest (i.e., the make-or-buy decision), the 
property rights theory differs from transaction cost economics in its underlying assumptions. It 
assumes that economic actors are rational without any cognitive limitations, that the environment is 
                                                   
3 Grossman and Hart (1986) do not distinguish between ownership and control. Employees are treated in the 
same way as outside contractors if the firm provides all tools and other assets used by the contractor. 
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characterized by risk about the future state of nature and that there is symmetric information between 
contracting partners but asymmetric information with third parties. Hence, actions and investments of 
the parties are observable, but not verifiable. Whereas transaction cost economics understands ex-post 
haggling over quasi-rents as the principal source of inefficiency, the property rights theory assumes 
efficient bargaining ex-post but non-contractible specific investments and investment distortions ex-
ante. Furthermore, property rights models typically distinguish between upstream and downstream 
integration whereas transaction cost economics investigates only whether successive stages of a value 
chain should be unified. See Williamson (2000, p. 606) and Saussier and Yvrande-Billon (2007, 
pp. 100 ff.) for further details. 
Whinston (2001) discusses whether empirical literature confirming transaction cost economics does 
deliver any evidence for the property rights theory. Predictions of the two approaches differ 
substantially. To formulate testable hypothesis for the second, numerous information about the trading 
environment, in general not documented in transaction cost analysis, are necessary. Therefore, existing 
empirical studies in general do not provide evidence for both approaches due to the lack of 
information, mainly on the extent of non-contractible investments. 
(3) On the roots of incentive theory a third stream of literature has established, based on the 
assumption of asymmetric information between the contracting parties (see e.g., Laffont and 
Martimort, 2002). Within this approach, the firm itself is not the unit of analysis, but rather the 
collection of contracts between owners and managers, managers and employees, the firm and its 
customers and suppliers, or a regulator and the firm. The firm is understood as “nexus of a set of 
contracting relationships“ (Klein, 1999, p. 466) with the central question being the optimal design of 
ex-ante incentive compatible contracts suited to mitigate agency costs in the face of potential adverse 
selection and moral hazard. The boundary of the firm here is not the focal subject of attention. This is 
criticized by Williamson (1991b, p. 274), who argues that “to regard the corporation only as a nexus of 
contracts misses much of what is truly distinctive about this mode of governance.” 
(4) From an alternative perspective, numerous articles discuss the boundaries of the firm with respect 
to its resources and capabilities. The resource-basd view (see e.g., Barney, 1991) has especially 
contributed to the field of strategic management. Competitive advantage is supposed to stem from the 
possession of unique factors of production and valuable, difficult-to-imitate, difficult-to-transfer 
resources. A firm’s specific resources may include organizational capabilities and routines, managerial 
skills, technological and reputational capital. A value chain of production can be broken down into 
various activities. Some activities may be similar n that they draw on the same firm capabilities; 
others may be complementary in that they are connected within the value chain. Richardson (1972, 
p. 895) argues in an early paper that “[w]here activities are both similar and complementary they could 
be coordinated by direction within an individual business.” Dissimilarity of activities is supposed to 
make integration costly. Asset specificity is primarily regarded as a form of human assets embedded in 
firm-specific routines. Accordingly, the resource-based view hypothesizes that increased asset 
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specificity enhances the governance efficiency of internal organization rather than decreasing the 
efficiency of market exchange.  
(5) Other theoretical approaches have concluded that market imperfections such as the existence of 
market power, barriers to entry, or price discrimination favor vertical integration. See Joskow (2005) 
for a detailed summary.  
2.2 Transaction cost economics: A static concept 
Transaction cost economics is a comparative analysis studying governance structures under the target 
of economizing economic exchanges with respect to the sum of both production and transaction costs. 
Organizational forms are never examined separately but always in relation to alternatives. The 
transaction, defined as “occur[ing] when a good or service is traded across a technologically separable 
interface”, is the basic unit of analysis of transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1993b, p. 16). The 
following paragraphs provide an overview on the theory’s underlying assumptions, the relevance of 
transaction costs in exchange relationships and the optimal alignment of transactions which differ in 
their attributes to governance modes that differ in their costs and competencies. 
2.2.1 The concept of transaction costs: From Coase (1937) to Williamson (1975, 1985) 
 “There was nothing inevitable about my writing The Nature of the Firm. It came about as a series of 
accidents” Ronald Coase stated in 1988, three years before he was awarded the Nobel Prize in 
Economics. In fact, Coase, who chose to study economics only because of little interest in 
mathematics and a lack of knowledge in Latin, made on  of the most important contributions to New 
Institutional Economics.  
Coase (1937) criticizes the simplified view of an economy assumed by most researchers until the first 
half of the 20th century. The economic system was understood to work by itself without any central 
control and supply and demand being coordinated by a price mechanism, i.e., an automatic, totally 
elastic and immediately adaptive process. In traditional price theory there were no costs but production 
and transportation costs. So when Coase asked “his brilliant naive question” (Langlois et al., 2002, 
p. xii) why there are firms, he could not find an aswer in price theory. He was the first economist, 
thinking about costs that accompany exchange relationships on markets arguing that the neoclassical 
picture would be incomplete and not able to explain two basic questions, namely the existence of firms 
and the determinants of firm size.  
The first central statement of his article is that the “main reason why it is profitable to establish a firm 
would seem to be that there is a cost of using the price mechanism” (Coase, 1937, p. 389). These 
include the costs of discovering relevant prices and negotiating and concluding contracts. Hence, firms 
are likely to emerge when contracting becomes too expensive. Coase defines the firm based on the 
concept of authority as a coordinating device. Whereas on a market agents decide on their exchange 
relationships based on relative prices, in a firm the employer decides on the employees’ activities.  
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But what determines the optimal size of the firm with size defined as the number of transactions 
organized internally? Coase (1937, p. 393) asks: “Why, if by organizing one can eliminate certain 
costs and in fact reduce the cost of production, are there any market transactions at all? Why is not all 
production carried by one big firm?” He specifies two reasons. First, additional internal costs arise 
with every transaction organized within a firm; second, the entrepreneur’s capability of making the 
best use of production factors decreases. All innovati ns improving management efficiency tend to 
increase firm size since internal organization and coordination costs are reduced. A firm will tend to 
expand until the cost of organizing an extra transaction within the own hierarchy equals the cost of 
carrying out the same transaction on the market or the cost of organizing it within another firm. 
About 30 years Coase’s work attracted little attention, but with the development of NIE during the 
1970s it became one of the most cited articles. However, Coase (1937) does not discuss the sources of 
transaction costs and contractual difficulties. Williamson (1975, 1985) operationalized transaction cost
economics focusing on the economic actors’ behaviorl characteristics on the one hand and on 
transaction attributes on the other. Ménard (2004, xxi) points out that “[Williamson] opens the door t 
a systematic analysis of alternative modes of governance“ in establishing the relationship between the 
sources of contractual hazards and their impact on the choice of institutional arrangements. His work 
has been widely cited during the last three decades (Foss and Klein, 2009) and has a substantial impact 
on recent theoretical developments based on transaction cost economics as well as on a huge body of 
empirical literature. 
Williamson (1975, pp. 20 ff.) develops a framework f organizational failure in market exchanges 
softening step by step neoclassical economics’ assumptions on behavioral and environmental 
characteristics (see Figure 2): 
Behavioral assumptions: Economic individuals are characterized by bounded rationality; they are 
“intendedly rational, but only limited so” (Simon, 1961, xxiv).4 Bounded rationality involves limited 
cognitive competences such as neurophysiologic limits (impossibility to receive, store, retrieve, and 
process all information without any error) and langua e limits (individuals are not able to articulate 
their knowledge and information clearly to be perfectly understood by others). See Selten (1990) for a 
discussion on the development of the concept of bounded rationality.  
Second, economic actors may behave opportunistically guided by considerations of self-interest and 
making strategic decisions in a way to achieve an indiv dual advantage (e.g., by lying, cheating, or 
calculated distorted disclosure of information). Two types of opportunistic behavior are distinguished: 
i) deviations from joint-surplus maximizing within the terms of an existing agreement and ii) 
enforcement of renegotiations and modification of contractual terms in the case unexpected changes in 
market conditions evolve (hold-up). Woolthuis et al. (2005, p. 814) distinguish between a passive form 
                                                   
4 Williamson (1986, pp. 173 f.) later distinguishes between three levels of rationality: i) strong rationality (i.e., 
postulated in neoclassical economics with firms being reduced to production functions, consumers being 
characterized by utility functions, institutions taken as given), ii) semistrong rationality (i.e., bounded 
rationality), and iii) weak rationality (i.e., organic rationality relevant within evolutionary approaches).  
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of opportunism (lack of dedication in performing to the best of one’s own competences) and an active 
form (self-interest seeking with guile as referred to within transaction cost economics). 
Transaction attributes: There are several exchange hazards that necessitat con ractual safeguards. 
The institutional environment may be characterized by uncertainty about the future state of nature 
including amongst others price and demand levels, tchnological innovations, or legal instabilities. An
increase in uncertainty can originate from two sources: more disturbances occur and/or disturbances 
become more consequential (Williamson, 1991b, p. 291). Within exchange relationships, the most 
relevant form of uncertainty is behavioral uncertainty which arises from the difficulty in predicting 
actions of the counterparty considering the potential for opportunistic behavior.  
The presence of relationship-specific assets transforms an exchange relationship from ex-ante 
competition where the identity of the trading partne s is irrelevant to an ex-post bilateral dependency 
where the identity of the exchange partner is of critical importance. Williamson (1986, pp. 184 ff.) 
calls this ‘fundamental transformation’. The frequency of transactions will have an impact on the 
recovery of investments in relationship-specific asset  (Williamson, 1985, pp. 60 f.). Asset specificity 
thereby refers to “durable investments that are undertaken in support of particular transactions, the 
opportunity cost […] is much lower in best alternative uses or by alternative users should the original 
transaction be prematurely terminated” (Williamson, 1985, p. 55). The excess value of an asset over 
its salvage value is termed ‘quasi-rent’. Six types of pecific assets are distinguished:  
• Site specificity: Immobile assets are placed in close proximity in order to minimize transportation 
or time costs or to benefit from complementarity advantages (e.g., the liquefaction plant has to be 
close to natural gas fields whereas crude oil economically can be transported to refineries in 
downstream countries); 
• Physical asset specificity: Assets involving design characteristics specific to the transaction having 
a lower value in alternative uses (e.g., regasificat on facilities of the first generation were designed 
to receive natural gas from a specific supplier characterized by a certain quality);  
• Dedicated assets: Investments in assets dedicated to a certain trading partner that otherwise would 
not be made; they are not redeployable due to a limited size of the market for these assets (e.g., 
LNG vessels in the early years of the industry were ordered once a long-term sales and purchase 
contract was signed and were dedicated to specific trade routes between an export and an import 
project);  
• Human asset specificity: Human capital evolving dueto learning of individuals and team building 
(e.g., only a small number of engineering firms is capable of constructing LNG terminals); 
• Intangible assets: Intangible capital such as a brand n me (e.g., McDonald’s); and 
• Temporal specificity (added to the discussion by Klein et al., 1978, p. 301): The threat of a delay 
in production or delivery may be an effective bargaining device (e.g., newspaper publishers 
generally own presses whereas book publishers in general do not). 
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In a static market, free of any uncertainty, bounded rationality is irrelevant and an analysis of 
transaction costs uninteresting. All contingencies can be specified ex-ante in a complete contingent 
claims contract.5 Bounded rationality will become relevant under environmental uncertainty and 
complexity which makes periodical contract adaptations necessary. Writing a complete long-term 
contract is too costly or not feasible anymore since it is not possible to specify all contingencies 
ex-ante. However, the presence of incomplete contracts per se would be unproblematic as long as 
economic individuals are benevolent. Since this cannot be presumed for the ‘homo oeconomicus’, the 
hazard of ex-post opportunistic behavior persists. As long as the exchange can be carried out on a 
functioning competitive market, economic agents will have no incentive to deviate from joint-surplus 
maximizing behavior. However, in situations where only a small number of potential trading partners 
are available on the market – which is the case onc specific investments are realized – contracting on 
the market will result in high ex-post transaction costs.  
Figure 2: Organizational failure framework 
 
Source: Own depiction  
 
Transaction costs have been described as the “costs of running the economic system” (Arrow, 1969, 
p. 48) or the “equivalent of friction in physical systems” (Williamson, 1985, p. 19). One distinguishes 
ex-ante costs (e.g., discovering potential trading partners and relevant prices, negotiating and writing 
contracts) from ex-post costs (e.g., costs from maladaptation, renegotiation, monitoring, and breach of 
contract). The focus of transaction cost economics typically is on ex-post transaction costs which 
become especially relevant under long-term contracting and might exceed ex-ante costs by far.  
Summarizing, economic individuals within the framework of transaction cost economics are 
cognitively less competent due to bounded rationality but motivationally more complex due to 
                                                   
5 ‘Complete contingent claims contracts’ can be specified if everything is observable to everyone and if the 
observable information is also verifiable by third parties. One talks about ‘complete contracts’ if there are 
information asymmetries (world of agency theory) and of ‘incomplete contracts’ if neither everything is
observable to all parties nor the observable is fully verifiable. 
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opportunism in the sense of self-interest seeking with guile than are those presumed within 
neoclassical economics. Therefore, it is essential to “[o]rganize transactions so as to economize on 
bounded rationality while simultaneously safeguarding them against the hazards of opportunism” 
(Williamson, 1986, p. 177). Williamson (1971, p. 112) picks up Coase’s (1937) discussion asking: “if 
the costs of operating in competitive markets are zero […] why integrate?” Transaction cost 
economics understands the firm as being more than a simple efficiency instrument in the sense of 
economies of scale and/or scope or technical complementarities. The firm possesses coordinating 
potential. Substituting market exchange by internal organization is efficient in the presence of market 
failures (see also Williamson, 1975, pp. 20-40). Transaction cost economics tries to explain how 
trading partners choose, from a set of feasible institutional arrangements, the governance form that 
protects relationship-specific investments at least costs. The following paragraph discusses this so-
called discriminating alignment. 
2.2.2 Discriminating alignment 
Given that long-term contracts are unavoidably incomplete due to bounded rationality and that 
contracts as mere promise are not self-enforcing due to opportunism, the question is, which 
transactions should be organized under which governance modes. NIE focuses on a comparative 
institutional analysis. Thereby, the difference between rather than the absolute magnitude of 
transaction costs matters. 
Two pole governance structures, market and hierarchy with a continuum of hybrid forms in between, 
are distinguished.6 Anonymous spot markets have an advantage over central planning in situations 
where the price reflects all relevant information. Firms get to specialize in doing what they do best and
innovation is generated by numerous sources. The opposite pole of governance is vertical integration 
in the form of backward integration into the supply of inputs or forward integration into marketing and 
distribution. Internal organization of successive stages of the value chain is the optimal governance 
choice where relationship-specific investments under uncertainty are required. Between the two poles 
hybrid forms of governance (e.g., long-term contracts, joint ventures, or partial ownership 
arrangements) are settled. Since an economically enforceable long-term contract is the primary 
alternative to vertical integration in order to avoid pportunistic behavior, some economists regard 
these two organizational structures with indifferenc . However, Klein et al. (1978, p. 302), as other 
transaction cost economists, criticize this simplified view as having “defined [the] extremely difficult 
question [of optimal governance choice] away by calling a long-term contract a form of vertical 
integration.” 
As already revealed by Hayek (1945, p. 523), “economic problems arise always and only in 
consequence of change.” Williamson (1991b) understand  adaptation to unexpected circumstances as 
the central economic problem. Thereby, he distinguishes between inconsequential disturbances 
                                                   
6 Other authors use alternative terms such as buy, ally, and make (e.g., Gulati and Nickerson, 2008). ‘Internal 
organization’ and ‘firm’ are used as synonyms for ‘hierarchy’ in this thesis. 
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(adjustment costs would exceed the efficiency gain), consequential disturbances to which contractual 
agreements are adaptable (for example via price adapt tion provisions), and highly consequential 
disturbances (providing incentives for ex-post opportunism departing from the original spirit of the 
contract). 
Governance structures differ in their capacity to respond to exogenous disturbances. Whereas Hayek 
(1945) proposes that the price system is a more efficient mechanism for communicating information 
and inducing change as compared to central planning, Barnard (1938) highlights adaptation within the 
organization. Williamson (1991b) picks up both opinions arguing that the two authors refer to 
adaptations of different kinds. There is autonomous adaptation (i.e., the neoclassical economics’ ideal) 
on the one hand and coordinated adaptation (i.e., required within long-term bilateral exchange 
relationships) on the other.    
The central hypotheses of transaction cost economics originate from the discriminating alignment 
hypothesis according to which “transactions that differ n their attributes, are aligned with governance 
structures, which differ in their costs and competenci s, in a discriminating (mainly transaction cost 
economizing) way” (Williamson, 1991b, p. 277). The level of investments in relationship-specific 
assets thereby is the most important dimension.  
Governance costs for market organization (M) or internal organization (H) increase with the level of 
investments in specific assets (s). Since internal organization involves higher bureaucratic costs as 
well as lower internal incentives (changes in an agent’s effort have little or no immediate effect on his
compensation assuming a fixed-wage schedule), the in ercept of a hierarchy’s governance cost curve is 
higher than that of market organization with M(0) < H(0). Whereas the market supports autonomous 
adaptation to unpredictable events, internal organization supports coordinated adaptation which 
becomes relevant in the presence of bilateral dependency (i.e., relationship-specific investments). 
Hence, the slopes of the cost curves are characterized by dM(s)/ds > dH(s)/ds > 0. Hybrid governance 
forms (L) are located between market and hierarchy with respect to incentives, adaptability, and 
bureaucratic costs with M(0) < L(0) < H(0) and dM(s)/ds > dL(s)/ds > dH(s)/ds. The choice of the 
optimal (i.e., transaction cost economizing) governance form implies operating on the envelope and 
using the market for s < s1, hybrid governance modes for s1 < s < s2 and internal organization 
otherwise (see Figure 3).  
A variety of alternative governance modes for similar transactions is most likely to be observed where 
the governance form matters least, i.e., for levels of asset specificity near the threshold values. In 
contrast, where one governance form has large cost advantages over the others, the superior alternative 
will tend to dominate. In the short run, misalignment may occur, though in the long run, a firm’s 
governance choice given transaction attributes converges to equilibrium. 
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Figure 3: Discriminating alignment  
 
Source: Own depiction 
 
Table 1 summarizes the attributes of alternative governance modes with respect to incentive intensity, 
administrative controls and adaptation. The gains from coordinated adaptation for internal 
organization in the presence of bilateral dependency relationships come at a cost. Decreased incentives 
and an increase in agency costs (i.e., inter-organizational opportunism) with an increasing size of the 
firm are accompanied by increased bureaucratic costs. Therefore, “[v]ertical and lateral integration are 
usefully thought of as organization forms of last resort, to be employed when all else fails” 
(Williamson, 1991, p. 279). Internal organization will be the efficient mode of organization only in the 
presence of both substantial relationship-specific investments and environmental uncertainty where the 
hazard of post-contractual opportunistic behavior by the counterparty would otherwise result in ex-
ante under-investment and decreasing overall efficincy. Asset specificity without uncertainty allows 
for the conclusion of complete contingent claim contracts; uncertainty without asset specificity can be 
dealt with in exchanges on competitive markets.  
Table 1: Attributes of alternative governance modes 
Attribute Market Hybrid Hierarchy 
Incentive intensity 
Administrative controls 
Autonomous adaptation 
Coordinated adaptation 
Strong 
Weak 
Strong 
Weak  
Semi-strong 
Semi-strong 
Semi-strong 
Semi-strong 
Weak 
Strong 
Weak 
Strong  
Source: Own depiction based on Williamson (1991b, p. 281) 
 
It has to be pointed out again that the objective of firms is to economize on the sum of both transaction 
and production costs as is illustrated in Figure 4. Assuming a constant output level, the difference in 
governance costs between internal organization and market exchange depending on the level of 
Governance 
costs 
Asset 
specificity s 
M(s) 
H(s) 
L(s) 
1s 2s
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specific investments  is defined as ∆GC(s) = GCH (s) – GCM (s). If economies of scale and scope are 
assumed to be negligible, the decision to integrate successive stages of the value chain will depend 
solely on the difference in governance costs. Internal organization will be the preferred governance 
form when asset specificity is high, i.e., when ex-post bilateral dependency arises and coordinated 
adaptations become necessary.  
However, markets are often able to realize economies of scale and/or scope by aggregating the 
demands of various customers. Hence, production cost differences have to be taken into account. The 
production cost difference between internal and market procurement of a given output is defined as 
∆PC(s) = PCH (s) – PCM (s). This difference will always be positive and decreases with s. For generic 
transactions, the penalty of internal procurement is large due to forgone scale economies and higher 
internal organization costs. With an increasing leve  of investments in specific assets, the potential of 
economies of outside supply in aggregating demands decreases and ∆PC(s) converges to zero.  
The minimization of ∆GC(s) + ∆PC(s) reveals a threshold value of the level of specific investments 
s*. Economies of aggregation favor market procurement over a wider range of asset specificity than 
would be observed if production cost economies were absent. Since the market always has an 
advantage over the firm in production cost respects, vertical integration will never be economically 
reasonable for production cost reasons alone.  
Figure 4: Comparative production and governance cost  
 
Source: Own depiction following Williamson (1985, p. 93) 
 
The investment in specific assets and the additional costs of hierarchical governance forms will be 
easier to recover for transactions of a recurrent ki d (Williamson, 1985, p. 60). Therefore, the 
frequency of transactions is understood as the third critical dimension determining investment 
behavior and governance choice. A firm will be better able to realize economies of scale as its own 
requirements of the respective product or service become larger. For a higher transaction frequency 
$ 
GC∆
GCPC ∆+∆
PC∆
s* 
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specificity s 
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∆PC(s) will fall with ∆GC(s) remaining unchanged. The critical value of s* will move to the left. 
Hence, larger firms are predicted to be more integrat d than smaller firms.  
2.3 Transaction cost economics: An empirical success story? 
“[T]heory without evidence is, in the end, just speculation” (Masten, 2002, p. 428). Transaction cost 
economics often has been referred to as an “empirical success story” (e.g., Williamson, 2002, p. 182). 
Several literature reviews highlight the increasing number of corroborative empirical papers. About 
900 studies, including published articles, working papers and book chapters, test propositions derived 
from transaction cost economics. Most of them seem to be consistent with the theory’s predictions; 
investments in relationship-specific assets are ident fi d as the main driver of more hierarchical 
governance structures. The following section summarizes the historical development of empirical 
contributions related to the optimal governance choice and discusses critically, whether the existing 
body of literature provides conclusive support for transaction cost economics. 
2.3.1 Review on empirical literature  
Empirical studies investigating a firm’s motivation to choose among alternative governance modes 
have a long-standing history. One can distinguish between quantitative analyses (i.e., based on 
econometrics) and qualitative studies (i.e., case studies), cross-sectional and panel data, papers 
investigating the make-or-buy decision and papers interested in the choice of contractual provisions. 
This review cannot present all existing empirical work in the transaction cost economics tradition, but 
rather summarizes the development of alternative classes of empirical contributions during the last 
three decades and introduces some seminal papers. 
The first generation of empirical tests based on a transaction cost framework appeared already during 
the early 1980s. At this time, the authors focused on backward integration in manufacturing sectors 
with most studies using data on US-based companies. Monteverde and Teece (1982a) describe the 
phenomenon of ‘quasi vertical integration’, where a downstream firm owns specialized tools that are 
used in the upstream production stage. Motivations f r integration are flexibility on the one hand (if 
the supplier’s production is interrupted, tools can be moved to another supplier) and avoiding post-
contractual opportunistic behavior on the other. Estimation results from a linear probability model 
using data on 28 input components of a US car company show that the likelihood of integration 
increases with the level of quasi-rents at stake. Masten (1984) analyzes input procurement in the US 
aerospace industry using a dataset of 1,887 components. He shows that the probability of backward 
integration is higher for complex and highly specialized inputs and that the hazards from incomplete 
contracting in complex environments increase in the presence of component design specificity. Further 
contributions include amongst others Klein et al. (1978), Monteverde and Teece (1982b), Walker and 
Weber (1984), and Klein (1988).  
The second generation of studies investigates forward integration into marketing and distribution f 
products from the manufacturing sector. Anderson and Schmittlein (1984), focusing on vertical 
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structures in the US electronic component industry, analyze the corporate choice between employing a 
sales person (corresponding to market exchange) and direct employee sales people (corresponding to 
integration). Estimation results from a logit model show that the presence of asset specificity, the 
difficulty in evaluating performance, and company size have a positive influence on the likelihood of 
integration. John and Weitz (1988) analyze forward integration into the distribution stage of industrial 
good manufacturers. Distribution channels are classified into direct channels (company employees) 
and indirect channels (independent resellers). The authors show that the likelihood of integration 
increases with the level of specific assets and enviro mental uncertainty. Further contributions include 
Klein (1989). 
Whereas this early literature mainly focused on the manufacturing sector, later studies also analyze 
vertical integration in other industries. These are for example studies on the make-or-buy decision in 
the rail freight sector (Palay, 1984), in the Canadian forest industry (Globerman and Schwindt, 1986), 
in the aluminum and tin industries (Hennart, 1988), in naval shipbuilding (Masten et al., 1991), in the
chemical sector (Lieberman, 1991), in bulk shipping markets (Pirrong, 1993), in the pulp and paper 
industry (Ohanian, 1994), in the poultry, egg, and broiler industries (Martinez 1999, 2002), in 
information services (Poppo and Zenger, 1998; 2002; Aubert et al., 2004), in the Spanish cotton 
industry (Rosés, 2005), in sugar production (Sartorius and Kirsten, 2005), or in the global natural gas
market (Ruester and Neumann, 2009). 
Another group of empirical studies is interested in the choice of contractual provisions. This literature 
started with qualitative discussions of contracting structures in the mid-1980s. Mulherin (1986) shows 
that specific investments in the US natural gas industry historically have been protected by the use of 
complex forms of organization. Whereas prior to the 1930s vertical integration from production over 
transportation to distribution has been common, governmental regulation led to long-term contracts 
being the predominant governance form with pipeline companies buying from producers and reselling 
to distributors. Exclusive dealing and take-or-pay rovisions served as a mean to protect quasi-rents at 
stake and prevent opportunistic behavior by the non-i vesting parties. Hubbard and Weiner (1986) 
analyze long-term natural gas supply contracts betwe n producers and pipelines following the phased 
deregulation of wellhead prices in the US and derive a theoretical model on the determination of take-
or-pay provisions. They show that wellhead price ceilings favor long-term contracts which include 
non-price contract provisions which increase the producers’ total compensation.  
A quite substantive body of empirical literature aims to explain the determinants of contract duration. 
Joskow’s (1987) seminal work investigating the relationship between specific investments and 
contract duration in the US coal industry shows that contracting parties make longer commitments 
when site specific, physical asset specific or dedicated investments occur. Saussier (1999) provides an 
empirical study based on the European coal industry discussing the trade-off between both the costs 
and benefits of contracting. Using a dataset containing 70 contracts for the transportation and 
unloading of coal to Electricité de France’s power plants, he confirms that contract duration reflects 
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the desire to minimize transaction costs. Whereas duration increases with the level of appropriable 
quasi-rents at stake in the transaction, it decreases with the level of uncertainty. Further contributons 
include Crocker and Masten (1988), Kerkvliet and Shrogren (2001), Hirschhausen and Neumann 
(2008), and Ruester (2009a).  
Other studies explore the optimal determination of alternative contractual provisions. Masten and 
Crocker (1991) investigate the choice of alternative price adaptation clauses in US natural gas supply 
contracts. Whereas the presence of uncertainty should favor renegotiation, the presence of high quasi-
rents at stake should support redetermination clauses based on pricing formulas which reduce the 
frequency of negotiations and therewith the hazard of opportunistic haggling. Saussier (2000) adds a 
new dimension to the discussion, testing the influece of transaction parameters on the level of 
completeness of French coal supply contracts, accounting for the endogeneity of asset specificity. 
Analyzing a sample of 29 contracts he shows that the completeness of contracts increases with the 
level of physical-, site-, dedicated-, and human asset specificity and decreases with the level of 
uncertainty. 
Recent papers pick up the aspect of relational governance in the form of implicit, unwritten contractual 
agreements. Using data on outsourcing relationships in information services, Poppo and Zenger (2002) 
show empirically that formal contracts and relational governance function as complements and both 
have a positive impact on exchange performance. The complementarity of contractual and relational 
governance is also confirmed by Zheng et al. (2008). Further contributions include Liu et al. (2008), 
Nagaoka et al. (2008), and Desrieux et al. (2009).  
Other literature – which is not discussed in detail here – also focuses on other hybrid governance 
forms such as inter-firm alliances (e.g., Oxley, 1999), franchise contracts (e.g., Bercovitz, 2004), or 
joint ventures (e.g., Richards and Yang, 2007). However, as Gulati and Nickerson (2008, p. 690) point 
out, there are only few empirical studies addressing this expanded set of governance modes. Table 2 
illustrates the historical development of different generations of empirical literature as discussed 
above. Table 3 and 4 in the Appendix provide a summary on selected empirical papers testing 
transaction cost economics’ propositions. Literature reviews are also provided by Klein (2004) and 
Macher and Richman (2006). 
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Table 2: Development of empirical literature 
Period > 1975 > 1980 > 1985 > 1990 > 1995 > 2000 > 2005 
Backward integration in manufacturing sector 
(e.g., Klein et al, 1978; Monteverde and Teece, 1982a and b; Masten 1984) 
 
Forward integration in manufacturing sector 
(e.g., Anderson and Schmittlein, 1984; John and Weitz, 1988) 
M
ak
e-
o
r-
b
u
y 
d
ec
is
io
n
 
  
Back-/forward integration in non-manufacturing industries 
(e.g., Globerman et al., 1986; Lieberman, 1991; Ohanian, 1994) 
  
Qualitative discussion of contracting structure 
(e.g., Mulherin, 1986; Hubbert and Weiner, 1986) 
  
Econometric analyses (EA) explaining contract duration 
(e.g., Joskow, 1987; Crocker and Masten, 1988; Lyons, 1994) 
   
EA explaining other contractual provisions 
(e.g., Masten and Crocker, 1991) 
     
EA explaining 
contractual completeness 
(e.g., Saussier, 2000) C
o
n
tr
ac
tu
al
 p
ro
vi
si
o
n
s 
     
EA investigating 
relational governance 
(e.g., Poppo/Zenger, 2002) 
Source: Own depiction 
 
2.3.2 Limitations of existing empirical literature 
At first glance, transaction cost economics in fact seems to be an empirical success story. However, 
the existing body of empirical literature suffers fom a number of shortcomings: i) a part of the studies 
is not fully consistent with propositions developed within transaction cost theory; ii) in some cases, 
imperfect proxies for key variables are employed; iii) the endogeneity of right-hand side variables 
often is ignored; and iv) most analyses are based on reduced form models and therefore cannot test for 
the theory’s propositions directly. 
2.3.2.1 Inconsistency with hypotheses derived from transaction cost theory 
As is also highlighted in Carter and Hodgson (2006), only few empirical studies provide unambiguous 
support for the hypotheses derived from transaction cost theory. Most of the studies do not test for all 
three transaction attributes, i.e., relationship-specific investments, uncertainty, and frequency of 
transactions. This is also mirrored by the above presented sample of empirical papers; most of those 
focus on asset specificity and uncertainty, ignoring the frequency of transactions within the exchange 
relationship. Furthermore, few studies explore the int raction effects among transaction cost variables 
and other potentially relevant factors (e.g., specific investments in the presence of uncertainty). Also 
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contractual provisions such as contracted volume, contract duration, and price adaptation clauses are 
chosen simultaneously and can be expected to interact with one another.  
Whereas empirical findings generally provide broad support for the positive relationship between 
specific investments and the likelihood of more hierarchical governance forms, this is not always the 
case for other transaction attributes. Anderson and Schmittlein (1984), for example, testing the impact 
of transaction frequency on forward integration do not find any support for the predicted positive 
impact. Macher and Richman (2008, p. 7) justifiably claim that a “greater theoretical and empirical 
treatment of frequency is […] required.”  
In addition, numerous empirical studies investigating the effect of environmental uncertainty on 
governance choice present non-significant and even ambiguous results (e.g., Crocker and Masten, 
1988; Heide and John, 1990; Masten and Crocker, 1991). Klein et al. (1990, p. 206) argue that their 
study “raises more questions than it answers” finding a positive impact of uncertainty in the form of 
volatility in environmental conditions and a negative mpact of uncertainty in the form of diversity in 
uncertainty sources on vertical integration. Klein (1989) argues that the effect of uncertainty depends 
on its dimension. He shows that whereas unpredictability has a negative impact on vertical control, 
complexity has a positive impact. Therefore, future empirical studies should split external uncertainty 
into its components, investigate the opposing effects and determine which dimensions of uncertainty 
are relevant for the respective transaction.  
2.3.2.2 Measurement difficulties 
Of the transaction attributes that have been examined empirically, the level of relationship-specific 
investments is argued to be the most important determinant of governance choice (see e.g., Klein, 
1999; Macher and Richman, 2008). However, this variable at the same time is argued to be the most 
difficult to measure. Proxy variables in general are constructed using secondary data sources and, 
therefore, are often only very rough approximations f the respective theoretical construct. Typical 
proxies include the level of investment costs (physical asset specificity, e.g., Lieberman 1991), 
worker-specific knowledge (human asset specificity, e.g., Monteverde and Teece, 1982b), the 
complexity of components (physical asset specificity, e.g., Masten, 1984), locational proximity of 
exchange partners (site specificity, e.g., Joskow 1987), quantities dedicated to the trading partner 
(dedicated asset specificity, e.g., Saussier, 1999), the percentage of input capacity satisfied by the 
counterpart (dedicated asset specificity, e.g., Kerkvliet and Shrogren, 2001), or a ranking of the 
importance of having an input on schedule (temporal specificity, e.g., Masten et al., 1991). Often, 
these right-hand-side variables are constructed based on ordinal – and even binary – rankings which 
limit the comparability of the variables across studies. 
Environmental uncertainty is generally referred to unanticipated changes in circumstances surrounding 
an exchange. Among the proxy variables employed are the volatility of prices indicating price 
uncertainty (e.g., Masten and Crocker, 1991), time dummies indicating more or less uncertain periods 
(e.g., Saussier, 1999), rankings of uncertainty concerning future demand (e.g., Athias and Saussier, 
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2007), rankings of general environmental uncertainty (e.g., John and Weitz, 1988), rankings of 
technological requirements’ unpredictability (e.g., Heide and John, 1990), or rankings evaluating the 
exchange partner’s performance indicating behavioral uncertainty (e.g., Anderson and Schmittlein, 
1984). As discussed above, empirical evidence for the impact of different dimensions of uncertainty 
on optimal governance choice is mixed. 
Furthermore, a number of studies obtain data from the contracting parties themselves using surveys 
and interviews with key informants.7 On the one hand, this has the advantage that the researchers can 
specify survey questions in a way measuring the variables of interest for their analyses which 
otherwise generally are not publicly available (e.g., specificity of an investment, exchange 
performance, reliability of the exchange partner, etc.). On the other hand, however, this has the 
disadvantage that the received information may be based on the respondents’ subjective beliefs rather 
than on objective valuations. In addition, the quality of survey data may suffer from the respondents’ 
difficulties in understanding the question: Masten (1996, pp. 48 f.), for example, argues that the 
difference between asset specificity (i.e., non-redeployability) and specialized assets (e.g., equipment 
that only can produce a single product) often is not clear and underline this presumption reporting very 
low correlations between two respondents’ evaluations f the level of asset specificity of input 
component in naval shipbuilding.  
2.3.2.3 Endogeneity of right-hand-side variables 
Variables affecting governance choice and contractual design often are themselves endogenous 
variables. This applies amongst others for the level of specific investments, the contracted volume in 
long-term supply agreements, or contractual completeness. These variables are chosen simultaneously 
with and dependent on the governance form. However, “[t]he binding constraint here is not technique 
but data availability” (Masten and Saussier, 2000, p. 232). Instrumental variables are difficult to 
identify and researchers often lack access to written contracts so that they have no information on 
contractual provisions such as price adaptation or renegotiation clauses. 
Therefore, endogeneity is a serious problem in econometric studies testing theories of the firm.8 Even 
though some authors account for this issue (e.g., Saussier 1999, 2000), there is a huge body of 
empirical literature ignoring the endogeneity of right-hand-side variables. Hamilton and Nickerson 
(2003, p. 53) found that “of the 421 empirical papers published in the Strategic Management Journal 
                                                   
7 Among empirical studies using survey data are Anderson and Schmittlein (1984), Walker and Weber (1984), 
John and Weitz (1988), Klein (1989), Masten et al. (1991), Lyons (1994, 1995), Zaheer and Venkatraman 
(1995), Zaheer et al. (1998), Saussier (1999), Poppo and Zenger (2002), Gulati and Nickerson (2008), and Gulati 
and Sytch (2008). 
8 Endogeneity of a right-hand-side variable occurs when the respective regressor is not orthogonal to the error 
term, i.e., Cov(x, u) ≠ 0. Simple one-stage estimation procedures such as ordinary least squares will lead to 
biased estimates; two-stage instrumental variables estimation is required. For further details on econometric 
procedures see the empirical applications in Chapters 5 and 6.  
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(out of 601) between January, 1990, and December, 2001, […] only 27 papers […] explicitly 
econometrically correct for potential endogeneity concerns.”  
2.3.2.4 Tests based on reduced form models 
Since an efficient outcome would be achieved under any governance form in the absence of any 
transaction costs, an explanation of the existence of alternative institutional arrangements must turn on 
a comparison of the costs of governing the transaction under alternative modes of organization. One 
can formalize Coase’s (1937) discussion as  
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where G* represents the chosen governance form; GA and GB indicate alternative modes of 
organization (such as spot market versus internal organization) and CA and CB are the costs of 
governing the transaction under the corresponding organizational alternatives. However, it is very 
difficult or even impossible to measure (ex-post) transaction costs. Furthermore, transaction costs only 
can be observed for actually chosen governance forms but not for the alternative. Williamson’s (1975, 
1985) major contribution to the theoretical discussion was the identification of transaction attributes 
that influence the transaction costs of alternative organizational arrangements, which can be 
formalized as CA = f(X, eA) and CB = f(X, eB) with 
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assuming linear relationships. X represents a vector of observable transaction attributes, α and β are 
vectors of parameters, and eA and eB capture unobserved factors such as omitted variables, decision 
maker misperceptions about the true values of transaction costs, and measurement errors. Even though 
transaction costs themselves are not observable, testabl  propositions can be derived by analyzing how
transaction attributes affect the relative costs of institutional alternatives. The probability of observing 
governance mode GA equals 
  
( ) ( ) ( )( )XeeCCGG BABAA αβ −<−=<== PrPr*Pr     (2-3) 
 
The impact of exogenous variables X on optimal governance choice then depends on the sign of 
(β − α). According to Williamson’s transaction cost economics, the likelihood of more hierarchical 
governance modes will increase with the quasi-rents at take (i.e., the level of relationship-specific 
 26 
investments), with the level of uncertainty and complexity of the transaction, and with transaction 
frequency.  
First generation empirical tests predict exactly this differential effect by applying discrete choice 
models such as probit or logit specifications with the chosen governance form (typically make versus 
buy) defined as a binary dependent variable (e.g., Monteverde and Teece, 1982b; Masten, 1984; 
Lieberman, 1991) and transaction attributes as wellas a number of control variables as explanatory 
variables. Later studies also extend these models to multinomial settings (e.g., Masten and Crocker, 
1991) or parameterize the governance form as a continuous variable, such as the degree of vertical 
integration (e.g., Ohanian, 1994; Rosés, 2005). However, estimation results of such reduced form 
models cannot say anything about the respective signs of the single coefficients but calculate 
coefficients in the form of (β − α)/σ with σ being the standard deviation of the difference of the error 
terms eA and eB. This variance negatively correlates with the quality of the decision maker’s 
perceptions. The less precise the manager’s evaluation of the performance of alternative governance 
modes, the higher will be σ and the lower will be the estimated effect of an exogenous attribute on the 
probability of choosing a particular governance mode.  
The estimation of differential effects implies that a significant number of studies can be reinterpreted 
in terms of other theories of the firm. However, alternative approaches not always predict 
complementary but in some cases also rival proposition  on the impact of exogenous factors on 
governance choice. This shall be illustrated comparing theoretical discussions coming from transaction 
cost economics with those deduced from the resource-bas d view of the firm. Whereas both 
approaches predict increasing transaction costs on the market under increasing asset specificity, 
transaction cost economics hypothesizes that transaction costs within the firm increase, too, even 
though to a lower extend – whereas the resource-basd view argues that transaction costs of internal 
organization decrease with specific human assets (se Figure 5).  
Figure 5: Rival propositions on the impact of asset specificity on transaction costs 
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According to the resource-based view, increased human asset specificity may generate shared 
language, knowledge, and routines that enhance the fficiency of coordination (see Poppo and Zenger, 
1998, pp. 853 f.). Alternatively, skilled workers may require less monitoring (Masten et al. 2001, 
p. 19). Hence, we should test for (β − α) > 0 with (β > α > 0) to test for transaction cost economics and 
for (β − α) > 0 with (β > 0) and (α < 0) to test for the resource-based view. Estimating only the 
differential effect does not allow for differentiating between these rival hypotheses.  
Similar reduced form tests are conducted in order to investigate the optimal duration of long-term 
agreements. Starting with the discrete choice problem developed above, exchange partners will choose 
to contract if the expected gains from doing so exce d the expected gains from organizing the 
transaction in another way: G* = GC if VC > V0 with VC and V0 measuring the net gains from 
contracting and not contracting respectively. The choi e of optimal contract duration can be 
understood as a series of discrete choices in which t e exchange partners decide whether or not to 
contract for an additional period. This can be formalized as 
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with τ indicating contract duration, T indicating the potential duration of the exchange relationship, 
VC(τ) representing the cumulative value of exchange under the contract, and V0(T – τ)  being the value 
of trade in periods not covered by the contract. The first order condition yields optimal contract 
duration τ*  with VC′(τ* ) = V0′(τ* ). Since the costs (i.e., the hazard of being bound in an agreement not 
reflecting market realities) and benefits (i.e., avoiding repeated negotiations) of contracting for an 
additional period are not observable, the value of exchange under contracting and respectively not 
contracting are related to observable transaction attributes X with VC′ = f(τ, X, eC) and V0′ = f(τ, X, e0). 
Assuming linear relationships: 
 
 
0
210
0
210
'
'
eXV
eXV CC
+++=
+++=
βτββ
αταα
        (2-5) 
 
with the error terms capturing unobserved factors. F om Equation (2-5) one can derive the optimal 
contract duration being determined by 
 
vX ++= 10* γγτ          (2-6) 
with ( ) ( )11000 / βααβγ −−= , ( ) ( )11221 / βααβγ −−= , and ( ) ( )110 / βα −−= Ceev   
 
Existing empirical literature generally predicts these differential effects instead of testing for the
structural form propositions derived from theory. 
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2.4 Recent trends in transaction cost economics 
Even though “there is considerable support for many of the central tenets of [transaction cost 
economics]” (Macher and Richman, 2008, p. i), researchers have continued to develop and improve 
the theory. The following paragraphs introduce recent trends in the theoretical discussion as well as in 
empirical testing.  
2.4.1 From a static to a dynamic concept 
Transaction cost economics in its basic form is a static concept taking the institutional environment as 
given. This has been a major point of criticism in the New Institutional Economics literature. In 1991, 
Oliver Williamson therefore introduced the so called shift parameter framework, an extension of the 
transaction cost economics model investigating how the optimal choice of governance changes in 
response to dynamics in the institutional environmet. Changes in exogenous parameters will shift the 
relative costs of alternative governance structures and therefore, will have an impact on the optimal 
alignment of transactions to institutional arrangements. Shift parameters shall be used to indicate 
institutional differences between alternative market s ttings (such as developed versus developing 
countries) and will influence the predictions about transaction costs and governance choice in each 
environment. Hence, the influences of both transaction characteristics and the institutional 
environment on governance choice are analyzed (Williamson, 1991b).  
Empirical work testing Williamson’s shift parameter framework is rather scarce. Oxley (1999) 
analyzes the impact of intellectual property protection on the structure of inter-firm technology 
transfer alliances linking US and non-US firms. Henisz and Williamson (1999) investigate the concept 
of shift parameters for national and multinational firms focusing on the impact of weak (respectively 
strong) property rights and on the stability of contract law on governance choice (e.g., partnership 
between the foreign and a host-country firm). Gulati and Nickerson (2008) discuss the impact of inter-
organizational trust on governance choice and the performance of exchange relationships in the US 
auto industry. For a formalization of the shift parameter framework and an application to the global 
liquefied natural gas market see Chapter 4. 
2.4.2 Linking alternative theories of the firm 
As early as in the mid-1980s, Williamson (1986, p. 200) argued that “[t]ransaction cost economics is 
[…] in need of refinement. […] it needs to be joined with other approaches to the study of economic 
process. I am confident that developments of both kinds will be forthcoming and that the evolving 
theory of economic organization will be deepened as a consequence.” In recent years, several authors 
have started to develop theoretical approaches combining alternative theories of the firm. The general 
consensus is that “managers are well advised to adopt a multidisciplinary approach to strategy to 
ensure their firms’ survival” (Silverman et al., 1997, p. 31). 
To link transaction cost economics with the field of strategic management has first been proposed by 
Day and Klein (1987) who discuss the determinants of inter-firm cooperations along value chains from 
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both a market failure and a strategic management appro ch. Rumelt et al. (1991, p. 14) highlight 
“[transaction cost economics’] affinity with strategic management.” Both approaches are interested in 
organizational structures and institutional details such as particular contract provisions. 
The so called positioning-economizing perspective fnally has been introduced by Nickerson (1997). 
He develops an extension of the basic transaction cost model transforming Williamson’s theory from 
an ‘economizing theory of organization’ that focuses on the discriminative alignment of transactions 
to institutional arrangements into an ‘economizing theory of strategy’. Nickerson argues that decision 
regarding market position, resource investments, and governance mode are interdependent and are 
determined simultaneously. A target market position is supported by a resource profile that in turn 
determines the organizational choice of a firm. Ghosh and John (1999) develop a similar model 
starting with traditional transaction cost economics l nking transaction attributes to governance modes 
and then add positioning (i.e., the target market position) as well as resources (i.e., scarce and 
imperfectly mobile skills, assets, or capabilities). According to this approach, two firms in the same 
market may choose varying governance forms in order to align these to the respective external and 
internal conditions depending on their strategy.   
Empirical literature testing hypotheses derived from the positioning-economizing perspective is very 
rare. The first application has been provided by Nickerson et al. (2001) analyzing the international 
courier and small packages service in Japan. For a formalization of the positioning-economizing 
perspective and an application to the global liquefied natural gas market see Chapter 5. 
2.4.3 Structural form tests: The two-stage Heckman model 
The majority of empirical tests is based on reduced-form models where the probability of observing a 
certain governance form depends on transaction attributes (i.e., asset specificity, uncertainty, 
transaction frequency). Such studies, however, “establi h correlations, not causal relations” (Klein, 
2004, p. 25); they provide no basis to test for structural relations derived from alternative theories of 
the firm and leave open the question what the costs f misalignment are. Since in some cases rival 
explanations for certain correlations between exogen us variables and the governance form would be 
viable (e.g., transaction cost economics versus resou ce-based view), there is an obvious need for tests
that can discriminate between alternative interpretations. In order to conduct stronger tests of 
transaction cost propositions, measures of transaction costs or other performance indicators are 
needed.  
There is an extensive literature finding mixed results for the relationship between measures of firm 
performance and governance choice. However, these studie  simply regress a performance measure π 
on an indicator of the governance form G and a vector of exogenous variables X with πi = αGi + βXi +ei  
and interpret the estimated parameter α as the contribution of governance choice to performance 
(Masten, 2002). But they fail to account for the fact that managers make strategic decisions, such as 
the organizational structure, not randomly but rather decide based on the expectations on how their 
choices affect future performance and self-select into the strategy where they expect a competitive 
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advantage. Therefore, this literature ends up answering the question: ‘What is the difference in the 
performance of firms that adopt a certain governance form and of those adopting an alternative 
institutional arrangement?’ In contrast, from a trans ction cost perspective, the crucial question that 
should be addressed is: ‘What would have been the performance level if the transactor had chosen th  
alternative governance form?’ 
The Heckman model is a two-stage estimation in which results from a first regression explaining the 
selection decision (e.g., governance choice) are used to control for selection bias in the structural form 
performance equations. Suppose a simple model with a set of strategies (e.g., make versus buy) 
G = (G0, G1) and the corresponding performance outcomes π = (π0, π1). Transaction cost economics is 
interested in the difference between the performance under the chosen governance form and the 
performance under the alternative, namely what Hamilton and Nickerson (2003, p. 60) call the 
‘strategy effect’ 01 ii ππ − . The question is, what would have been the performance outcome under the 
alternative, not chosen, governance form, E(π0│S1) and  E(π1│S0), respectively.  
Governance choice is modeled as a continuous latent variable G* and depends on the expected 
performance difference 01 ii ππ − , on exogenous variables Z affecting governance choice but not the 
performance outcome, and on some unobserved factors v: 
   
  ( ) iiiii vZG ++−= δππγ 01*    with 1=iG  if 0* >iG  and zero otherwise. (2-7) 
 
The parameter γ measures the extent to which the impact of strategy on performance itself affects 
strategy choice. Since we only observe the performance outcome under the chosen alternative, we 
have to substitute the performance levels using 111 iii eX += βπ  and 
000
iii eX += βπ  and get the 
reduced form model 
 
  iiii wZXG ++= δβ
*    with ( ) iiii veew +−= 01γ  and ( )01 ββγβ −= . (2-8) 
 
Heckman (1979) showed that under the assumptions that e1, e0 and v are jointly normally distributed 
and that unobservables for 1iπ  are uncorrelated with unobservables for 
0
iπ  that 
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with φ  being the normal density function, Φ being the cumulative normal distribution, λ being referred 
to as the inverse Mills ratios, and the parameter values β and δ estimated from Equation (2-8). The 
sample-selection corrected performance equations then can be estimated using ordinary least squares 
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(OLS), including the inverse Mills ratios as an additional regressor. The inclusion of the inverse Mills 
ratios leads to expected values of the error terms equaling zero by construction; OLS estimation will 
deliver unbiased estimates for the parameters of 
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As discussed in Hamilton and Nickerson (2003, pp. 64 ff.), the parameter estimates of the inverse 
Mills ratios in fact have an interesting interpretation. The expected performance outcome for firms 
having adopted G1 is given by ( ) 11111 iuii XGE λσβπ −= . Since the inverse Mills ratio always has a 
positive value, 01 <uσ  implies that ( ) ii XGE 111 βπ >  and that a positive selection into the strategy 
occurs; i.e., firms having chosen G1 actually have performance outcomes above average und r this 
strategy selection. Similarly, 00 >uσ  implies that ( ) ii XGE 000 βπ >  and indicates a positive selection 
of firms into G0. Summarizing, if we observe both 01 <uσ  and 0
0 >uσ , we have a situation of 
competitive advantage. Each firm has chosen the strategy where it maximizes its expected 
performance. When 001 == uu σσ  strategy choice is exogenous.  
The estimated parameters from Equation (2-10) furthermore can be used to construct the strategy 
effects and calculate the gain in performance realiz d by having chosen a certain governance form (G1 
for the first equation or G0 for the second equation) instead of the alternative (G0 or G1, respectively): 
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For an extension of the two-stage Heckman model to situations in which numerous alternative 
strategies (e.g., make versus long-term contract versus buy) are possible, see Hamilton and Nickerson 
(2003, pp. 68 ff.). 
There is only a small number of studies that test transaction cost economics’ predictions based on 
structural form equations and that therefore can explicate the costs associated with failing to align 
transactions and governance forms in a transaction ost economizing way and test for hypotheses 
derived from rival theories of the firm, but “[w]e would like to know how much we lose by going from 
the best to the next best” (Joskow, 1991, p. 81).  
Masten et al. (1991) investigate organizational choice in the US naval shipbuilding industry. Using 
survey data, they are able to construct a measure of the governance costs of internal organization (i.e., 
the number of hours devoted by the management to planning, directing, and supervising a particular 
component or process times the average hourly wage r te). The authors provide dollar estimates of 
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transaction costs based on a two-stage Heckman model an  show that organizational misalignment 
would lead to substantial cost increases of 175% if the internally made items in the sample would have 
been subcontracted and of 72% if subcontracted items would have been produced within the respective 
firm. This implicates that changes in legal rules that favor one governance form can have significant 
efficiency implications. For the first-stage estimation Masten et al. confirm transaction cost theory’s 
predictions showing that internal organization is more likely the higher temporal and human asset 
specificity are. They find a non-monotonic effect of complexity on the probability of vertical 
integration; the deficiencies of contracting seem to exceed the administrative costs of internal 
organization only for very complex components. Labor intensity has a positive and engineering 
intensity a negative effect on the integration decision. For the second-stage estimation, they 
furthermore show that contrary to transaction cost economics’ predictions, an increase in human asset 
specificity will decrease the costs of internal organization suggesting thatit is less costly to manage 
employees with more specific skills. 
Developing a model of comparative institutional performance, Poppo and Zenger (1998) examine the 
make-or-buy decision in information services and test alternative theories of the firm (e.g., transaction 
cost theory, resource-based view, agency theory). Using survey data, they measure overall exchange 
performance (considering production and transaction c sts) via proxy variables that rank the 
satisfaction with overall costs, the quality of the output, and the responsiveness to problems or 
inquiries. The first-stage estimation results show that the presence of firm-specific assets encourages 
internal procurement whereas outsourcing of a servic  is more likely if extensive technological skills 
are required. The second-stage equations indicate th  asset specificity has a negative effect on firm
performance under outsourcing but no significant effect on performance of internal organization. 
Measurement difficulty has a negative impact on the ov rall costs. Furthermore, uncertainty seems to 
have no effect on boundary choice in the information services industry. Summarizing, this paper 
provides broad support for transaction cost economics and refutes rival hypotheses concerning the 
impact of asset specificity on the performance under int gration derived from the resource-based view 
of the firm. 
Leiblein et al. (2002) analyze firms’ decision to outsource production in the global semiconductor 
industry and quantify the impact of governance choie on technological performance (measured as a 
function of transistor density). In the first step, they show that firms tend to internalize production 
when ex-ante small number bargaining with potential suppliers is severe. Furthermore, confirming 
transaction cost economics, they find that outsourcing is less likely when firms have to invest in 
specific assets under high demand uncertainty. Estimation results of the second stage support the 
assumption that firms self-select into the strategy where they expect a higher performance. Deviation 
from the optimal governance mode with respect to the attributes of the transaction will have a negative 
impact on performance. Average expected performance would decrease by about 45% if firms that 
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internalized production would rely on outsourcing; expected performance for observations showing 
outsourcing would decrease by about 30% if those would be integrated.  
Sampson (2004) examines the costs of misaligned governance in the context of R&D alliances in the 
telecommunications equipment industry. Thereby, she distinguishes between excessive contracting 
hazards in an alliance not safeguarding ex-post opportunism and excessive bureaucracy in an alliance 
providing too much hierarchical structures. She shows that firms choose a more hierarchical 
governance mode when alliance activities are more complex (specification and monitoring are 
expected to be difficult) and when only weak external protections for intellectual property are 
available. Furthermore, she finds support for transaction cost economics’ structural form hypotheses. 
If the alliance form is selected according to the tory’s propositions, firm performance (measured via 
firm patents for a specified period after the alliance) improves substantially. Misalignment will 
decrease performance by more than 60%. Interestingly, misalignment costs occur inhomogenously; 
governance misalignments imposing excessive bureaucacy reduce performance more than 
misalignments imposing excessive contracting hazards.  
Ruester and Zschille (2009) investigate the impact of governance structure on firm performance using 
a database of German water supply companies. Based on a first OLS model, they find that private 
sector participation as opposed to pure public servic  provision is accompanied with higher retail 
prices. Controlling for scale economies as well as technical and structural characteristics, a 
representative household on average pays 18.40 € per year more if water is supplied under private 
sector participation. Estimation results of a two-stage Heckman model indicate, however, that 
governance choice seems to be an exogenous variable from the supplier’s perspective. In fact, 
outsourcing decisions are taken by local public authorities and need not always be driven by 
economical but also by political considerations.  
2.4.4 Relational contracting 
During the past decade, researchers came up with an increasing interest in relational institutional 
arrangements since traditional transaction cost economics may overstate the desirability of complex 
long-term contracts and vertical integration in exchange settings where a substantial hold-up potential 
is present. Close relationships between exchange partners allow to enact relational contracts and to 
obtain first best outcomes that would not be achievable through explicit contracts alone.  
Relational (or implicit) contracts are informal agreements between two parties – within the firm 
(between employer and employee) or between firms (vertically or horizontally) – which are not 
enforceable by any third party such as a court. They circumvent the limitations of formal contracting 
in helping to respond to unforeseen contingencies or inducing a supplier to provide informally agreed 
optimal product or service quality when transaction attributes are not verifiable ex-post. Exchange 
partners may choose to rely on a less complete contract in order to avoid contractual rigidities, leaving 
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out certain elements of intended performance unspecified and enforcing these terms instead by a 
private enforcement mechanism. 9 
Since relational contracts are not verifiable ex-post, they have to be self-enforcing; the value of the 
future relationship must be sufficiently large that neither party wishes to renege. Mechanisms through 
which relational governance attenuates exchange hazards can be both economic (monetary cost-
benefit calculus) and sociological (based on social norms and developed social ties). Exchange 
partners compare the short-term gain with the long-term disadvantages of breaching the contract, 
including the future loss due to the termination of the relationship plus the potential damage in 
reputation. The self-enforcing range measures the ext nt to which market conditions can change 
without providing one of the parties an incentive to hold-up the other, but where the parties will 
perform in a way consistent with the mutually understood contractual intent (Klein, 1996). Relational 
contracting increasingly is becoming the subject of study in theoretical and applied literature. The 
following paragraphs introduce a number of selected exemplary contributions.  
Focusing on a setting where actions are unobservable (moral hazard) and outcomes are observable but 
not verifiable (non-contractibility), Baker et al. (2002) develop repeated-game models investigating 
why and how relational contracts within firms differ from those between firms. Amongst others, they 
formally show that vertical integration is an efficient response to widely varying supply prices since 
integration reduces the incentives to renegotiate contract terms in such settings.  
Poppo and Zenger (2002) focus on relational governance in the form of relational norms such as trust 
between the exchange partners and point out that contractual enforcement within relational contracts 
occurs through social processes that promote norms f flexibility (facilitating adaptation to unforeseen 
events), solidarity (facilitating problem solving), and information sharing (facilitating both problem 
solving and adaptation). Using survey data on outsourcing relationships in information services, they 
find that formal contracts and relational governance function as complements. Well-specified contracts 
may support more cooperative exchange relationships at the same time that relational governance may 
help to overcome the limitations of incomplete contracts in the sense that there exists a bilateral 
commitment to ‘keep-on-with-it’ also for situations where market conditions change unexpectedly. 
Second, the authors show that both relational governance and contractual complexity deliver higher 
levels of satisfaction with exchange performance. The complementarity of contractual and relational 
                                                   
9 An illustrative example of a rigid contract resulting in unexpected ex-post hold-up is the Fisher Body / General 
Motors case study often cited in transaction cost literature: In 1919, General Motors signed a contract with its 
supplier Fisher Body over the delivery of closed metal automobile bodies. Fisher Body had to make a 
relationship-specific investment in stamping machines which resulted in a significant hazard that General Motors 
could hold-up Fisher Body, once the investment was realized. Therefore, the exchange partners concluded a 
long-term contract including a ten-year exclusive dealing clause and setting the price equal to Fisher Body’s 
variable costs plus 17.6%. However, the demand for automobiles increased enormously and the altered 
environmental conditions permitted the supplier to hold-up its customer. Fisher Body took advantage of the 
contract and rejected to invest in cost-decreasing technologies or to locate its production facilities closer to 
General Motors’ assembly plant. General Motors could not switch to an alternative supplier because the 
company had agreed to purchase bodies exclusively from Fisher Body. As this case illustrates, once an 
agreement is formalized in a written contract, it cannot cheaply be breached if unanticipated changes occur in the 
market.  
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governance is also confirmed by Zheng et al. (2008) discussing two case studies of long-term 
arrangements in the form of public-private partnership .  
Liu et al. (2008) study the role of contractual and relational mechanisms in manufacturer-distributor 
relationships in the Chinese household appliance industry. Estimation results of a multivariate 
regression show that written contracts and relationl governance in the form of mutual norms and trust 
are complements in that opportunism is restrained more effectively and exchange performance is 
improved when both mechanisms operate simultaneously. However, they do not account for the 
impact of relational norms on the degree of contractual complexity but only regard whether any 
contract is used to govern the relationship. Chapter 4 of this thesis adds to this discussion an empirical 
study investigating the impact of inter-organizational trust on the choice of more or less hierarchical 
governance modes. 
Nagaoka et al. (2008) assess the determinants of governance choice extending the traditional decision 
between make and buy introducing as a third choice the procurement from an affiliated supplier. This 
typically Japanese type of strategic alliance, also called keiretsu, is a form of relational contracting. 
Using survey data on Japanese car manufacturers and their component supply, the authors find that an 
increasing level of design specificity of a component makes keiretsu sourcing preferred to market 
procurement, but does not significantly affect the probability of vertical integration over keiretsu. This 
result suggests that relational contracting can effectively mitigate the hold-up risk associated with 
specific investments.  
Gil and Marion (2009) examine the impact of relationships between contractors and subcontractors in 
the Californian highway construction market on bidding, auction participation, and subcontractor 
choice. Amongst others, they show that a bigger stock f past relationships between the same 
exchange partners results in lower bids (i.e., indicating lower coordination costs) and that a higher 
number of potential future interactions results in lower bids, too (i.e., indicating a higher value of 
continuing the exchange relationship). Furthermore, past relationships seem to have only a negligible 
impact in the absence of any self-enforcement mechanism of future business. 
Desrieux et al. (2009) seek to explain why local public authorities tend to bundle the provision of 
alternative services to private operators instead of contracting every service separately. In a first step, 
the authors develop a model based on the incomplete contracts literature. A public authority decides to 
contract out the management of two services whose uncontractible investments (i.e., innovative 
efforts) have different impacts on social benefit (for one service, a cost reducing innovation will have 
an adverse effect on service quality). The key question is whether the choice to bundle the two 
services to one private operator has a consequence o  relational mechanisms (i.e., non-verifiable 
informal dealings in the form of promises about supplementary money transfer). The model shows that 
in a static framework, the presence of relational governance as well as the decision to bundle services 
are irrelevant. However, in a repeated game framework, bundling can force the private operator to 
respect informal dealings; immediate gains from breaching the contract are traded-off against future 
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costs. The model is tested using data on the French water sector. Consistent with the predictions, the 
authors find that if the provision of water and waste water services is under the responsibility of the 
same private operator, water prices are lower (having controlled for possible scale and scope 
economies). Based on their theoretical model, they argue that bundling should help sustaining 
relational contracts and provides incentives for the contracting parties to improve efficiency.  
2.5 Summary and conclusions 
Under the assumption that economic individuals are characterized by bounded rationality and might 
behave opportunistically, once relationship-specific investments have been realized, transaction cost 
economics aims to align transactions that differ in their attributes to governance modes that differ in 
their costs and competencies in an optimal way. Developed during the 1970s and 1980s, transaction 
cost economics motivated a huge body of empirical lterature. The studies typically seem to confirm 
the theory’s predictions; investments in relationship-specific assets are identified as the main driver of 
more hierarchical organizational forms. However, existing empirical literature suffers from a number 
of limitations. Not all analyses are entirely consistent with the theory’s propositions, regularly, 
imperfect proxies for key variables are employed, the endogeneity of right-hand-side variables often is 
ignored, and most analyses are based on reduced form tests.  
Several theoretical advancements have been proposed in r cent years. Williamson (1991b) introduces 
the shift parameter framework investigating how theoptimal choice of governance changes in 
response to dynamics in the institutional environmet. Nickerson (1997) develops the positioning-
economizing perspective linking transaction cost economics with the strategic management literature. 
Structural form tests employing two-stage Heckman models account for the self-selection of managers 
into a certain strategy (i.e., organizational form) and succeed in testing for rival propositions on the 
relationship between exogenous variables and exchange performance derived from alternative theories 
of the firm (e.g., Poppo and Zenger, 1998). Furthermore, researchers increasingly are interested in 
relational institutional arrangements (e.g., Gil and Marion, 2009).  
Chapters 4 to 6 of this thesis pick up several of the above discussed limitations of existing empirical 
work testing for transaction cost economics’ predictions and recent developments thereof using data 
on the global LNG market. First, the impact of inter-organizational trust as a shift parameter on the 
choice of more hierarchical governance modes is investigated. Second, an empirical test of the 
positioning-economizing perspective is provided. Third, optimal contract duration of long-term LNG 
supply contracts is analyzed accounting for the trade-off between contracting costs and flexibility. 
Contract duration as well as contracted volume thereby are considered as endogenous variables.   
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2.6 Appendix 
Table 3: Selected empirical studies testing transaction cost economics: Make or buy 
Authors/Year Sector/Unit of 
analysis 
Method  Dependent variables Main independent 
variables 
Main findings 
Klein et al. 
(1978) 
US auto sector (Fisher 
Body and GM), 
petroleum industry 
Qualitative discussion Vertical integration along 
successive stages of the 
value chain 
Hold-up potential by 
exchange partner 
Vertical integration is more likely when hold-up potential (i.e., 
quasi-rents from firm-specific investments) is large. 
Globerman 
(1980) 
Technology-intensive 
industries (focus on 
telecommunication, 
defense, IT) 
Qualitative discussion Backward integration into 
research and development 
Uncertainty, 
complexity, transaction-
specific investments 
The more complex, uncertain, and specialized the innovation, 
the more complex will be the governance structure. 
Competitive bidding only feasible when technology transfer is 
amenable to fairly precise performance and feature 
specifications.  
Monteverde and 
Teece (1982a) 
US auto sector Linear probability 
model 
Vertical quasi integration 
(downstream firm owns 
specialized tools used in 
upstream production) 
Asset specificity Positive relationship between appro riable quasi-rents and the 
occurrence of quasi integration. 
Monteverde and 
Teece (1982b) 
US auto sector  Probit model Backward integration into
component supply 
Human assets Engineering effort is positively related to appropriable quasi-
rent. 
The higher the appropriable quasi-rent, the greater the likelihood 
of vertical integration. 
Masten (1984) US aerospace industry Probit model Internal versus external 
procurement of supplies 
Design and site 
specificity, complexity 
of item 
Probability of internal procurement is higher for cmplex and 
highly specialized inputs. 
Hazard of incomplete contract in complex environments is 
greater when specific designs are involved.  
Walker and 
Weber (1984)* 
US auto sector Multiple-indicator 
structural equation 
model (unweighted 
least squares) 
Backward integration into 
supply of simple 
components 
Volume and 
technological 
uncertainty, specificity, 
supplier production cost 
advantage 
The higher the supplier production cost advantage the more 
likely is external procurement; the competitiveness of upplier 
market increases production cost advantage of suppliers over 
buyers.  
Volume uncertainty increases the likelihood of integration. 
Palay (1984)* Rail freight industry Qualitative discussion 
and some statistics 
Vertical structures between 
rail freight carriers and 
their shippers 
Asset specificity As investment characteristics become more transaction-specific, 
the associated institutional structure becomes increasingly 
unique to the parties and transactions it supports. 
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Authors/Year Sector/Unit of 
analysis 
Method  Dependent variables Main independent 
variables 
Main findings 
Anderson and 
Schmittlein 
(1984)* 
US electronic 
component industry 
Logit model Forward integration into 
marketing 
Specificity, uncertainty 
(environmental unpre-
dictability, difficulty of 
evaluating performance)  
Asset specificity, the difficulty in evaluating perfo mance, and 
company size all have a positive influence on the likelihood of 
forward integration. 
Joskow (1985) US coal-burning 
power plants 
Qualitative discussion Vertical structure between 
coal supplier and power 
plant (i.e., spot market, 
vertical integration, or 
long-term contract) 
Specificity (site, 
physical asset, 
dedicated), uncertainty 
and complexity 
Empirical results consistent with transaction cost economics; 
e.g. vertical integration or very long and complex long-term 
contracts are used for mine-mouth plants. 
Globerman and 
Schwindt (1986) 
Canadian forest 
products 
Qualitative discussion Backward integration of 
forest product companies 
into ownership of timber 
rights 
Dedicated asset 
specificity  
Transactional considerations, particularly asset spcificity, prove 
to be robust empirical determinants of governance structures. 
Klein (1988) US auto sector (Fisher 
Body and GM) 
Qualitative discussion Backward integration of 
General Motors into the 
supply of car bodies 
Hold-up potential by 
exchange partner 
Vertical integration will be used when hold-up potential (i.e., 
quasi-rents from firm-specific investments) is large. 
Hennart (1988) Aluminum and tin 
industries 
Qualitative discussion Upstream vertical 
integration 
Number of actual or 
potential parties at each 
stage, level of quasi-
rents, uncertainty 
Scale economies, barriers to entry, higher transportati n costs, 
and greater asset specificity explain a higher degree of upstream 
integration. 
John and Weitz 
(1988)* 
Industrial good 
manufacturers  
Multiple regression 
and multinomial logit 
models 
Forward integration into 
distribution 
Specificity, 
environmental and 
behavioral uncertainty 
The higher the level of specific assets and the higher the level of 
uncertainty, the higher the likelihood of forward integration. 
Klein (1989)* Canadian exporting 
firms 
Multiple regression Degree of vertical control 
exerted by a firm in its 
export channel 
Specificity, uncertainty 
(complexity/dynamism), 
transaction frequency 
The higher asset specificity, frequency, and uncertainty (i.e., 
complexity) the higher will be the degree of vertical ontrol. 
Uncertainty (i.e., dynamism) has a negative effect. 
Lieberman 
(1991) 
US chemical sector Logit model Backward integration  Specificity, supplier 
concentration, demand 
variability measures 
The likelihood of integration increases with asset specificity. 
Backward integration to avoid variability in the input market 
that is independent of fluctuations in own downstream market 
(assuring stable supplies). 
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Authors/Year Sector/Unit of 
analysis 
Method  Dependent variables Main independent 
variables 
Main findings 
Masten, 
Meehan, Snyder 
(1991)* 
Naval shipbuilding 
sector 
Two-stage self 
selection model 
Backward integration into 
input component supply  
Specificity (physical, 
human, temporal), 
complexity, similarity 
of the transactions 
Temporal and human asset specificity have a positive impact on 
the likelihood of vertical integration.  
Non-monotonic effect of complexity (for simple components 
increases in complexity make it less likely that production is 
internalized; for more complex components positive impact). 
Integration is more likely for more labor-intensive and less 
engineering-intensive activities. 
Contrary to expectations, human asset specificity has a negative 
impact on transaction costs suggesting that workers with more 
specific skills are less costly to manage. 
Pirrong (1993) Bulk shipping markets Qualitative discussion Contracting practices and 
vertical integration 
Differences in 
exogenous factors (e.g., 
market structure, vessel 
specialization) 
Whereas spot contracts are chosen in the absence of any 
bilateral dependency relationship, forward contracts re 
employed when significant temporal specificity is observed.  
In a specialized shipping market where both temporal and 
contractual specificities are present, long-term contracts or 
vertical integration are observed. 
Ohanian (1994) US pulp and paper 
industry 1900-1940 
Logit and tobit 
models 
Likelihood and degree of 
vertical integration of pulp 
and paper production 
Market concentration, 
controls such as firm 
size 
With rising small number bargaining problem and higher 
investments in specific assets the likelihood for as well as the 
level of vertical integration increase.  
Lyons (1995)* UK mechanical 
engineering, motor 
vehicle, electronics, 
and metal processing 
industries 
Logit models Backward integration into 
input procurement 
Specificity (specialized 
equipment necessary for 
input production), 
economies of scale and 
scope 
The probability of buying-in specialised inputs is h gher if the 
production technology is non-specific, but only if there are 
economies of scale or scope.  
The effect of economies of scale and scope is much reduced in 
the presence of specific assets. 
Poppo and 
Zenger (1998)* 
Information services Two-stage Heckman 
model 
Outsourcing (dummy, 
percentage) 
Asset specificity, 
measurement difficulty, 
technological 
uncertainty, economies 
of scale 
1st stage probit: The presence of firm-specific assets encourages 
internalization whereas outsourcing more likely if extensive 
skills are required. 
2nd stage: Asset specificity has a negative effect on market 
performance and no clear effect on firm performance; 
measurement difficulty has a negative impact on overall costs. 
Martinez (1999) US pork and broiler 
industry 
Qualitative discussion Contracting practices and 
vertical integration 
Transaction cost 
variables 
Observed vertical structures in the pork and broile industry are 
consistent with transaction cost economics’ predictions. 
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Authors/Year Sector/Unit of 
analysis 
Method  Dependent variables Main independent 
variables 
Main findings 
Simoens and 
Scott (1999) 
UK primary care 
sector 
Qualitative discussion 
and literature review 
Vertical and horizontal 
integration 
Transaction cost 
variables 
Economic and non-economic theories of integration are relevant 
and applicable to explain integration in primary care. 
Gonzalez et al. 
(1999) 
Spanish construction 
industry 
OLS, fixed effects 
panel data approach 
Subcontracting Specificity, uncertainty, 
geographical dispersion, 
output variety, 
technological 
specialization 
As specificity is higher, firms tend to subcontract less. The 
opposite happens when output heterogeneity and the use of 
intangible assets and capabilities increase.  
Neither temporary shortage of capacity nor geographic l 
dispersion of activities seem to affect the extent of 
subcontracting. Proxies for uncertainty do not show any clear 
effect. 
Fan (2000) Petrochemical 
industry 
Multivariate 
regression 
Vertical integration (input 
self-sufficiency ratio) 
Specificity, price 
uncertainty 
Input price uncertainty in the 1970s positively affected the 
extent of backward integration. This positive reaction of vertical 
integration to price uncertainty mainly occurs in transactions 
subject to asset specificity. 
Vernimmen et 
al. (2000) 
Belgian agriculture 
sector 
Probit model Outsourcing of 
administration 
Complexity, 
uncertainty, transaction 
frequency 
The complexity of the task and uncertainty regarding the 
outcome have a high impact on the decision to outsource. 
Larger firms tend to outsource more administration. 
Martinez (2002) US poultry, egg, and 
pork industries 
Qualitative discussion Contracting practices and 
vertical integration 
Transaction cost 
variables 
Observed vertical structures are consistent with transaction cost 
economics’ predictions. 
Leiblein et al. 
(2002) 
Global semiconductor 
industry 
Two-stage Heckman 
models 
Outsourcing of production, 
technological performance 
Ex-ante number of 
suppliers, asset 
specificity, uncertainty 
of product demand 
1st stage: Firms tend to internalize production when ex-ante 
small number bargaining with potential suppliers is evere. 
Outsourcing is less likely when the firms have to invest in 
specific assets under high demand uncertainty.  
2nd stage: Firms self-select into the strategy where they expect a 
higher performance.  
Aubert et al. 
(2004)* 
IT outsourcing Partial least squares Level of outsorcing  Asset specificity, 
uncertainty, required 
business and technical 
skills 
Uncertainty is the major deterrent to outsourcing, while the level 
of technical skills is the most important reason to outsource.  
Business skills do not seem to play a significant role; asset 
specificity showed inconsistent effects. 
Sampson (2004) R&D alliances in the 
international 
telecommunications 
equipment industry 
Two-stage Heckman 
model 
Alliance type (pooling 
contract vs. equity joint 
venture), firm innovative 
performance 
Contracting difficulties, 
alliance characteristics, 
strength of intellectual 
property regime 
Misaligned governance dampens firm performance.  
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Authors/Year Sector/Unit of 
analysis 
Method  Dependent variables Main independent 
variables 
Main findings 
Rosés (2005) Spanish cotton 
industry 1720-1860 
Logit and tobit 
models 
Likelihood and degree of 
vertical integration of 
cotton spinning and 
weaving production 
Market concentration, 
asset specificity, firm 
size 
The likelihood as well as the level of vertical integration 
increase with higher specificity and a higher small numbers 
bargaining problem. 
Acemoglu et al. 
(2005) 
Numerous industries 
worldwide 
OLS Degree of vertical 
integration 
Contracting costs, credit 
market development, 
barriers to entry 
Firms are more integrated in countries with greater contracting 
costs, greater credit market imperfections, and greate  barriers to 
entry. 
Countries with worse contracting institutions and greater credit 
market imperfections are more concentrated in industries that 
are typically characterized by strong vertical integration. 
Sartorius and 
Kirsten (2005)* 
Southern African 
sugar production  
Case study Outsourcing of sugarcane 
production to small-scale 
farmers  
Transaction frequency, 
asset specificity, 
uncertainty 
Sugarcane production should not be outsourced but rather co-
ordinated by a more relational structure such as a strategic 
alliance. 
Makholm (2006) US natural gas 
industry 
Qualitative discussion Vertical integration 
between pipelines, 
production, and 
distribution 
Asset specificity, 
regulatory actions 
Until 1935, no federal regulation and a high degree of vertical 
integration – consistent with transaction cost economics due to 
the high level of asset specificity. 
After 1935, vertical separation of pipelines and long-term take-
or-pay contracts between producers and pipelines with pipelines 
re-selling the gas to distributors. 
Since 1985, functioning market for pipeline capacity with well 
defined property rights and transparency over prices. 
Spekle et al. 
(2007) 
Auditing activities in 
Dutch companies  
OLS Proportion of outsourcing 
of auditing activities 
Specificity, frequency, 
environmental and  
behavioral uncertainty 
Firm-specific knowledge and frequency (influenced e.g. by firm 
size) positively influence internal auditing. 
Uncertainty has no impact on the outsourcing decision. 
Gil (2007) Spanish movie 
industry 
OLS, two-stage least 
squares 
Share of vertically 
integrated companies 
Renegotiation 
frequency, movie 
release in the US, 
Spanish origin of the 
movie 
Movies renegotiated ex-post more often are more likely to be 
distributed by integrated distributors.  
Hence, integrated distributors specialize in movies that are 
contractually more complex and use their own theaters more 
often for those of their movies that are contractually more 
complex. 
Bigelow and 
Argyres (2008) 
US auto industry 
1917-1933 
Probit models Make or buy of the engine 
for each of its models 
Specificity, number of 
suppliers, firm’s 
industry experience 
Asset specificity associated with an engine was associated with 
a greater likelihood that the engine would be produce  
internally. 
 42 
Authors/Year Sector/Unit of 
analysis 
Method  Dependent variables Main independent 
variables 
Main findings 
Nagaoka et al. 
(2008)* 
Japanese automobile 
manufacturers 
Multinomial logit Choice between vertical 
integration, relational 
contracting (keiretsu) or 
market sourcing 
Design specificity, 
interdependency in 
design of this and other 
components, testability 
of quality 
An increasing level of design specificity of a component makes 
keiretsu sourcing preferred to market procurement, but does not 
significantly affect the probability of vertical integration over 
keiretsu.  
The interdependency of components has a positive impact on the 
likelihood that more hierarchical governance forms are chosen. 
Fernández-
Olmos et al. 
(2008) 
Spanish wine industry Ordered logit models Market versus hybrid 
versus hierarchy 
Physical and dedicated 
asset specificity, 
behavioral and environ-
mental uncertainty, firm 
size, product quality 
The probability of vertical integration increases with asset 
specificity and uncertainty.  
Wineries that produce high-quality wines are more lik ly to 
vertically integrate. 
 
*… based on survey data 
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Table 4: Selected empirical studies testing transaction cost economics: Contractual provisions 
Authors/Year Sector/Unit of 
analysis 
Method  Dependent variables Main independent 
variables 
Main findings 
Mulherin (1986) US natural gas 
industry 
Qualitative discussion Development of vertical 
structures 1920s to mid-
20th century 
Vulnerability to 
opportunistic behavior 
Potential for opportunistic behavior created by specialized assets 
has induced the use of complex, long-term contracts. 
Hubbert and 
Weiner (1986) 
US natural gas 
industry 
Qualitative discussion 
with some descriptive 
statistics 
Contractual structure Phased deregulation of 
wellhead prices in the 
US 
Derive a theoretical model on the determination of take-or-pay 
provisions. Wellhead price ceilings favor long-term contracts 
which include non-price contract provisions such as take-or-pay 
clauses increasing the producers’ total compensation. 
Joskow (1987) US coal industry OLS and maximum-
likelihood models 
Contract duration Site, physical asset, and 
dedicated specificity 
Contracting parties make longer commitments when spcific, 
investments occur. 
Crocker and 
Masten (1988) 
US natural gas sector Tobit model, OLS, 
two-stage least 
squares 
Take-or-pay percentage, 
contract duration 
Uncertainty, number of 
potential traders to 
capture quasi-rent, 
regulatory actions 
Confirm the trade-off between the costs of repeated bargaining 
in the presence of relationship-specific investments a d the 
hazard of being bound to an inflexible long-term agreement.  
Show theoretically and empirically that distortions i  
performance incentives raise the costs of long-term agreements 
and therefore shorten contract duration. 
Masten and 
Crocker (1991) 
US natural gas sector Probit and 
multinomial probit 
models 
Processes by which parties 
adjust prices in long-term 
contracts (renegotiation vs. 
redetermination) 
Specificity, price 
uncertainty 
No significant results for transaction cost variables. 
With increasing contract duration, the probability of adopting 
renegotiations increases as expected; negative relationship 
between price and quantity flexibility as expected. 
Lyons (1994)* UK engineering firm Probit model Formal contract Vulnerability to 
opportunistic behavior, 
complexity 
The probability of using formal contracts increases with the 
vulnerability to opportunistic behavior whereas it decreases with 
the complexity of the transaction. 
Saussier 
(1999)** 
Electricité de France’s 
coal supply 
OLS, two-stage least 
squares 
Contract duration Specificity (physical, 
site, dedicated, human 
assets), uncertainty 
Whereas contract duration increases with the level of 
appropriable quasi-rents at stake, it decreases with the level of 
uncertainty. 
Saussier 
(2000)** 
Electricité de France’s 
coal supply 
OLS, ordered probit, 
and two-stage models 
Contractual completeness Specificity (physical, 
site, dedicated, human 
assets), uncertainty 
Whereas contractual completeness increases with the level of 
appropriable quasi-rents at stake, it decreases with the level of 
uncertainty. 
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Authors/Year Sector/Unit of 
analysis 
Method  Dependent variables Main independent 
variables 
Main findings 
Kerkvliet and 
Shrogren (2001) 
US coal supply 
contracts to power 
plants in Powder 
River Basin 
OLS Contract duration Specificity (physical, 
site, dedicated assets), 
trading and market 
experience 
Positive relationship between physically specific investments 
and contract duration but counterintuitive result for impact of 
dedicated asset specificity. 
Duration decreases with rising trading and market experience.  
Poppo and 
Zenger (2002)* 
Information services Three-stage least 
squares model 
correcting for self-
selection into 
outsourcing 
Contractual complexity 
and relational governance, 
exchange performance 
Exchange performance 
, relational governance 
index, contractual 
complexity, asset 
specificity, 
measurement difficulty, 
technological change 
Increases in the level of relational governance are associated 
with greater levels of contractual complexity. 
Both relational governance and contractual complexity deliver 
higher levels of satisfaction with exchange performance. 
 
López-Bayon 
and González-
Diaz (2004)* 
Spanish electronics 
industry 
Logit and multinomial 
logit models 
Contract duration of 
subcontracting agreements 
Product specificity, 
technological and 
demand uncertainty 
 
Probability of signing an indefinite duration contract is related 
positively to the specificity of the activity and negatively to the 
uncertainty regarding future demand and to the degree of 
formalization of the contract.  
Indefinite duration contracts (working as relational contracts) 
improve flexibility for adjusting the relationship to the changing 
environment. 
Zylbersztajn and 
Lazzarini (2005) 
Technology licensing 
contracts between 
seed companies and a 
governmental R&D 
organization in Brazil 
Hazard rate models Contract survival Quasi-rents, monitoring 
costs, past performance, 
environmental stability 
Rates of contract termination decrease with the levl of quasi-
rents at stake, decrease as a function of past satifactory 
outcomes, increase with the extent of disturbances aff cting the 
technology’s demand, and increase over time. 
Brickley et al 
(2006) 
Franchise contracts  OLS and ordered 
probit models 
Contract duration, change 
in contract duration 
Total investments, 
training requirements, 
contract renewal 
restrictions 
Contract duration increases with the franchisee’s physical and 
human capital investments, recontracting costs, and the 
franchisor’s experience in franchising (argued to be negatively 
related to uncertainty about optimal contract provisions). 
 
Athias and 
Saussier 
(2007)** 
International 
infrastructure 
concession contracts 
Ordered logit and 
two-stage ordered 
logit models 
Contractual rigidity  Uncertainty (future 
demand, costs, difficult 
to predict future), 
reputation 
Develop a model combining property rights theory and TCE. 
The higher demand uncertainty, the more flexible the toll 
adjustment provisions will be. Reputation has a negative effect 
on the level of rigidity.  
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Authors/Year Sector/Unit of 
analysis 
Method  Dependent variables Main independent 
variables 
Main findings 
Liu et al. 
(2008)* 
Chinese household 
appliance industry 
Multivariate 
regression 
Relationship between 
formal and relational 
contracts 
Specific investments, 
relational norms, trust, 
exchange performance 
Contracts are more effective in restraining opportunism while 
relational mechanisms are more powerful in improving 
performance. 
Written contracts and relational governance in the form of 
mutual norms and trust are complements. 
Hirschhausen 
and Neumann 
(2008) 
World natural gas 
market 
OLS Contract duration Specificity, market 
restructuring 
Contract duration decreases as the market structure evolves to 
more competitive regimes. 
Investments linked to specific infrastructures increase contract 
duration by an average of three years. 
Ruester (2009) World liquefied 
natural gas market 
Two-stage least 
squares, GMM 
Contract duration, annual 
contracted volume 
Specificity, uncertainty, 
transaction frequency 
The higher asset the longer is contract duration. On the contrary, 
the need for flexibility in today’s ‘second generation’ LNG 
market supports shorter-term agreements.  
When firms have experience in bilateral trading, contract 
duration decreases.  
Countries with a greater dependence on imports in the form of 
LNG tend to negotiate longer agreements. Deliveries to 
competitive downstream markets are realized via contracts with 
about 2.5 to three years shorter duration.  
Kozhevnikova 
and Lange 
(2009) 
US coal industry Tobit model Contract duration Asset specificity, 
contractual complete-
ness, regulatory 
reforms 
Larger quantities and spatial closeness of plants and mines lead 
to longer contracts. 
Contract completeness has no impact on the duration once it is 
controlled for endogeneity. 
The railroad reform, which decreased transportation costs, had a 
negative effect on contract duration. 
 
*   …  based on survey data 
** … authors had access to complete contracts 
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3 Dynamics in the Liquefied Natural Gas Industry 
3.1 Introduction 
Natural gas accounts for about 24% of world primary energy supply. It is mainly employed for power 
production, for industrial uses as well as for heating and cooking in the residential sector. In 2008, 
27% of the total production of 3,018 billion cubic meters (bcm) have been traded internationally. LNG 
thereby accounted for 28% (227 bcm) of the exported gas (BP, 2009). The International Energy 
Agency (IEA) forecasts that natural gas will play a key role in the global energy picture also in the 
future, even though the pace of demand growth will critically depend on climate policy actions. In the 
IEA reference scenario, global gas demand increases by an average of 1.5% per year until 2030 with 
the power sector remaining the largest driver of gas demand (IEA, 2009b, p. 365).10 LNG is expected 
to continue to gain in importance since it enables th  transportation of natural gas over long distances 
and often becomes the fuel of choice in cases where pip line sources are limited (e.g., Japan or 
Portugal) and where supply sources and trade routes shall be diversified (e.g., Spain or Greece).  
During the last decade, the LNG industry altered substantially. Traded volumes increased by an annual 
average of 7% from 2000 on. New players entered the market and new trading patterns evolved. On 
the one hand, vertical and horizontal integration have become more common with oil and gas majors 
investing in a portfolio of LNG export, transport, and import capacities which enables flexible trades. 
On the other hand, new business models of non-integration emerged. Long-term contracts with a 
duration of more than 20 years co-exist with short-term agreements. Recent developments of 
unconventional gas resources change the global supply picture. The current economic crisis entails 
short-term overcapacities in the global LNG export market and supports the development of a buyers’ 
market at least for the mid-term future. The survival of incumbents and new entrants strongly depends 
on their ability to operate economically.  
The heterogeneity of transactions in terms of varying levels of relationship-specific investments, 
external uncertainty, downstream competition, and dependence on natural gas imports in the form of 
LNG of buying countries should be matched by a diversity in governance forms such as varying levels 
of vertical integration and varying characteristics and durations of supply contracts. For these reasons, 
the LNG industry seems to be particularly well-suited to test propositions derived from transaction 
cost economics. This chapter provides an overview on dynamics in the LNG industry from a technical 
and an economic perspective as well as with respect to corporate behavior and qualitatively discusses 
observed vertical structures before Chapters 4 to 6 c nduct econometric tests based on transaction cost 
economics and recent developments thereof.  
                                                   
10 This increase in natural gas demand is fostered by environmental motivations. Natural gas entails lower 
specific CO2 emissions as compared to coal or oil. Improvements in the technology of combined cycle gas 
turbine power plants furthermore allow for natural gas being employed for mid- and base-load electricity 
generation. The average yearly increase in world demand for the period from 1990 to 2008 was 2.4%. See Figure 
19 in the Appendix for an illustration of the development of world natural gas demand.  
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3.2 The LNG industry 
3.2.1 LNG value chain 
Prior to the development of the LNG technology, theransportation of natural gas was limited to 
destinations that could be served by pipeline. The liquefaction of natural gas enables transport over 
long distances as well as between regions where the construction of pipelines is not feasible due to 
difficult geographic conditions. Whereas transportation of natural gas in the form of LNG requires 
very capital-intensive upfront investments, variable costs increase less with shipping distance than for 
pipelines. Break-even of offshore pipeline and LNG transport is achieved at about 2,500 km (Jensen, 
2009b, p. 7). 
Figure 6 depicts the five stages of the LNG value chain. Following exploration and production 
(stage 1), the raw feed gas is transported via pipeline to liquefaction facilities. After removing 
impurities and separating heavier hydrocarbons, it is cooled to minus 160°C under atmospheric 
pressure in so called liquefaction trains and shrinks to about 1/600 of its volume (stage 2). This 
energy-intensive process consumes about 12% of the incoming gas. The liquefied gas is transported to 
the destination country using tankers equipped witha complex insulation system essential to keep the 
gas liquid during shipment (stage 3). Gas boiling-off throughout the journey (0.15% of the cargo 
volume per day) can be used to fuel the ship. Upon arrival, tankers are off-loaded to terminals that 
reconvert the LNG to its original state of aggregation via heat exchangers where again up to 1% of the 
incoming gas is used as a fuel (stage 4). Finally, the gas is fed into the destination country’s pipeline 
grid, traded and sold to marketers, distributors, or p wer producers, or stored for future demand 
(stage 5).  
To investigate the LNG industry from an economic pers ctive, the five stages of the value chain 
should be considered together. In general, the structure of export and import projects is largely 
predetermined by exogenous factors and therefore lies beyond the control of individual players. 
Exploration and production of natural gas are directly linked to the liquefaction projects whose 
ownership structures in many cases are determined by national oil and gas companies. On the 
downstream end, national infrastructure, marketing, and distribution systems are often in place before 
import terminal construction. Therefore, this analysis concentrates on the three successive stages of 
upstream, midstream, and downstream activities.  
Figure 6: LNG value chain 
  
 
 
 
 
Source: Own depiction 
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Transportation infrastructure is a substantial elemnt linking exporting and importing projects. In 
contrast to oil shipping, vessels for LNG transport are very capital-intensive and therefore traditionally 
have been dedicated assets for specific routes booked under extensive long-term contracts. However, 
an increasing number of vessels for uncommitted trae re now in the order books of shipyards and 
will reduce dedicated asset specificity. 
Investment costs within the five stages vary signifcantly. Exploration and production including gas 
processing and transportation from the field to the liquefaction facility account for 15-20% of the total 
costs of the LNG value chain; liquefaction including gas treatment, cooling, loading and storage for 
30-45%; shipping for 10-30%; and regasification including unloading and storage for 15-25% 
(EIA, 2003, p. 42).  Exact figures depend on the distance, traded volumes, and local conditions such as 
construction costs. 
During the period from the mid-1990s to about 2003, costs along the whole value chain were declining 
(see e.g., EIA, 2003; Cornot-Gandolphe, 2005; Energy Charter Secretariat, 2008) which supported the 
rapid expansion of the LNG sector and a general enthusiasm with respect to future growth potentials. 
This was mainly driven by technological advances and the realization of economies of scale in 
liquefaction, shipping, and storage. Fuel efficiency in liquefaction and regasification could be 
improved using higher-efficiency gas turbines. Overcapacities and redundancies have been reduced. 
Whereas the first liquefaction trains (Arzew in Algeria) had a capacity of 0.3 mtpa, today, trains with a 
capacity of 4 mtpa are common and Qatar recently completed its first ‘mega-trains’ including 7.8 mtpa 
units. See Figure 7 for an illustration of the development of average liquefaction train size. Economies 
of scale of two 4 mtpa trains reduce liquefaction cst of an 8 mtpa greenfield project with four 2 mtpa 
units by nearly 30%. An increase to one 7.8 mtpa unit leads to an additional 20% cost reduction 
(Jensen, 2003, p. 31). Average investment costs fell from about 550 USD/mtpa in the early years of 
the industry to 350 USD/mtpa in the 1980s, 250 USD/mtpa in the late 1990s, and 200 USD/mtpa in 
the early 2000s (Cornot-Gandolphe, 2005, p. 8).  
Figure 7: Development of average liquefaction train size by start-up year 
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Tanker financing and construction schedules have ben fit d from new manufacturing techniques and 
more shipyards that can build LNG vessels. Typical vessel size today is in the range of 120,000 to 
180,000 cubic meters (m³). Building costs for standard LNG tankers have decreased from about 280 
million USD in the mid-1980s to 155 million USD in the early 2000s (EIA, 2003, p. 42). In November 
2007, the first super-size tankers with a capacity above 210,000 m³ have been delivered (see Figure 20 
in the Appendix). These ships benefit from lower aver ge transport costs; however, there are 
restrictions concerning potential destination facilities since only a number of ports can handle these 
vessels. Small-size LNG carriers are employed in Japan, where intra-country LNG transport 
compensates for the lack of a nationwide transmission ystem.  
In the mid-2000s, the trend of falling costs reversed due to rising raw material prices (such as steel or 
nickel – a critical component for cryogenic storage tanks and piping) and the large demand for LNG 
facility construction. There are only four companies contracting for engineering, procurement and 
construction of LNG plants and the contractor market has become increasingly tight during the last 
years, when significant investments along the LNG value chain have been realized. The number of 
liquefaction trains simultaneously under construction ncreased from an average of eight during the 
1990s to twelve in the early 2000s and to 16 for the period from 2005 to 2008 (IEA, 2009b, p. 451). 
Table 5 provides a summary of cost estimates over tim . The initial decrease and following re-increase 
in recent years are also mirrored by the dataset used for empirical tests in this thesis (see Figure 8).  
Table 5: Development of costs along the LNG value chain  
 Cost of 
service early 
1990s 
Cost of 
service early 
2000s 
Capex as of 
2006 
Cost of 
service as of 
2006 
Capex as of 
2009 
Cost of 
service as of 
2009 
 [USD/MBTU] [USD/MBTU] [bn USD] [USD/MBTU] [bn USD] [USD/MBTU] 
Source 
Trade route 
Cornot-Gandolphe (2005): 
Deliveries from Middle East to 
Europe 
Jensen (2006):  
Two 4 mtpa trains, Nigeria 
to US Gulf coast 
Jensen (2009b):  
Two 4 mtpa trains, Nigeria 
to US Gulf coast 
E&P 0.5-0.8 0.5-0.8 1.6 0.80 3.0 1.00 
Liquefaction 1.3-1.4 1.0-1.1 1.6 0.94 4.3 2.15 
Shipping 1.2-1.3 0.9-1.0 2.0 0.99 2.1 1.23 
Regasification 0.5-0.6 0.4-0.5 0.6 0.38 1.1 0.70 
Total 3.5-4.1 2.8-3.4 5.8 3.11 10.5 5.08 
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Figure 8: Development of per unit costs of liquefaction and regasification projects  
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Source: Own depiction 
 
A number of projects have suffered from cost overruns and construction delays during the last years: 
e.g., for Indonesia’s 7.6 mtpa Tangguh project, an 18-month delay in the final investment decision led 
to a cost increase from 1.4 to 1.8 billion USD. The Russian Sakhalin II and Norway’s Snovhit projects 
have experienced huge cost overruns which might partially be caused by the Arctic environment. 
Snovhit furthermore suffered from technical failures and ran at only 55% of nominal capacity from its 
commissioning in 2007 and was shut down again in 2008 for an additional maintenance. Cost overruns 
and delays also have been reported for Yemen LNG and the large-scale trains at Qatargas IV and V 
(all still under construction).  
3.2.2 Development of the LNG industry 
Converting natural gas to LNG for transportation by tanker has been utilized for more than 40 years, 
but the industry achieved a remarkable level of global trade only recently. Since 1964, the technology 
of natural gas liquefaction enables commercial transport in tankers with the first deliveries having 
been dedicated from Algeria to the UK.11 Transport remained expensive and natural gas markets 
stayed regional in nature until the 1990s.  
The North American market including the US, Canada nd Mexico traditionally has been highly self-
sufficient with substantial domestic production in all three countries and some intra-regional pipeline 
trade. The US opened its first LNG receiving terminal in 1971 to import additional volumes from 
Algeria. However, due to a surplus in domestic supplies in the mid-1980s two of the four import 
terminals (i.e., Elba Island and Cove Point) have be n mothballed in 1985 and contracts with the 
Algerian Sonatrach were terminated before their official end. In Europe, indigenous natural gas 
supplies and imports via pipeline were available to meet demand and LNG capacities grew relatively 
slowly. Spain opened its first LNG import terminal in 1969, Italy and France followed in 1971 and 
                                                   
11 The UK imported LNG from 1964 to 1982. With the growing natural gas production in the North Sea, 
however, imports had been stopped, the UK became a net exporter of natural gas and the regasification facility at 
Canvey Island was dismantled. 
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1972, respectively. In contrast, traditional Pacific Basin natural gas importers such as Japan, South 
Korea or Taiwan lack domestic supplies and are beyond the reach of any pipeline sources. They are 
highly dependent on imports in the form of LNG and dominated the LNG industry during its first 
decades (see Figure 9).  
Figure 9: Development of natural gas imports of the world’s major importing regions 
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Source: Own depiction based on data from BP Statistical Reviews of World Energy (1990-2009) 
 
During this early stage, most of the world’s LNG export infrastructure remained under state control 
and private or foreign companies were involved only with minority shares. Inflexible bilateral long-
term contracts with take-or-pay and destination clauses secured the capital-intensive infrastructure 
investments and reliable supplies for import-dependent buyers (see Section 3.4 for a detailed 
discussion of the development of contracting structures in the global LNG market). 
Nissen (2004) calls these early trading structures ‘project-utility chain model’ where the export project 
(typically a joint venture between a national oil and gas company (NOC) and a private oil and gas 
major) functions as the seller and a monopoly franchised utility or a merchant trader as the buyer. 
Downstream competition in most importing countries was not encouraged; e.g., buyers in South Korea 
and Taiwan were state entities, the Japanese natural gas sector was highly regulated without any 
foreign participation and Japanese utilities controlling all imports; and also in European countries such 
as France for example, a state-owned monopoly was responsible for all imports and natural gas 
transmission. Capacities along the whole value chain, including shipping, have been bilaterally 
committed and each supply project was linked by technical and commercial design to a specific 
market.  
Since the 1990s, investments in LNG infrastructure gr w rapidly as worldwide natural gas demand 
increased significantly, leading to substantial economies of scale throughout the value chain. New 
entrants include Turkey (1994), Greece (2000), Portugal (2003), India (2004), China, and Mexico 
(both 2006). The UK re-emerged as an LNG importer in 2005 to substitute for declining domestic 
production. Significant expansions and new investmen s have been realized in Spain and the US re-
opened its mothballed terminals since domestic supply sources no longer appeared adequate to support 
the expected increase in demand. South American coutries received their first LNG in mid-2008.  
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Industry experts agree that the LNG industry has altered substantially during the last decade (Iniss, 
2004, p. 9; Jensen, 2004, pp. 7 ff.). Regasification capacities increased from 251 mtpa in 1999 to 462 
mtpa at the end of 2009 (+84%), liquefaction capacities from 108 to 229 mtpa (+112%) during the 
same period and the number of operating LNG vessels augmented from 106 to 337 (+218%). Atlantic 
Basin LNG trade gained in importance. After nearly 20 years without any export capacity extensions, 
Trinidad/Tobago and Nigeria opened their first liquefaction trains in 1999, Egypt followed in 2005 
and Equatorial Guinea and Norway in 2008 and 2009, respectively. The Middle East, accounting for 
more than 40% of worldwide proven natural gas reserves, is becoming the largest regional exporter of 
LNG. With Qatar and Oman, two additional suppliers started deliveries in 1997 and 2000. The region 
is currently evolving to a swing producer. Deliveries to European and Asian markets and even to 
North America are feasible without a significant difference in transportation cost.12 Jensen (2007a, 
p. 29) even argues that Qatar, the largest LNG exporter since 2005, may become the “Henry Hub of 
global LNG pricing”. 
Figure 10: Countries participating in LNG trade and inter-regional trade volumes 1999 vs. 200913 
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12 Shipping costs for deliveries from North Africa account for about 0.35 USD/MBTU (to Europe), 0.95 
USD/MBTU (to the US Gulf coast), and 1.8 USD/MBTU (to Japan). For deliveries from the Middle East they 
are in the range of 0.8, 1.0, and 1.4 USD/MBTU, respectively (Razavi, 2009, p. 14). 
13 The figure of traded volumes in 2009 uses trade data of 2008. However, due to the economic crisis and its 
negative impact on natural gas demand, no increase in traded volumes is expected for 2009 (IEA, 2009b, p. 48). 
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In today’s LNG market, new flexibility in trading patterns comes from i) changes in the structure of 
long-term contracts, ii) a small but growing short-term market, and iii) a trend of suppliers towards 
self-contracting with their own downstream marketing affiliates. Changing contract terms have taken 
several forms: average contract duration as well as contracted volume are decreasing, take-or-pay 
requirements are reduced, destination clauses are eliminated and buyers increasingly conclude for 
free-on-board agreements enabling cargo diversions. Long-term contracts are accompanied by flexible 
short-term agreements as well as vertical integration and strategic partnerships. Today, spot and short-
term trade account for about 20% of total LNG trade. Arbitrage trade in the Atlantic Basin is 
increasingly linking North American and European markets. The first liquefaction projects without 
having sold total volume based on long-term contracts re moving forward.  
Changes in the institutional framework, i.e., the move from monopolistic structures to competition,14 
in turn demand fundamental changes in the organizational behavior of market participants. More 
competition, mirrored by evolving spot markets, a gin in contract flexibility, and increasing 
international trade, exposes traditional players to greater pressure. Global mergers and acquisitions, 
integration, and strategic partnerships have become r utine today and the LNG industry is dominated 
by a small number of large players. Global oil and natural gas producers and distributors are 
frequently engaged in all stages of the LNG value chain. In addition, export projects are increasingly 
financed and developed by private (and foreign) interests. Former downstream monopolists of natural 
gas are finding their traditional markets challenged by the intrusion of oil and gas majors integrating 
into import markets. Vertical integration in response to market deregulation features drivers including 
upstream producers aiming to benefit from downstream margins and from ownership of transportation 
capacities to exploit arbitraging possibilities. Distribution and power companies move upstream to 
ensure margins and supply security. See Section 3.4 for a discussion of vertical structures in the LNG 
industry. 
3.2.3 Globalization of the natural gas market 
The technology of natural gas liquefaction enables inter-regional gas trade linking the historically 
isolated markets of North America, Europe-Eurasia and Asia-Pacific. Even though regional trading 
patterns prevailed a long time, today’s natural gas m rket can be regarded as a global market in the 
sense that price signals are transmitted from one region to another. However, the (liquefied) natural 
gas market is different from global commodity markets such as the oil industry. Highly capital-
intensive infrastructures make it economically difficult to hold permanent spare capacity and instead 
support the conclusion of long-term sales and purchase agreements. Together with high cost of 
                                                   
14 The US natural gas industry, where restructuring already started in 1978 with the Natural Gas Policy Act
deregulating wellhead prices, is a functioning and highly competitive market. See Makholm (2006; 2007) and 
Hirschhausen (2006, pp. 4 f.) for an overview on regulatory actions implementing vertical unbundling and 
competition in production and marketing. The UK followed with the privatization of British Gas in 1986 and 
vertical unbundling in the 1990s. In Continental Europe, the liberalization process did not start before the late 
1990s with the EU directives 98/30/EC and 2003/55/EC. In Japan, deregulation of natural and electricity sectors 
started only recently.  
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transportation and a lack of liquid trading hubs and fully competitive downstream markets these 
conditions prevented the establishment of a global natural gas price.  
However, recent developments towards more flexibility within contracts and trades support the 
globalization of the natural gas market. The volume of uncommitted capacities along the value chain 
increases. The first export projects without having sold their total volume based on long-term contracts 
are constructed (e.g., Oman LNG, Malysian Tiga LNG, Russian Sakhalin II, expansion trains of 
Australia’s North West Shelf Venture). Project delays of downstream regasification plants or a surplus 
in capacity during ramp-up periods can be used to conduct short-term deliveries (e.g., in 2002, LNG 
shipments from Oman and Abu Dhabi which had been destined for India’s Dabhol import terminal 
suffering from construction delays were sold on the s ort-term market).  
A long time, shipping has been seen as the critical bott eneck motivating oil and gas majors and export 
and import consortia to order a large number of vessels. As a result, the number of LNG ships has 
augmented significantly. Whereas in 1999, virtually a l ships had been dedicated to specific trade 
routes, the share of uncommitted capacity increased to 14% in 2009 (49 of the 337 ships with a total 
capacity of 6.9 million m³; see Figure 21 in the Appendix for an illustration of the development of 
shipping capacities). Free transport capacities are also available due to recent delays in the start-up of 
liquefaction projects. In addition, the current economic crisis reinforces this imbalance between LNG 
production and transportation capacities at least in the mid-term future. Whereas LNG trade ceased 
growing in 2008, the number of LNG ships still increased by 32% from 2007 to 2008; another 35 
ships are currently in the shipyards’ order books (see Figure 11). It is likely that this surplus will 
support the future expansion of the short-term and spot market. LNG vessels also could be employed 
as temporary floating storage and sellers thereby could take advantage of short-term and seasonal price
differences.  
Figure 11: Development of LNG trade and shipping capacities 
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Figure 12 shows the historical natural gas and crude oil spot prices observed on both sides of the 
Atlantic. Whereas oil prices (i.e., the US West Texas Intermediate (WTI) and North Sea Brent) move 
quite parallel reflecting a global oil price, natural gas prices (i.e., US Henry Hub and UK National 
Balancing Point (NBP)) clearly diverge. To a major pa t, they reflect region-specific, instead of global, 
supply-demand conditions. Using spot data for the US, the UK and Continental Europe from 1999 to 
2008, Neumann (2009) confirms the non-convergence of international natural gas prices. However, 
she shows that formerly regionally isolated markets are becoming more integrated and that 
convergence is higher for winter months when markets are tight and natural gas spot prices tend to be 
more volatile, supporting the redirection of LNG spot cargoes.  
Figure 12: Development of crude oil and natural gas prices 
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Tight supply situations in Asian importing countries regularly mirror in high prices for short-term 
deliveries, too, despite the absence of liquid natural gas markets and import prices being determined 
based on oil price indexed pricing formulas within long-term contracts. The short-term price 
differences between regions provide economic incentiv s to redirect flexible cargoes and to deliver 
additional spot volumes to higher value markets. In the period from 2000 to 2001, for example, the US 
faced higher price levels than Continental Europe which led to cargoes being redirected from Europe 
to North America. A similar price relationship and trade pattern was observed in 2003. During the 
winter of 2005/2006, a severe competition for LNG spot cargoes within the Atlantic Basin and sharp 
price spikes occurred. In North America, hurricanes Katrina and Rita severely affected production; in 
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the UK, the transition from a net exporter to a net importer created additional import demand; Spain 
suffered from poor hydro conditions raising the demand for gas-fired power generation; and demand 
in Continental Europe was high due to a cold winter. In early 2008, cold weather pushed Japanese 
power consumption to record levels at the same timewh n a major share of the country’s nuclear 
capacity was offline. Tokyo Electric Power shut down its 8.2 GW Kashiwazaki-Kariwa power plant 
after an earthquake in July 2007. Hence, natural gas demand from the power sector increased 
substantially which mirrored in prices of up to 19 USD/MBTU paid for LNG spot cargoes at a time 
when average import prices were in the range of 9 USD/MBTU. In April 2008, China bought an LNG 
spot cargo at 14 USD/MBTU. Similar prices have been paid for other spot shipments in spring 2008. 
RWE contracted for the delivery of eight cargoes to be delivered to the UK from December 2009 to 
January 2010. Due to recent price increases in the US, however, these volumes will be redirected 
towards the North American market. 
Theoretical and empirical studies of arbitrage trade in the LNG industry are rare. Hayek (2007) 
simulates the value of the option to conduct flexible LNG trades developing a mean-reverting model 
to represent the stochastic evolution of gas prices in regional markets and the resulting price spreads. 
Obviously, larger price differences will be observed for a low correlation between regional prices. 
Zhuravleva (2009) provides a qualitative discussion of different arbitrage models (i.e., initial seller-
arbitrageur, initial buyer-arbitrageur, and independe t trader-arbitrageur). Section 3.4.2 of this thesis 
discusses alternative corporate strategies in today’s LNG industry amongst others with respect to a 
player’s motivation to benefit from systematic investments in infrastructure along successive stages of 
the LNG value chain.  
3.3 Prospects for liquefied natural gas 
Evaluating the future development of LNG export and import capacities is a very difficult task due to 
a number of reasons: i) during the last decade, natural gas (and/or LNG) demand augmented rapidly in 
countries such as China, India, or Spain, but also in historically self-sufficient countries such as the 
UK or Indonesia. The recent economic crisis, however, yields a stagnation (and even reversion) of 
regional demand growth at least for a shorter-term perspective and has fostered the development from 
a sellers’ to a buyers’ market. The exploration of unconventional natural gas sources such as shale gas 
in North America may have an impact on the domestic supply of different countries; ii) oil and natural 
gas prices experienced a sharp increase during 2007 and the first half of 2008, followed by a rapid 
price decrease. The demand for LNG is inherently sensitive to natural gas price volatility and small 
changes in the supply-demand balance alter incentives o invest in its capital-intensive infrastructures; 
iii) the future treatment of greenhouse gas emissions will also have an impact on the economics of 
natural gas as a fuel competing with coal and oil on the one hand as well as with renewable and 
nuclear energy sources on the other.  
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This is supported by Jensen (2007b, p. 10), who argues that “[i]n this environment, it is unlikely that 
any forecast – no matter how well done – will get it right.” The following paragraph therefore focuses 
on the prospects of investments in LNG export and import capacities in the mid-term future up to 
2015. A dataset including all LNG facilities (i.e., operating, under construction, planned, and 
proposed) has been built up using data from various publicly information such as periodical reports, 
newsletters, industry journals, and company websites. I  includes information on nominal liquefaction, 
regasification, and storage capacities, ownership structures, capital investments, supply sources, 
customer portfolios, concluded contracts as well as the LNG world fleet. The number of projects 
reported publicly substantially exceeds the number of projects that are likely to be commercialized; 
therefore, it is necessary to judge which projects are likely to go forward and when. Based on these 
data as well as an objective evaluation of the technically feasible and from an economic point of view 
reasonable realization of the projects, forecasts for capacity development have been generated. These 
are compared to evaluations of future LNG demand mae by industry experts and international energy 
agencies.  
3.3.1 Prospects for LNG exporters 
The early LNG industry was dominated by Pacific Basin trade with supplies coming from Alaska 
(start-up 1969), Brunei (1972), Indonesia (1977), Malaysia (1983), and Australia (1989). In the 
Atlantic Basin, Algeria (1964) and Libya (1970) were early exporters and the United Arab Emirate 
started deliveries from the Middle East to Asian customers in 1977. At the end of 2009, there are 
226 mtpa of liquefaction capacity, of which 35% arelocated in the Atlantic Basin, 42% in the Pacific 
Basin and 23% in the Middle East (see Table 6 in the Appendix). In 2008, Qatar was the largest 
exporter supplying a total of 39.7 bcm of LNG to both European and Asian customers. Together with 
Malaysia (29.4 bcm), Indonesia (26.8 bcm), Algeria (21.8 bcm), Nigeria (20.5 bcm), Australia 
(20.2 bcm), and Trinidad/Tobago (17.4 bcm), these seven countries accounted for 78% of total LNG 
exports (BP, 2009). 
For the near term, significant expansions will be added especially within the Middle East, a region 
where more than 40% of world natural gas reserves ar  located.15 Major expansions are under way in 
Qatar and an additional greenfield project is expected to start operation in Yemen in 2010. Qatar 
announced to observe the behavior of the production fr m the North Field before making 
commitments about further expansions; therefore, additional export capacities beside those already 
under construction are not expected for the mid-term. In the Atlantic Basin, capacities will be 
expanded in Algeria and Libya. In Norway a small-scale LNG project for intra-regional trade is under 
construction and Angola is likely to enter the stage as an additional supplier. Nigeria in the longer-
term has the potential to provide additional exports; domestic consumption is low and still much gas is 
flared during oil production. In the Pacific Basin, neither Brunei nor Malaysia are expected to expand 
                                                   
15 A substantial share of the Middle East’s natural gas reserves are situated within the world’s largest natural gas 
field (i.e., Qatar’s North Field and Iran’s South Pars form one single geological field). 
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their liquefaction capacity. The Alaska venture will reach the end of its economic life in the mid-term. 
Peru is expected to open its first LNG terminal in 2010. Works on Australia’s Pluto venture already 
started in 2007 and also the Gorgon venture is likely to be developed until 2015.  
In recent years, the evolving competition between growing domestic demand and exports in traditional 
supply countries such as Algeria or Libya has become increasingly discussed.16 In the absence of new 
gas developments, export availability will be reduced (IEA, 2009a). For example, Egypt faced 
continuously increasing domestic natural gas consumption over the last 20 years with an average 
yearly demand increase of 11% from 1998 to 2008. The government decided to prioritize the home 
market and introduced a moratorium on new export projects in 2008. In Iran, domestic consumption 
increased by an average of 8.7% during the last decade. Large volumes of produced natural gas are re-
injected into oil fields in order to maintain oil production at economic levels.  
Indonesia is a country showing substantial dynamics. After twenty-five years enjoying the position as 
a reliable supplier of LNG, the country has become a source of supply uncertainty. LNG exports 
peaked in 1999 at a level of 38.8 bcm and declined to 26.9 bcm in 2008. The reasons are diverse. First, 
domestic demand increases due to the government’s efforts to reduce oil consumption via slowly 
reducing subsidies on domestic oil use. Second, the Arun natural gas field, which began production in 
1978, is aging and production declines. Furthermore, domestic natural gas consumption is prioritized; 
certain volumes are delivered to a fertilizer and a pulp company. The LNG plant is already partially 
shut down and is expected to stop exports during the next decade. From the Bontang field, some 
natural gas is diverted to the domestic industry, too.  
Hence, the country was not able to fulfill its long-term supply contracts. According to Global Insight, 
ten cargoes destined for Taiwan had to be cancelled in late 2004; the Oil and Gas Journal reported in 
2007 that Indonesia already had failed to deliver 72 cargoes of LNG (4.1 mtpa) to Japanese customers. 
In 2007, 0.23 mtpa of scheduled LNG cargoes to South Korea had been dropped. Pertamina, the state-
owned oil and gas company, negotiates with LNG buyers over the further proceeding (i.e., whether the 
export volume will be reduced or whether some cargoes might be rescheduled or replaced by swap 
arrangements). The company furthermore has purchased volumes on the spot market to fulfill its 
delivery commitments. Some of its older contracts with Taiwan and South Korea will expire in the 
coming years and Pertamina already has indicated that it will not renew these contracts at their original 
levels. The new Tangguh liquefaction plant which started operation in early 2009 will temporarily 
absorb the decline in the country’s exports. However, industry experts agree that any exports from the 
                                                   
16 Razavi (2009) discusses natural gas pricing policies in MENA countries (holding almost half of global gas 
reserves) where gas prices are set by the governments, often substantially below its economic cost which in turn 
results in a wasteful use of gas, the deployment of inef icient technologies, and a huge burden on government 
budgets. For example, the Egyptian government buys the gas from producers at a price of 2.65 USD/MBTU and
sells it in the domestic market at an average price of 1.19 USD/MBTU resulting in a subsidy of about 7 bn 
USD/a. The Iranian government provides gas to the natio al power utility at 0.1 USD/MBTU, to the industrial 
sector at 0.6 USD/MBTU and to residential/commercial ustomers at 0.45 USD/MBTU. Similar estimates for 
actual price levels and much higher market values for numerous countries are provided by EIA (2009b, p. 525). 
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Donggi field, as had been proposed for the mid-term future, are very unlikely due to the high domestic 
demand as well as lower gas reserves confirmed as expected. 
Another interesting development in Indonesia is that e country announced to study the potential of 
LNG import facilities. A pipeline network covering Sumatra and Java connects the main demand 
centers Java and Bali and with the predominant supply sources Natuna Island and southern Sumatra. 
Other supply regions such as Kalimantan and Papua are not connected to the pipeline system and LNG 
import terminals are considered in eastern and western Java as well as in northern Sumatra. 
Taking the above discussed developments into account, world liquefaction capacity being operational 
in 2015 is forecasted to be 322 mtpa, with the Atlantic Basin accounting for 33%, the Pacific Basin for 
37% and the Middle East augmenting its share to 30%of the installed capacities (see Figure 13). In 
the short-run, the current economic crisis will have a negative effect on LNG demand and on the 
ability to finance infrastructures along the value chain. However, the normal lag in liquefaction plant 
construction (on site works take about four years) makes it difficult for suppliers to respond quickly to 
demand variations. The delayed supply response to an earlier demand growth will start operation until 
2015 and will create a surplus in supply in the mid-term future.  
These forecasts go in line with the LNG demand projections developed by Jensen (2009b, p. 58) 
expecting between 270 and 325 bcm in 2015. Also the Energy Information Administration (EIA) in its 
recent World Energy Outlook projects global LNG trade to be in the range of 300 bcm in 2015 (EIA, 
2009b, p. 439) with prospects for installed liquefaction capacity at a level of 295 mtpa. 
Figure 13: Development of liquefaction capacities 
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3.3.2 Prospects for LNG importers 
The first LNG import facilities started operation in the UK (1964), Japan and Spain (both 1969), Italy
and the US (both 1971), France (1965), and South Korea (1986). Whereas capacities in Europe and 
North America grew slowly or even were mothballed (i.e., UK and US) during the first decades of the 
Expected Observed 
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industry, Pacific Basin countries, rapidly invested in additional projects. Since 2000, however, 
Atlantic Basin countries experience substantially higher annual growth rates with an average of 16.4% 
(versus 2.3% for Asian importers). This renewed interest in LNG had a number of reasons including 
decreasing production from conventional natural gas fields in the US and the North Sea (the UK has 
become a net importer of natural gas in 2006), increasing employment of gas-fired combined cycle gas 
turbine power plants (e.g., gas-fired generation increased from 19 TWh in 1999 to 93 TWh in 2007 in 
Spain), and efforts to diversify supply sources.  
At the end of 2009, there are 450 mtpa of regasificat on capacity, of which 41% are located in the 
Atlantic Basin, 58% in the Pacific Basin and 1% in the Middle East (see Table 7 in the Appendix). In 
2008, Japan was the largest importer receiving a total of 92.1 bcm of LNG (41% of world LNG trade). 
Together with South Korea (36.6 bcm), Spain (28.7 bcm), France (12.6 bcm), and Taiwan (12.1 bcm), 
these five countries accounted for 80% of total LNG imports (BP, 2009). In the coming five years, 
significant expansions are expected especially within Asian emerging countries. Moderate expansions 
are projected for European countries whereas North America currently faces a supply-overhang due to 
the development of substantial unconventional natural gas sources. Figure 22 in the Appendix 
classifies LNG import countries according to their dependence on natural gas imports in the form of 
LNG and the level of proposed new capacities. 
3.3.2.1 North America 
With 812 bcm of natural gas production and a consumption of 824 bcm in 2008, North America 
accounts for a major share of the total world natural gas industry. Thereby, the US represents the 
world’s largest consumer (657 bcm) and the second largest producer (582 bcm). Domestic production 
was rather sufficient to satisfy demand during the last decades and LNG historically could not 
compete with cheap domestic production. It accounted for less than 1% of North American gas 
consumption in 1999 and was mainly used for peak-lod energy needs with LNG import facilities 
restricted to the area of the US. Intra-regional trde included pipeline deliveries from Canada to the 
US as well as some minor volumes from the US to Mexico.  
The EIA forecasts in its latest Annual Energy Outlook that natural gas demand in the US is expected 
to decline in the short-run until 2011 and will continue to grow afterwards with an average annual 
growth rate of 0.2% for the period from 2007 to 2030 (EIA, 2009b, p. 109). The major consuming 
regions are the states of Louisiana and Texas in the South (high consumption originating from the 
industrial and electricity sectors), the Midwest and the Northeast (mainly for heating purposes). The 
share of electricity generated by gas-fired power plants increased from 15% in 1999 to 22% in 2007. 
This equals average annual growth rates of 6.2% since 1999. In comparison, growth rates for coal, 
nuclear, fuel oil, and hydroelectric generation have been less than 1% over the same period (EIA, 
2009c, p. 11). However, the future demand for natural gas is mainly influenced by future climate 
policy actions and the economics of natural gas with respect to relative costs of alternative fuels 
(Ruester and Neumann, 2008, pp. 3162 f.). 
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Major producing regions are Texas, Louisiana, offshore fields in the Gulf of Mexico, and Alaska. 
Production in the Rocky Mountains has increased steadily since 1998. The construction of new 
transmission capacity to consumption centers in the Northeast and Midwest and the expansion of 
existing pipelines to Southern California underline th  importance of the mid-central region as a 
domestic supply source. In 2008, nearly one fifth of total US production came from unconventional 
sources; 55.6 bcm of coal-bed methane (mainly from Wyoming, Colorado and New Mexico) and 57.2 
bcm of shale gas (mainly from Texas) were extracted. 17 
The year 2000 saw a renaissance of interest in imports in the form of LNG. Conventional natural gas 
production reached a peak in 2001 at the same time that demand was projected to continue to increase 
and forecasts claimed that US natural gas production w uld be unable to meet growing demand (e.g., 
EIA, 2004, p. 91). With the opening of the LNG export terminal in Trinidad/Tobago, furthermore, a 
supply source close to the North American market was emerging. Potential investors for LNG for a 
long time believed the biggest struggle for realizing new capacities would be to get the regulator’s 
(i.e., FERC or MARAD) approval. FERC, however, sought to create an investor-friendly environment 
and even deviated from its initial view where LNG import capacity should be treated the same way as 
pipeline capacity. With the ‘Hackberry Decision’ in 2002, it terminated open access requirements to 
regasification facilities. This led to a rapid boost in project proposals. At present, there are 25 
approved projects (including greenfield investments and expansions) in total North America.  
All four LNG import terminals which have been built during the 1970s and early 1980s have revisited 
operation and even have undergone substantial expansions (see Ruester and Neumann, 2008, 
pp. 3163 f.). Gulf Gateway LNG, an offshore facility in the Gulf of Mexico operated by Excelerate, is 
the first new-built terminal since more than two decades and started operation in 2005. Four additional 
terminals came on stream recently (i.e., Freeport Texas, Sabine Pass Louisiana, and Northeast 
Gateway offshore Boston all commissioned in 2008; Cameron LNG Louisiana received its first 
shipment in July 2009). Mexico opened its Energia Costa Azul import facility in May 2008; total 
capacity is dedicated for re-exports via the 140-mile Baja North pipeline to California and Arizona. 
It becomes apparent that all new-build and advanced proposed projects are either located in the Gulf of 
Mexico or feed into the US pipeline system (see Figure 14). Since September 11, 2001, the public has 
grown more aware of risks to national security. Chemical plants and existing and planned nuclear and 
LNG facilities have come under intense scrutiny. Receiving terminals on both the Atlantic and Pacific 
coast face a strong resistance from the local population (‘not-in-my-backyard’ attitude).  
The long-standing history of natural gas production in Texas and Louisiana has proved beneficial for 
all participants: local governments and population are familiar with the approval process, several large 
                                                   
17 ’Unconventional gas’ is found in difficult-to-access geological formations with the rocks being hardly 
permeable and natural gas only flowing with great difficulty. The three main sources include gas shale, tight 
sands, and coal-bed methane. 
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customers are nearby, and major pipelines are conneti g to the Midwest and northeastern US.18 At 
present, the pipelines are reserved 100% by firm customers, but there are two issues of interest: the 
feasibility of expansions and declining domestic production from conventional sources. Volumes in 
the form of imported LNG could make up such shortfalls. Beside the already completed projects, two 
further facilities are under construction. 
It is difficult to assess the probability of success for individual US projects outside the Gulf of Mexico 
(see also Jensen, 2004; Frisch et al., 2005). Developers regularly delay or cancel proposed projects. In 
California and Massachusetts, for example, both state  with an increasing natural gas demand, 
proponents face strong public resistance. Thus, investors look elsewhere. Mexico has already opened 
an import terminal dedicated to supply the southwestern US; another project is proposed. Canada’s 
Atlantic provinces deliver natural gas produced offshore near Sable Island to the northeastern US since
1999. The Canaport LNG terminal currently under construction is expected to start operation in 2010. 
Two further projects are under consideration.  
Figure 14: North American LNG import potential 
 
Source: Own depiction 
 
New LNG must compete with existing facilities and expansions both within the US and in other 
importing regions. A barrier to entry during the first half of the 2000s was the lack of available 
upstream deliveries. Excelerate Energy’s Gulf Gatewy import facility, for example, received only 
nine cargoes during its first year of operation. In co trast to market entrants, incumbent oil and natural 
gas majors therefore currently simultaneously construct liquefaction capacities to correspond with 
regasification capacities. 
However, nothing has altered the North American natural gas market and its appetite for LNG as 
severe as the discovery and development of significa t unconventional gas sources. Within a couple of 
                                                   
18 E.g., The Transco-, Texas Eastern-, and Tennessee Gas pipelines extend to the Northeast. Trunkline Gas 
Company and Mississippi River Transmission supply power producers and industrial users in the Midwest. 
Demand center 
Supply source 
  Existing US onshore 
  Existing US offshore   
  Existing Mexico  
  Proposed US 
  Proposed Mexico/Canad 
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years, the supply-demand balance has changed from one of continuous production declines to one of 
an upcoming surplus. Rising natural gas prices since 2001, easy financing and technological 
innovations (i.e., horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing) encouraged companies to invest in wells. 
Amongst others, large deposits were explored with the Barnett Shale and Eagle Ford plays (both in 
Texas) and the Haynesville Shale (Louisiana). The Potential Gas Committee states in its 2008 
assessment report that the US alone might possess a total resource base of 51,200 bcm which would 
increase the static reserves-to-production ratio from about ten to 90 years. In Canadian British 
Columbia, the Horn River Shale Basin is estimated to comprise about 14,000 bcm. A pipeline to the 
coast and a liquefaction terminal are under consideration.  
The substantial rise in unconventional gas production reversed the historical decline in US gas output 
reducing demand for LNG. In the early 2000s, researchers still saw North America as a major player 
in the future LNG market (see e.g., Chabrelie, 2003, p. 5; CIEP, 2003, p. 114). The EIA regularly 
adapted its annual energy production and consumption forecasts. In 1999, most domestic production 
was expected from conventional natural gas with unconventional sources projected to account for not 
more than 200 bcm in 2020 and LNG imports were forecasted to remain at marginal levels. The 2004 
outlook five years later predicted unconventional production to increase to 255 bcm and LNG imports 
to rise to 140 bcm in 2025. In its latest outlook, future unconventional natural gas production has been 
adjusted further upwards (340 bcm in 2025 and 400 bcm in 2030) whereas the prospects for LNG 
imports with 30 bcm in 2030 are less enthusiastic (ee Table 8 in the Appendix). 
The future potential for natural gas production from unconventional sources, however, will mainly be 
determined by the level of natural gas prices and the development of production costs. Each shale play 
has its individual geological characteristics; no general statement on the cost structure can be made. 
Dar (2009) quotes the break-even price at 3.88 USD/MBTU (Eagle Ford), 3.74 USD/MBTU 
(Marcellus), 4.49 USD/MBTU (Haynesville), and 5.18 USD/MBTU (Barnett). This goes in line with 
Jensen (2009b) arguing that much shale gas could be ev loped at natural gas price levels of 
4 USD/MBTU. Berman (2009), in contrast, argues thatonly half of the Barnett Shale wells would be 
economic at prices of 10 USD/MBTU and expects a drop in drilling activities as a response to the 
lower prices since mid-2008. Whether current production levels can be maintained at prices below 
5 USD/MBTU is one of the major uncertainties for the mid-term future. 
As a consequence of the increased domestic productin, needs for imports declined. For the short-
term, this trend is further amplified by the recent demand downturn due to the economic crisis 
(IEA, 2009a). US LNG imports dropped in 2008 to 9.9bcm from 21.8 bcm in 2007. Import terminal 
operators suffered from idle regasification capacities. The load factor of total North American LNG 
import capacity fell from 61% in 2004 to 8% in 2008 (see Figure 15). It is very likely that beside the
completion of projects already under construction, no significant investments in LNG capacities will 
be realized in the mid-term future. Some LNG terminal operators even have already sought permission 
from FERC to add export equipment to their facilities. Since North America w s expected to be a 
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major growth market for LNG, this development has a evere impact on the future global LNG 
demand. 
Figure 15: Development of North American LNG imports and nominal import capacity 
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3.3.2.2 South America 
South America has emerged as an LNG importing region in mid-2008 with the commissioning of 
Argentina’s Bahia Blanca offshore terminal operated by Excelerate Energy in June and Brazil’s Port 
Pecem offshore facility operated by state-owned Petrobras in July. An additional project is already 
under construction offshore Rio de Janeiro and is expected to start operation in 2010. South American 
natural gas demand is expected to increase above world average from 127 bcm in 2007 to 229 bcm in 
2030 with an average annual growth rate of 2.6% (IEA, 2009b, p. 366).  
Further proposals for regasification facilities include one project each in Argentina and Uruguay and 
two projects each in Brazil and Chile. For the mid-term outlook, it is very likely that no substantial 
investments will be realized since most countries ar  endued with some natural gas reserves and intra-
regional pipeline trade (e.g., from Bolivia to Brazil or Argentina) could be expanded. For Chile, a 
country without large natural gas resources, the construction of one small-scale facility until 2015 
seems probable. In 2004 and 2005, Argentina reduced its deliveries to the country in order to ease its 
own domestic gas shortages which raised concerns about energy security. 
3.3.2.3 Europe 
After a short-term decrease in natural gas demand as a consequence of the world economic crisis, the 
long-term upward path is projected to continue from 2010 on. The IEA forecasts an increase from 
544 bcm in 2007 to 651 bcm in 2030 in the reference scenario (IEA, 2009b, p. 366) with the demand 
growth mainly being driven by the power sector. Modern combined-cycle gas turbine power plants 
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benefit from lower up-front investment costs and shorter construction times than alternative mid- and 
base-load technologies, greenhouse gas emissions are significantly lower than for other fossil fuels, 
and gas-fired capacity is a suitable complement to renewable energy sources since its flexible 
operation is able to absorb supply fluctuations.   
On the supply side, overall OECD Europe’s production is expected to decline from 294 bcm in 2007 
to 222 bcm in 2030, even though Norway will raise output during the coming decade increasing its 
production from the Ormen Lange and Snovhit fields. The Netherlands’ Groningen field and UK’s 
Continental Shelf are reaching maturity. The explorati n of unconventional gas sources is still in its 
infancy. Shale gas resources are estimated to be in th  range of 14,000 bcm but will only play a minor 
role on a local scale, given that public resistance i  the densely populated areas can be overcome 
(Schulz and Horsfield, 2009). Hence, overall import needs are forecasted to move up from 250 bcm in 
2007 to 428 bcm in 2030 (IEA, 2009b, p. 478). 
The future composition of foreign supplies will depend on a number of factors including the 
comparative supply costs and natural gas availability of alternative sources, upstream investment risks 
and midstream transit risks of alternative supply routes, and the countries’ policies with respect to 
diversification. Industry experts agree that increased import needs are likely to be met through 
additional pipeline supplies from Europe’s traditional suppliers (i.e., Russia, Algeria, and Norway), 
new supplies from the Caspian region and potentially from the Middle East, and additional LNG 
imports. Thereby, Russia will experience higher supply costs in the long-term since production from 
its Yamburg, Urengoy and Medvezhye fields will decline and new, more expensive fields (e.g., 
Shtokman, Yamal Peninsular) have to be developed, which in turn improves the competitiveness of 
alternative supplies. Figure 23 in the Appendix provides an overview on supply costs of potential 
natural gas sources for both pipeline as well as LNG. 
Nominal European LNG import capacities augmented from 36 mtpa in 1999 to 91 mtpa at the end of 
2009 with Spain accounting for about one third of the capacity increase. The country has always been 
highly dependent on natural gas imports receiving the first LNG deliveries in 1986. Pipeline deliveries 
are restricted to supplies from Algeria via Morocco and some minor volumes from Norway via France. 
In order to meet rapidly increasing demand and to diversify supply sources, Spain expanded its 
existing LNG receiving terminals and three new facilities came on stream since 2003. A seventh 
terminal currently is under construction.  
Greece and Portugal entered the industry in 2000 and 2003, respectively. For both countries no 
expansions are planned for the mid-term future. Italy, in contrast, will become a more important 
destination for LNG imports in the next years; two terminals are under construction; numerous 
additional projects are proposed. The commissioning of about three import terminals until 2015 seems 
likely and will decrease Italy’s reliance on Algerian and Russian natural gas imports. Further capacity 
additions are expected for France, Croatia (functioing as a transit country for deliveries to Central 
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Europe), and the Netherlands. Proposed projects in other countries such as Albania, the Canary 
Islands, Germany, Ireland, or Poland are not likely to be realized until 2015. 
The decline in the UK’s domestic production has provided incentives to invest in LNG infrastructure. 
Three regasification facilities started operation during the last four years and additional capacities are 
under construction. Imports in the form of LNG add to supply security on the one hand and may 
enable the country to function as a European hub and re-export volumes via the Interconnector and 
BBL pipelines to the Continent if local price differences support this.  
3.3.2.4 Asia Pacific 
Within the Asia Pacific region, one has to distinguish between traditional LNG importers (Japan, 
South Korea, and Taiwan) and newcomers (China and India). The somewhat isolated and more 
developed economies in northeast Asia lack substantial energy resources and have started to use LNG 
and nuclear energy in order to minimize their dependence on imported oil. Natural gas consumption is 
forecasted to increase only moderately during the coming two decades supporting only minor 
investments in new LNG import capacities. Two facilities will come on stream in Japan until 2015; 
one new import terminal is expected for Taiwan.  
The emerging economies of China and India, on the contrary, are the critical uncertainty factor within 
the global LNG market. Historically, the two countries have mainly used domestic coal to satisfy their 
energy needs. However, natural gas is increasingly becoming an important component of their primary 
energy mixes. The IEA forecasts an increase in natural gas consumption from 73 (39) bcm in 2007 to 
242 and 132 bcm in 2030 for China and India, respectively (IEA, 2009b, p. 366), representing annual 
growth rates of 5.3 and 5.4%, much above world average of 1.5%.  
The Chinese natural gas market has been expanding rapidly in recent years, particularly after the 
completion of the West-East pipeline in 2004. The government aims to expand the share of gas-fired 
power generation from currently 1% to about 10% in 2020 (IEA, 2009a, p. 123). Production growth 
cannot keep up with demand growth although new supplies from the Sichuan Province are expected to 
come on line in the short-term. The country could be dependent on imports for more than 30% of its 
consumption in 2030. These are likely to be met by pipeline imports from Turkmenistan via 
Kazakhstan and LNG (EIA, 2009a, p. 44). Three LNG import terminals are in operation with the 
Guangdong terminal (start-up in 2006) and the Fujian and Shanghai facilities commissioned in 2009. 
Two additional facilities are under construction, 14 terminals are proposed.  
In India, natural gas plays a small role in the total energy mix, but demand has been growing rapidly, 
too. Much of the country’s current production originates from more mature fields that are beginning to 
decline and India is projected to be dependent on imports for more than 30% in 2030 (EIA, 2009a, 
p. 44). Some new domestic production will come from the Krishna Godavari Basin. Pipelines 
supplying natural gas from the Middle East, Central Asia, or Myanmar have been discussed in the 
past; however, their realization is very unlikely in the near future. With the Dahej and Hazira facilities, 
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two LNG import terminals are operating since 2004 and 2005. One additional terminal is already 
under construction, seven projects have been proposed.  
For both countries, however, it is very difficult to evaluate how many projects finally will be realized 
and when. Unconventional gas resources are supposed t  be present in China (e.g., South China, 
Zhungaer, Tuha, Qadam, and East China Basins) as well as in India (e.g., Gondwana and Gambay 
Basins) and could reduce the needs for natural gas imports. Their scope and recoverability have not 
yet been explored. Furthermore, cheap abundant coal reserves could affect the optimistic growth 
forecasts for LNG imports. Obviously, Asian emerging economies represent a substantial challenge in 
a carbon-constrained world given the large share of coal in their energy supply portfolios and the high 
growth rates in energy demand. 
Using a model of the world natural gas market, Huppmann et al. (2009) investigate the impact of a 
strong demand increase in China and India on global trade patterns. Whereas domestic production 
levels in the two countries would increase only slightly under this positive demand scenario, imports 
gain in importance. Regasified volumes in 2030 would increase by 860% for China and by 450% for 
India as compared to the reference case. Intra-regional pipelines are constructed from Kazakhstan 
(2015) and Russia (2020) to China as well as from Pakistan (2020) to India, with expansions in later 
periods. LNG deliveries from the Middle East to Europe and North America decrease by 20% and 
47% respectively; exports to Asia increase by 40% and price levels raise. This mirrors that the future 
development of the supply-demand balance in these em rging economies will have a substantial 
impact on the global (liquefied) natural gas market. 
Two further countries will enter the LNG market until 2015. Singapore is constructing an import 
terminal in order to secure natural gas supplies. LNG shall complement the current pipeline imports 
from Indonesia and Malaysia which are used to generate 80% of the country’s electricity supply. Gas 
demand also is expected to rise due to the substitution of oil-fired power plants for new-built gas-fired 
capacities as well as the construction of new petrochemical plants. Thailand is constructing an import 
terminal in order to diversify supply sources. Domestic production is declining and pipeline imports 
are restricted to deliveries from Myanmar.  
3.3.2.5 Summary 
Taking the above discussed developments into account, world regasification capacity being 
operational in 2015 is forecasted to be 596 mtpa, with Europe accounting for 27%, North America 
(including Mexico) for 23%, Asia for 48%, and South and Central America for 2% of the installed 
capacities (see Figure 16).  
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Figure 16: Development of regasification capacities 
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Source: Own depiction  
 
World regasification capacity is outstripping liquefaction capacity; the ratio of total import over total 
export capacity approached about 0.5 during the last decades (see Figure 17). To a certain extent this 
is a natural development since LNG in some countries is a major source of seasonal supply. Korea Gas 
Corporation for example has a twenty-year long-term supply contract with Yemen LNG over the 
delivery of 2 million tons of LNG per year; 50% of the annual contracted volume thereby is taken off 
during the winter months. Other import terminals are run mainly based on short-term and spot 
deliveries in order to exploit favorable supply-demand situations (e.g., India’s Hazira terminal 
operated by Shell and Total; Excelerate Energy’s import facilities in the US, the UK, Argentina, and 
Kuwait). Moreover, a regasification facility is the cheapest part of the value chain and some players 
invest in an import terminal in order to enter a new market.  
Figure 17: World liquefaction versus regasification capacities 
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3.4 Vertical structures in the LNG industry 
The development of the global LNG market from an infant towards a mature industry has been 
accompanied by far reaching dynamics in vertical structures within the industry. The following 
subsections discuss the changing role of traditional l g-term contracts and the increasing relevance of 
short-term and spot trade. A number of oil and gas m jors follows a strategy of vertical and horizontal 
integration investing in a portfolio of export, shipp ng, and import capacities at the same time that 
other companies choose a strategy of non-integration operating LNG terminals as ‘tolling facilities’. 
The occurrence of such a menu of governance forms in one and the same industry is very interesting 
from a New Institutional Economics point of view.  
3.4.1 The changing role of long-term contracts 
Investments in LNG infrastructure, especially in upstream exploration, production, and liquefaction, 
are very capital-intensive. Therefore, financing traditionally required the conclusion of long-term sale  
and purchase contracts before the construction process was initiated (Jensen, 2009a, p. 7). Sellers 
typically have been state-owned oil and gas majors (e.g., Algerian Sonatrach, Indonesian Pertamina, 
Malaysian Petronas) and for a minor share joint venur s of private companies (i.e., US’ Philipps and 
Marathon) or of private and state companies (e.g., Brunei Coldgas, a partnership between the state of 
Brunei, Shell, and Mitsubishi). Buyers typically have been downstream state-controlled utilities (e.g., 
Gaz de France, Japanese Tokyo Gas and Osaka Gas, Korea Gas Corporation, Turkish Botas, or 
Spanish Enagas).  
The traditional contract was a rigid take-or-pay contract in which the buyer accepted to take-off a 
certain minimum level in the range of 90% of the nominal contracted quantities (CIEP, 2003, p. 12). 
The seller in turn accepted a price escalator related to some measure of competing energy prices. 
Hence, the buyer took the volume risk whereas the pric  risk was transferred to the seller. Restrictions 
in destination limited arbitrage trades.  
Within the three importing regions, alternative contracting patterns and pricing structures established. 
Prices for LNG thereby are set either by price competition with domestic gas (mainly US, UK) or by 
the operation of pricing formulas. When the first LNG contracts were negotiated with Japanese buyers 
in the 1960s, Japanese power generation was heavily dependent on fuel oil. Pricing clauses therefore 
tied the price escalation to the Japanese Customs Clearing price, an index of Japanese crude oil import 
prices. This pricing scheme later was adopted for other Asian contracts, too. In the mid-1990s, the oil-
linkage of LNG prices in Asian contracts was softened. So-called ‘S-curve’ formulas guarantee the 
interest of the seller if the price of the benchmark crude oil index drops below a certain threshold an
protects the buyer from oil prices rising above a certain ceiling.19 Asian importers traditionally were 
willing to pay a price premium of about 1 USD/MBTU as compared to LNG buyers in Europe and 
                                                   
19 The first ‘S-curve’ formula was applied within a contract concluded between the Australian North West Shelf 
venture and Japanese customers in 1994. The floor price was set at 16.95 USD/bbl and the ceiling price at 26.95 
USD/bbl (Chabrelie, 2003, p. 7). 
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North America reflecting their concerns about supply security (EIA, 2003, p. 35; IEA, 2009b, p. 521; 
see also Figure 24 in the Appendix). Continental European pricing structures were effectively 
originated by the Netherlands’ pricing policies fordomestic natural gas produced from the Groningen 
field since 1962. The natural gas price was indexed to light and heavy fuel oil. This pattern later was 
also adopted for export contracts. More recent (liquefied) natural gas contracts include also prices of 
other relevant energy sources such as coal, natural gas or electricity (see Figure 25 in the Appendix). 
The improvement of gas-to-gas competition and increasing liquidity in natural gas hubs should 
support the establishment of gas market indicators. In contrast, North America and the UK today are 
characterized by a functioning gas-to-gas competition with long- and mid-term contracts being to a 
large extent tied to gas market indicators.20  
As the LNG industry has expanded during the past deca , terms of long-term supply contracts started 
to change and trade became more flexible. Average contract duration as well as contracted volumes 
are decreasing in both Atlantic and Pacific Basin markets (see e.g., Hirschhausen and Neumann, 2008; 
Ruester, 2009a). Destination clauses are eliminated (Energy Charter Secretariat, 2008, pp. 56 f.). 
Take-or-pay requirements are relaxed and options for additional cargoes are included in recent 
contracts, e.g., in a recent contract between Korea Gas Corporation and Qatar’s Rasgas venture 
(Chabrelie, 2003, p. 6). Whereas deliveries in the early years of the industry typically have been ex-
ship sales, free-on-board (fob) agreements are becoming more common (Eng, 2006; Nissen, 2007b). 
For fob contracts, the buyer takes ownership of the cargo once it is loaded and has complete flexibility 
over a potential redirection or resale. For example, Korea Gas Corporation traditionally procured LNG 
ex-ship but enlarged its tanker fleet recently and now concludes for fob contracts. In 2007, Equatorial 
Guinea sold its entire LNG output on an fob basis to BG. In 2008, a re-loading facility was 
inaugurated at the Zeebrugge import terminal. Once a cargo is discharged to the storage tanks, the 
LNG belongs to the importing company and re-export is feasible without violating the contract. 
Cargoes sourced originally from Qatar already have be n delivered to South Korea, India, Portugal 
and Spain.  
Contract flexibility has also been a major target of buyers when renegotiating existing contracts. The
Japanese importers Tokyo Gas and Tokyo Electric Power for example have renegotiated a Malaysian 
contract to supply a part of the volume fob rather than ex-ship enabling the buyers to resale some 
cargoes. According to Zhuravleva (2009), it is also becoming common practice to divert contractually 
committed LNG volumes to third markets given a mutual agreement of both seller and buyer. This 
increased contract flexibility is supportive to supply security (see also Makholm, 2007, p. 32) since it 
permits adaptations to short-term changes in the supply-demand balance. The netback value will 
determine the most attractive market in those cases where LNG shippers are free in the choice of 
destination. 
                                                   
20 Suppliers adopt their contracts according to the common pricing structures in the import market; e.g., Qatar 
links the price for LNG deliveries to crude oil prices in Japan, to fuel oil prices in Continental Europe, and to 
natural gas spot prices (Henry Hub and NBP) in the US and the UK (Dorigoni and Portatadino, 2008, p. 3372). 
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Long-term supply contracts allowing the financing of new infrastructures are increasingly 
accompanied by short-term agreements (less than 3 years) and spot transactions balancing supply and 
demand in the short- to medium-term. For example, a consortium of Japanese buyers signed contracts 
with Malaysia to buy 0.68 mtpa for a period of 20 years and an additional 0.34 mtpa for a single year 
beginning in April 2004. The short-term component is updated annually. This combination of short- 
and long-term provisions provides much higher volume flexibility than conventional take-or-pay 
contracts.  
The short-term market established not before the 1990s with the first arbitrage trades and swap 
agreements appearing in the early 2000s (Energy Charter Secretariat, 2008, pp. 57 ff.). Electricité de 
France (holding 3.3 mtpa at Zeebrugge and 0.7 mtpa at Montoir) has signed a swap agreement with 
the US-based Dow (3.75 mtpa at Freeport) offering each party a slot of 1 bcm per month of import 
capacity at the other company’s import terminals.21 The additional margin is shared among Electricité 
de France, Dow and the supplying company. A similar tr ns-Atlantic swap agreement involves Suez 
and ConocoPhilipps. Major short-term and spot volumes today are supplied by Qatar, Algeria, and 
Oman; main buyers have been the US, Spain and South K rea (see Figure 18). 
Figure 18: Development of short-term and spot trade  
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21 Electricité de France’s supply for Zeebrugge from Qatar’s Rasgas project is interruptible at the supplier’s 
option, which explains why many of its Zeebrugge slots are not used. 
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However, there may be technical and economic constrai ts limiting arbitrage activities. First, free 
capacities have to be available along the value chain including liquefaction plants (sellers may utilize 
volumes during the ramp-up period of a contract), shipping and storage at the downstream 
regasification plants. Second, gas quality differs by natural gas source (see Table 9 in the Appendix) 
and import facilities constructed during the early years of the industry have been designed to receive 
LNG of a certain composition. However, it is technically feasible to endow import terminals with 
natural gas adaptation equipment allowing for a decrease (i.e., nitrogen injection; mainly necessary in 
the UK and the US) or increase (i.e., propane injection; mainly Asian importers) of natural gas quality 
in order to meet grid requirements. Third, during the loading and shipping period, typically between 
four days (e.g., Trinidad/Tobago to the US Gulf Coast) and two weeks (e.g., Qatar to Japan), spot 
prices in the destination country may change.  
For the near-term future, the outlook for spot LNG trade is quite modest and will critically depend on 
how quickly the global economy recovers from the current recession. Many buyers that have been 
active in spot- and short-term trade currently can meet their gas requirements by their long-term 
contracts and some even have to demand downward adjustments in volume flexibility due to weak 
consumption levels (IEA, 2009b, p. 529). For the longer term, the outlook is more optimistic. LNG 
exporters increasingly dispose of uncommitted liquefaction capacities. The overhang in regasification 
capacities facilitates downstream market access for non-incumbents and the increasing liquidity of 
European trading hubs enhances price transparency.  
3.4.2 Recent trends towards vertical and horizontal integration 
After the analysis of contracting practices for thesupply of LNG, the following discussion addresses 
corporate structures in the sense of vertical and horizontal integration (and non-integration) within the 
LNG industry. The role of private and state-owned oil and gas companies, partnerships, and 
organizational forms with respect to the operation of LNG facilities are investigated.  
Joint ventures always have been a common form of organization within the LNG industry for two 
main reasons. First, the large investment costs associated with upstream exploration, production and 
liquefaction ventures makes it difficult for one single company to develop and finance the project on 
its own. Joint ventures are set up in order to share the risks and financial burden. Partnerships betwe n 
private oil and gas companies have formed: e.g., for Alaska LNG (ConocoPhillips and Marathon) or 
for the North West Shelf Venture in Australia (BHP Billiton, BP, Chevron, Mitsubishi/Mitsui, Shell, 
and Woodside Energy). Second, a joint venture with the incumbent NOC is likely (e.g., Abu Dhabi, 
Egypt, Indonesia, Nigeria, Russia or Qatar). On the on  hand, NOCs seek to retain control over natural 
gas reserves; on the other hand, private majors contribute to the partnership technological knowledge 
and marketing channels. In summary, 15% of the existing nominal liquefaction capacities are owned 
and operated by joint ventures between private majors, the majority of 76% is controlled by 
partnerships between NOCs and private partners, and the remaining 9% of the capacities are operated 
by NOCs without any third party (i.e., Algeria, Libya). 
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Forward integration from the upstream to the downstream sector is a governance form which has 
become characteristic for the industry with players controlling capacities along successive stages of 
the value chain. Upstream producers aim to benefit from downstream margins. One recent 
phenomenon is the increasing employment of self-contracting. Thereby, the seller concludes for a 
sales-and-purchase agreement with its own marketing affiliate as has been realized at Qatar’s Qatargas 
and Rasgas liquefaction projects (Exxon Mobil, Qatar Petroleum, and Total), in Trinidad/Tobago (BP, 
Repsol, and BG), or Norway (Statoil and Gaz de France). In Nigeria, the first three trains of the Bonny 
Island venture were dedicated to traditional long-term take-or-pay contracts concluded between the 
venture and European buyers. For trains 4 and 5 in contrast, Shell and Total (holding equity shares in 
the liquefaction plant) self-contracted certain volumes. In total, eleven companies have self-contracted 
for about 1,660 bcm of LNG over the period from 2009 to 2025 (IEA, 2009b, p. 527).  
In one version of this commercial business model, the LNG export project is operated as a tolling 
facility selling the services of liquefaction, storage, and loading to the LNG merchant (see also Nissen, 
2004; 2006) and natural gas producers rather than te venture become the sellers of natural gas. This 
structure has been adopted for example in Egypt where the BG Group and BP act as merchant traders 
at the Idku plant and the Spanish Union Fenosa at the Damietta facility. Alternatively, the venture’s 
project partners buy the LNG from the project.  
The unbundling of transportation assets and services from rigid export-import project relationships is a 
major precondition for flexible trade and the contrl of non-committed shipping capacities has become 
of strategic value in today’s LNG market. Private players have invested in a significant number of 
vessels during the last decade: Shell controls 30 carriers through joint ventures and direct ownership. 
Exxon Mobil and Qatar Petroleum have a fleet of 27 ships. The BG Group owns eight vessels and 
recently ordered another four ships. Several other companies entered the midstream shipping stage 
during the 2000s (e.g., BP, Gaz de France, and Osaka G s). As already discussed above, the number of 
uncommitted ships has increased from approximately z ro before 2000 to 49 in 2009 (of a total of 337 
ships representing 14% of total shipping capacity).  
Self-contracting accompanied with investments in a portfolio of upstream and downstream positions 
and uncommitted ships enables the players to decide where to send LNG cargoes on a shorter-term 
basis and to take advantage of favorable price conditi s. Three case studies shall demonstrate the 
successful employment of this strategy: Shell disposes of LNG export positions in Australia, Brunei, 
Malaysia, Nigeria, Oman, and Russia at the same timhat the company holds capacity rights at 
import terminals in India and Mexico. It will contiue its expansion within the industry and participate 
in projects proposed for France, Italy, and Brazil. S milarly, Total has built up a portfolio of export 
positions in all three exporting regions and import positions in India, Mexico, and France. Exxon 
Mobil and Qatar Petroleum entered a partnership in the late 1990s. In order to mitigate supply costs 
given the long distance from the Middle East to consuming centers, they constructed the largest 
liquefaction facilities (7.8 mtpa trains) and ordered the largest vessels (>210,000 m³) ever, thus 
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realizing substantial economies of scale. At the same time, the partners secured capacity rights at 
import terminals on both sides of the Atlantic (South Hook in the UK, Rovigo in Italy and Golden 
Pass in the US).  
Backward integration from the downstream to the upstream sector is observed, too. Traditional natural 
gas distributors increasingly participate in LNG export ventures, motivated mainly by supply security 
considerations: Gaz de France holds shares in Egypt’s Idku project and Norway’s Snovhit LNG; 
Union Fenosa participates in Oman’s expansion train; and Tokyo Gas in Australia’s Darwin project. 
Also electricity companies, forming part of the extended value chain including natural gas-fired power 
production, enter the stage. Whereas Spain’s first LNG terminals were operated by Enagas, traditional 
electricity companies (Union Fenosa, Endesa, and Iberdrola) are now the dominant investors. AES 
Corporation, the operator of a 319 MW gas-fired power plant in the Dominican Republic also owns 
and operates the country’s LNG import terminal. Electricité de France proposed a regasification 
facility in the Netherlands. Some Japanese power producers even integrate further upstream: Tokyo 
Electric Power holds a share in Australia’s Darwin project and Kansai Electric will participate in the 
Pluto venture. Hunger (2003) and Newbery (2007) provide theoretical analyses of the ongoing 
convergence of the natural gas and electricity sectors.  
In contrast to these integrated players, there are also some new entrants into downstream LNG markets 
which follow a strategy of non-integration: With the upcoming enthusiasm for LNG needs within 
North America in the early 2000s, Cheniere Energy entered the market and applied for the 
construction of four onshore LNG import facilities at the Gulf coast which should be operated as 
tolling facilities. The Freeport LNG and Sabine Pass projects were commissioned in 2008. However, 
as discussed above, the US’ supply-demand balance altered throughout the last years. With the 
development of substantial unconventional resources, increased domestic production is outstripping 
higher cost LNG supplies. Thus, the two terminals suffer from low utilization rates. Plans to build the 
additional facilities are dormant at the moment and it is very unlikely that these projects will be 
realized in the next decade. In fact, recent developments have resulted in liquidity problems for the 
company and Cheniere had to lay off more than half of its 360 employees in April 2009.  
Another entrant is Excelerate Energy, founded in 1999. In 2008, the German RWE acquired a 50% 
stake in the company. Excelerate employs an innovative echnology of offshore, onboard 
regasification. Five import facilities have been alre dy been built with the Gulf Gateway (start-up 
2005) and Northeast Gateway (2008) in the US, Teessid  GasPort in the UK (2007), Bahía Blanca 
GasPort in Argentina and Mina Al-Ahmadi GasPort in Kuwait (both 2008). An additional facility is 
proposed for Germany offshore Wilhelmshaven. However, industry experts report that only minor 
deliveries took place up to today through these facilities. The non-integrated players still have to pr ve 
to be successful in an industry, which a long time has been a sellers’ market without major 
uncommitted export capacities, and in which also in the longer-term future, once, the economic crisis 
is overcome, importers are expected to continue to compete for global supplies.  
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3.5 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter has discussed recent dynamics in the global LNG market, which developed from an 
infant towards a mature industry during the last deca . Capacities along all stages of the value chain 
more than doubled since 2000 and numerous players, countries as well as companies, entered the 
market. Long-term contracts gained in flexibility and are increasingly accompanied by short-term 
trades. Whereas the early industry typically was characterized by ex-ship take-or-pay contracts 
concluded between the upstream project and downstream utilities with the import terminal being part 
of the integrated value chain, today, explicit destination flexibility regularly is requested. LNG players 
increasingly invest in a portfolio of import positions and uncommitted shipping capacities enabling 
flexible trade. Some new import terminals are operated as merchant terminals, receiving spot cargoes 
and lacking any long-term supply contracts (e.g., India’s Hazira facility), others are operated as tolling 
facilities, with the owner selling unloading, storage, and regasification services (e.g., UK’s Grain 
LNG).  
The coming five years will see expansions in export and import capacities even though the recent 
decrease in global energy demand, falling cash flows, and a tight credit market have led to a drop in 
investments in large-scale energy projects. Long lead times in the construction of LNG facilities result 
in a delayed supply response to the demand growth observed during the past five years and numerous 
projects which currently are under construction will start operation until 2015 creating an oversupply 
in the market for the short-term. On the supply side, the Middle East will become a major exporting 
region and amplifies the globalization of the naturl gas market delivering LNG to both Atlantic and 
Pacific Basin customers. On the demand side, emerging economies in Asia represent a major source of 
uncertainty concerning future LNG demand and competition for global supplies. For the longer-term, 
the development of LNG depends on several factors such as natural gas’ relative competitiveness 
compared to coal in power generation, environmental policies, or the exploration and cost structure of 
unconventional natural gas sources. 
Various governance forms co-exist in the LNG industry, including the poles of spot market 
transactions and vertical integration as well as numerous hybrid forms such as long- and short-term 
contracts, joint ventures and strategic partnerships. Frequently, the same company chooses different 
governance modes along alternative value chains. Furthermore, different companies follow varying 
strategies even though they traditionally operate in similar stages of the value chain. These 
observations represent a suitable base for empirical studies investigating firms’ motivations to choose 
alternative organizational structures. Therefore, th  following chapters empirically investigate, based 
on transaction cost economics and recent extensions thereof, i) the likelihood of vertical integration 
and the impact of inter-organizational trust on thechoice of more or less hierarchical governance 
modes; ii) the relationship between strategic positioning in the market, relationship-specific 
investments, and governance form, iii) and the choice f optimal contract duration of long-term supply 
contracts.  
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3.6 Appendix 
Figure 19: Development of world natural gas consumption 
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Source: Own depiction based on data from BP Statistical Reviews of World Energy 
 
Figure 20: Development of vessel capacity by start-up year 
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Source: Own depiction based on data from http://www.shipbuildinghistory.com 
 
Figure 21: Development of shipping capacities 
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Table 6: Existing and proposed liquefaction facilities as of 2009 
Country Existing 
sites 
Nominal 
capacity 
[mtpa] 
Under 
construc-
tion 
Nominal 
capacity 
[mtpa] 
Proposed Nominal 
capacity 
[mtpa] 
Atlantic Basin 
Algeria 
Angola 
Egypt 
Equatorial Guinea 
Libya 
Nigeria 
Norway 
Trinidad/Tobago 
Venezuela 
Total 
 
2 
- 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
- 
9 
 
20.2 
- 
16.2 
3.7 
0.6 
20.3 
4.3 
14.8 
- 
80.1 
 
1 
1 
- 
- 
- 
- 
1 
- 
- 
3 
 
4.5 
5.2 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0.3 
- 
- 
10 
 
- 
- 
- 
exp. 
exp. 
3 
- 
exp. 
1 
4 
 
- 
- 
- 
4.4 
3.2 
40 
- 
3 
4.7 
55.3 
Pacific Basin 
Australia 
Brunei 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Peru 
Russia 
US 
Total 
 
2 
1 
3 
1 
- 
1 
1 
9 
 
19 
7.2 
35.1 
22.7 
- 
9.6 
1.4 
95 
 
1 
- 
- 
- 
1 
- 
- 
2 
 
4.3 
- 
- 
- 
7 
- 
- 
11.3 
 
5 
- 
2 
- 
- 
1 
- 
8 
 
37.5 
- 
4 
- 
- 
7.5 
- 
49 
Middle East 
Abu Dhabi 
Iran 
Oman 
Qatar 
Yemen 
Total 
 
1 
- 
1 
2 
- 
4 
 
4.8 
- 
10.7 
35.7 
- 
51.2 
 
- 
- 
- 
exp. 
1 
1 
 
- 
- 
- 
31.2 
6.7 
37.9 
 
- 
3 
- 
exp. 
- 
3 
 
- 
28.8 
- 
7.8 
- 
36.6 
Total 22 226.3 6 59.2 15 140.9 
Source: Own depiction based on data from various publicly available sources 
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Table 7: Existing and proposed regasification facilities as of 2009 
Country Existing 
sites 
Nominal 
capacity 
[mtpa] 
Under 
construc-
tion 
Nominal 
capacity 
[mtpa] 
Proposed Nominal 
capacity 
[mtpa] 
Atlantic Basin  
Argentina 
Belgium 
Brazil 
Canada 
Canaries 
Croatia 
Dominican Republic 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Jamaica 
Mexico 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Puerto Rico 
Spain  
Turkey 
UK 
Uruguay 
US 
Total 
 
1 
1 
1 
- 
- 
- 
1 
2 
- 
1 
- 
- 
1 
- 
1 
- 
1 
1 
6 
1 
3 
- 
8 
29 
 
2.2 
6.3 
1.6 
- 
- 
- 
2 
10.7 
- 
3.3 
- 
- 
2.6 
- 
3.6 
- 
4 
0.7 
33.5 
4.6 
20 
- 
88.7 
183.8 
 
- 
- 
1 
1 
- 
- 
- 
1 
- 
- 
- 
- 
3 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
1 
- 
1 
- 
3 
11 
 
- 
- 
3.7 
3.6 
- 
- 
- 
6.1 
- 
- 
- 
- 
21.3 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
5 
- 
4.5 
- 
29.6 
73.8 
 
- 
- 
2 
5 
1 
1 
- 
4 
2 
- 
1 
1 
13 
1 
- 
4 
- 
- 
- 
1 
3 
1 
25 
65 
 
- 
- 
3.6 
24.1 
1.3 
7.3 
- 
19.3 
11 
- 
3 
2.9 
75 
1.1 
- 
24.7 
- 
- 
- 
~ 3 
15.7 
2.6 
~ 51 
194.6 
Pacific Basin 
Chile 
China 
El Salvador 
Hong Kong 
India 
Indonesia 
Japan 
Mexico 
Philippines 
Singapore 
South Korea 
Taiwan 
Thailand 
Total 
 
- 
3 
- 
- 
2 
- 
23 
1 
- 
- 
4 
1 
- 
34 
 
- 
9.3 
- 
- 
8.6 
- 
176.3 
7 
- 
- 
53.6 
7.4 
- 
262.2 
 
- 
2 
- 
- 
1 
- 
1 
1 
- 
1 
- 
1 
1 
8 
 
- 
6 
- 
- 
5 
- 
3.7 
3.8 
- 
3 
- 
3 
5 
29.5 
 
2 
12 
1 
1 
7 
4 
5 
4 
2 
- 
1 
1 
- 
40 
 
4 
45 
0.8 
3 
22.5 
9 
~ 10 
20.9 
2.4 
- 
5 
3 
- 
115.6 
Middle East 
Dubai 
Kuwait 
Pakistan 
Total 
 
- 
1 
- 
1 
 
- 
3.8 
- 
3.8 
 
- 
- 
1 
1 
 
- 
- 
3 
3 
 
1 
- 
- 
1 
 
3 
- 
- 
3 
Total 63 449.8 20 106.3 105 310.2 
Source: Own depiction based on data from various publicly available sources 
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Figure 22: Import country matrix 
Source: Own depiction 
 
Figure 22 classifies LNG import countries according to their dependence on natural gas imports in the 
form of LNG and the level of proposed new capacities ( rrespective of the probability of realization of 
these capacities). Quadrant I thereby indicates countries with a high dependence on LNG imports and 
a high level of proposed new capacities which would in icate a low level of short-term physical 
supply security. No country is situated within this area. In contrast, there are many players within 
Quadrant II, characterized by numerous project proposals, too, but a low dependence on imports. 
These markets are expected to grow (e.g., China, India).22 Diversification of energy sources and 
natural gas supply routes is one motivation to expand LNG capacities (e.g., France, Italy). Other 
countries have to come up against decreasing domestic production (e.g., UK, Netherlands) or plan to 
expand re-exported volumes (e.g., Mexico, Canada, UK). Quadrant III mainly represents (potential) 
new entrants into the LNG market (e.g., Brazil, Kuwait) and small players in the market (e.g., Greece, 
Turkey, Belgium). Quadrant IV includes mature markets with a high dependence on LNG imports 
where significant investments have been realized in the past (e.g., Japan, Spain). 
 
                                                   
22 The US represents an exemption due to the recent change in the domestic supply-demand balance. Projects 
proposed during the last decade not being under construction yet are very unlikely to be realized in the near- to 
mid-term. 
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Table 8: EIA Annual Energy Outlook projections over time (reference case)  
Year of 
publication 
Supply sources Net imports Average 
annual 
increase in 
demand (%)  
1999  
(p. 71) 
 
- Most production expected from 
conventional sources 
- Unconventional: ~7 tcf in 2020     
(200 bcm) 
 
- Most imports from Canada 
- LNG not expected to grow on a 
significant scale 
1%  
for the 
period 1999-
2020 
2004  
(pp. 90-91) 
 
- Most production expected from 
unconventional sources 
- Unconventional: ~9 tcf in 2025  
(255 bcm) 
 
- LNG expected to gain in importance 
with ~5 tcf in 2025 (140 bcm) 
 
1.4%  
for the 
period 2002-
2025 
2009 
(pp. 77-78) 
 
- Significant potential of 
unconventional sources forecasted 
- Unconventional: ~12 tcf in 2025 
(340 bcm) and ~14 tcf in 2030 
(400 bcm) 
 
- LNG prospects corrected 
downwards with ~1 tcf in 2030 
(28 bcm) 
0.2% 
for the 
period 2007-
2030 
(decline in the 
short-run for 
2008-2011) 
Source: Own depiction based on EIA (1999, 2004, 2009b) 
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Figure 23: Supply costs for potential sources of gas delivered to Europe (USD/MBTU) 
 
Source: IEA (2009b, p. 482) 
 
Figure 24: Average LNG import prices (monthly data) 
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Figure 25: Oil-linkage in long-term natural gas contracts 
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Table 9: LNG characteristics 
Origin  Nitrogen Methane Ethane Propane C4+ LNG density Gross calorific value 
 % % % % % kg/m³ MJ/m³ [gas] 
Algeria-Arzew 
Algeria-Beth. 1 
Algeria-Beth. 2 
Algeria-Skikda 
Egypt-Damietta 
Egypt-Idku 
Equat. Guinea 
Libya 
Nigeria 
Norway 
Trinidad/Tobago 
Abu Dhabi 
Oman 
Qatar 
US-Alaska 
Australia 
Brunei 
Indonesia-Arun 
Indonesia-Badak 
Malaysia 
0.6 
1.2 
0.9 
1.0 
0.08 
0.0 
0.0 
0.7 
0.1 
0.8 
0.0 
0.3 
0.4 
0.4 
0.2 
0.1 
0.1 
0.2 
0.0 
0.3 
88.0 
87.6 
91.4 
91.2 
97.7 
97.2 
93.4 
81.6 
91.3 
91.8 
96.8 
84.8 
87.9 
90.1 
99.7 
87.4 
90.6 
90.7 
91.2 
90.3 
9.0 
8.4 
7.2 
7.0 
1.8 
2.3 
6.5 
13.4 
4.6 
5.7 
2.7 
13.2 
7.3 
6.2 
0.1 
8.3 
5.0 
6.2 
5.5 
5.3 
2.0 
2.1 
0.5 
0.7 
0.2 
0.3 
0.0 
3.7 
2.6 
1.3 
0.3 
1.6 
2.9 
2.3 
0.0 
3.4 
2.9 
2.0 
2.4 
3.1 
0.5 
0.7 
0.0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.2 
0.0 
0.7 
1.4 
0.4 
0.1 
0.1 
1.6 
1.0 
0.0 
0.8 
1.5 
1.0 
0.9 
1.1 
464 
469 
451 
453 
427 
430 
439 
485 
458 
451 
432 
467 
470 
460 
423 
467 
461 
457 
456 
461 
44.1 
44.0 
42.1 
42.2 
40.8 
41.0 
42.0 
46.6 
44.2 
40.1 
41.0 
44.9 
45.3 
44.0 
39.9 
45.3 
44.6 
43.9 
43.9 
44.3 
Source: GIIGNL (2008, p. 8) 
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4 Inter-organizational Trust as a Shift Parameter in the Extended 
Transaction Cost Framework 
4.1 Introduction 
Even though the huge body of empirical literature testing transaction cost economics’ predictions has 
increased the understanding of post-contractual hold-up, transaction cost economics in its basic form is 
a static concept taking the institutional environmet as given. This has been a major point of criticism 
and motivated Oliver Williamson to introduce an extension of the transaction cost economics model. 
The shift parameter framework investigates how the optimal choice of governance changes in 
response to dynamics in the institutional environmet. Changes in exogenous parameters (such as the 
stability of property rights, improvements in contract law, reputational effects in networks, or varying 
levels of uncertainty) will shift the relative costs of alternative governance structures. The impact of 
both transaction characteristics and the institutional environment on governance choice are analyzed 
(Williamson, 1991b).  
Transaction cost economics discusses post-contractual hazards under the assumption that the investing 
party faces an opportunistic counterpart with formal contractual arrangements and internal 
organization being the only possible safeguards against ex-post expropriation of quasi-rents. However, 
inter-organizational trust, a concept intensively studied in social sciences and psychology, can 
attenuate the incentives to behave opportunistically. Immediate gains from opportunism must be 
traded off against future costs since unreliable behavior would be punished with respect to future 
exchange relationships. The presence of inter-organizational trust should enhance information 
exchange, support conflict resolution, and decrease tr nsaction costs. Thus, trust reduces the need for 
hierarchical controls and should favor the choice of less hierarchical (i.e., more relational) governance 
modes.  
The following study contributes to the empirical literature an analysis that examines the effect of both
transaction characteristics and the institutional evironment on the choice of governance in the global 
LNG industry where vertical integration and strategic partnerships have become a common 
organizational form at the same time that short-term trade is continuously increasing in volume. Using 
a dataset of 237 corporate-specific value chains, I introduce inter-organizational trust as a shift 
parameter. First, following transaction cost economics, it is hypothesized that specific investments 
under uncertainty provide incentives to integrate vrtically. Second, it is argued that inter-
organizational trust changes the relative costs of vertical integration and non-integration and supports 
less hierarchical governance modes.  
These economic relationships are tested i) based on a probit model to explain the binary choice 
between vertical integration into midstream shipping and non-integration and ii) based on an ordered 
probit model to explain the degree of vertical integration (i.e., non-integration versus integration from 
upstream or downstream into midstream shipping versus integration along the whole value chain). 
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Estimation results provide broad support for transaction cost economics by showing that relationship-
specific investments in an uncertain environment drive LNG companies to invest in successive stages 
along the value chain. The presence of inter-organizational trust increases the likelihood of less 
hierarchical governance modes. The consideration of a shift parameter further enhances the 
explanatory power of the model supporting the need for empirical studies accounting for both 
transaction cost variables as well as variables capturing dynamics in the institutional environment.23 
4.2 Literature review  
Empirical literature testing the shift parameter framework is rather scarce. The first application is 
Oxley (1999) who investigates the impact of intellectual property protection on the structure of inter-
firm technology transfer alliances linking US and non-US firms. Finding support for transaction cost 
economics’ hypotheses she shows that more hierarchic l alliances (i.e., equity joint venture instead of 
a contractual alliance) are more likely in the presence of weak intellectual property protection. A 
strong protection of intellectual property is achieved only when property rights are easy to establish, 
interpreted broadly and strictly enforced. Weak protection will result in an increased appropriability 
hazard and support the choice of more hierarchical governance modes.  
Henisz and Williamson (1999) discuss the concept of shift parameters for national and multinational 
firms focusing on the impact of weak (respectively strong) property rights and on the stability of 
contract law on governance choice (e.g., partnership between the foreign and a host-country firm). 
They argue that within a single country, the choice is mainly determined by the attributes of the 
transaction. Comparing corporate behavior over time or across countries, a higher credibility of the 
institutional environment (i.e., secure property rights, stable contract law) will support complex 
transactions and governance forms. High political hazards should support partnering of multinational 
firms with host-country entities. 
Gulati and Nickerson (2008) analyze the impact of inter-organizational trust as a shift parameter on 
governance choice and the performance of exchange relationships in the US auto industry using a 
survey of component buyers at Ford Motor Company and Chrysler Corporation. Estimation results of 
a three-stage switching regression model24 support transaction cost theory’s predictions. Further, the 
authors’ hypotheses of exogenous trust enhancing performance both directly and indirectly are 
confirmed. On the one hand, an increase in inter-organizational trust directly enhances firm 
performance; on the other hand, it shifts the likelihood of organizational choice from hierarchy to the
market (i.e., a more expensive mode of governance is substituted by a less expensive one) and hence 
indirectly enhances firm performance, too.  
                                                   
23 This chapter builds on Ruester (2009b). 
24 In the first stage regression, inter-organizational trust is explained as a function of exchange attribu es and a 
number of antecedents of pre-existing trust; the second stage explains governance choice (i.e., buy, ally, and 
make) as a function of transaction attributes and the predicted level of trust; the third stage switching regression 
explains exchange performance as a function of governance choice, transaction attributes, and the predicted level 
of trust. 
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4.3 Theoretical background 
The following paragraph discusses the concept of inter-organizational trust and its relation to inter-
personal trust. It is assessed whether relational ad formal contracts should be regarded as 
complements or substitutes. After a formalization of the shift parameter framework, industry-specific 
propositions are derived.   
4.3.1 Inter-personal and inter-organizational trust 
The past decade has shown increased interest in invest gating the sources and consequences of trust in 
economic exchanges. Recent literature encompasses re arch in the fields of social psychology, 
organizational theory, strategic management, busines  history, and economics. Gulati and Sytch 
(2008) provide a detailed literature review, Gulati and Nickerson (2008, p. 690) a survey of empirical 
studies showing that trust is an important element of market exchanges.  
Traditional transaction cost economics argues that exchange relationships involving non-redeployable 
investments create ex-post bilateral dependency and vul erability to opportunistic behavior, trust does 
not yield a reliable safeguard unlike formal modes of governance. On the contrary, trust is understood 
as an important mean to mitigate relational risks in the social science literature which argues that 
economic players may not always behave opportunistically. There is an emerging view that in the 
governance of exchange relationships non-economic, social factors complement economic ones (see 
e.g., Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995).25 Woolthuis et al. (2005, p. 816) argue that “…the assumption 
that actors have an intrinsic tendency to keep promises is as true as their likelihood to behave 
opportunistically.”  
A narrow definition is called for when delineating the concept of trust from traditional economic 
terms. Zaheer et al. (1998, p. 143) define trust as “ he expectation that an actor (1) can be relied on to 
fulfill obligations, (2) will behave in a predictable manner, and (3) will act and negotiate fairly when 
the possibility for opportunism is present.” In other words, trust is based on reliability, predictability, 
and fairness. Similar definitions appear in Woolthuis et al. (2005, p. 816), Gulati and Sytch (2008, 
p. 167), and Gulati and Nickerson (2008, p. 689).  
Dispositional trust reflecting expectations about the trustworthiness of others in general is 
distinguished from relational trust which is based on experience and interaction with a particular 
exchange partner (Zaheer et al., 1998; Gulati and Sytch, 2008).26 The focus of the following discussion 
will be on the latter. Williamson (1993a) distinguishes calculative trust (i.e., refers to a rational form 
of trust built upon reputation and can be understood in terms of risk), personal trust (i.e., altruistic 
behavior not depending on calculations of self-interest but being motivated by benevolence), and 
institutional trust (i.e., derives from social and organizational embeddedness). Partly in line with this
                                                   
25 Zaheer and Venkatraman (1995, p. 374) discussing the complementarity of social and economic factors claim 
that “the significant social component in economic action is generally ignored in economic explanations f 
exchange activity, and is frequently consigned to the error term or to ‘noise’.” 
26 Woolthuis et al. (2005) discuss ‘competence trust’ and ‘intentional trust’ which correspond to dispositi nal 
and relational trust respectively. 
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last classification, Gulati and Nickerson (2005) discuss exogenous trust (i.e., arising out of past 
interactions) as opposed to endogenous trust (i.e.,intrinsic to the governance mode). Organizational 
arrangements may reduce the likelihood of opportunis ic behavior since they provide a basis for trust 
by creating incentives, providing administrative contr ls and a means for solving disputes.  
Trust in its relational form can be understood as an endogenous variable being determined by the 
history of prior interactions between trading partne s as well as by their evaluation of the future value 
of the relationship. For example, potential partners can jointly adjust the incentives to make 
trustworthy behavior an economically preferable option, select firms which engage in non-
opportunistic behavior, etc. Trust increases due to l arning about the partner and his likely behavior as 
well as due to improved coordination processes among firms. Contracts furthermore are self-enforcing 
if the present value of continuing the relationship exceeds the value of deviating from the implicit 
contractual terms. Fehr (2009) provides a literature review on recent research addressing the presence 
of inter-personal trust and its formation. 
A trust relationship becomes particularly valuable in situations characterized by risk and (behavioral) 
uncertainty. Higher levels of trust are related to reduced negotiation costs, less severe conflicts and 
easier problem solving, superior information sharing, and high levels of cooperation. Negotiations are 
less costly in the presence of trust because agreements are reached more quickly and easily. Trust 
mitigates information asymmetries by allowing more pen sharing of information. When unforeseen 
contingencies arise, high trust facilitates the development of a common understanding about the 
contingencies and how they might be resolved. The presence of trust reduces transaction costs by 
reducing or eliminating opportunism. Indeed, a number of papers find that trust in inter-firm 
exchanges can be a source of competitive advantage. Gulati and Nickerson (2005) discuss the central 
role of exogenous inter-organizational trust in both directly enhancing exchange performance and 
indirectly enhancing performance by supporting the use of less hierarchical (i.e., less costly) 
governance.  
Whereas the early literature focused on inter-personal trust (relationships between individuals such as 
boundary spanners who handle and manage inter-organizatio al exchange), later studies explicitly 
delineate inter-organizational trust (relationships between entities). Zaheer et al. (1998, p. 141) point 
out that “a fundamental challenge in conceptualizing the role of trust in economic exchange is 
extending an inherently individual-level phenomenon t  the organizational level of analysis. Not 
clearly specifying how trust translates from the individual to the organizational level leads to 
theoretical confusion about who is trusting whom.” 
Gulati and Sytch (2008, p. 171) argue that there are at least two mechanisms that contribute to the 
development of inter-organizational trust from the istory of interaction between individuals 
representing their entities (i.e., organizational boundary spanners). First, emerging interpersonal trust
between boundary spanners is likely to transform with time into organizational trust as the initially 
informal inter-personal commitments between individuals become routinized and institutionalized at 
 87 
the organizational level. Second, the history of interaction between organizational boundary spanners 
can foster inter-organizational trust directly as those individuals are viewed first and foremost as 
occupants of constrained organizational roles. Interaction between boundary spanners will reflect not 
just an inter-personal connection, but also an institutionalized role relationship. Zaheer et al. (1998, 
p. 144) argue similarly that the connection between inter-personal and inter-organizational trust is 
based on institutionalizing processes. Over time, repeated ties between two firms evolve into deeper, 
more stable cooperative arrangements. Informal commit ents made by individual boundary spanners 
become established as organizational structures and routines. Using data on exchange relationships 
between electrical equipment manufacturers and their component suppliers the authors confirm 
empirically the high correlation between inter-personal and inter-organizational trust as well as the 
negative impact of inter-organizational trust on the ransaction costs of inter-firm exchange. 
4.3.2 Trust versus formal contracts: Complements or substitutes?  
Empirical evidence about the relationship between trust and formal contracts is mixed (Poppo and 
Zenger, 2002, pp. 711 ff.; Woolthuis et al., 2005, pp. 813 ff.). Gulati and Nickerson (2008) argue that
trust and formal governance modes (i.e., hybrid modes as well as vertical integration) act 
simultaneously as both substitutes and complements.   
Trust can be understood as a substitute for formal contracts. If trust exists when firms enter an 
exchange relationship, it mitigates some of the contracting hazards associated with the exchange 
relationship which in turn results in a higher exchange performance since formal governance is 
substituted by less formal (i.e., less expensive) organizational forms. On the other hand, trust can also
be understood as a complement for formal contracts educing ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs and 
facilitating joint problem solving in cases where unexpected contingencies arise. Hence, exchange 
performance will be superior when trust operates with formal contracts regardless of the chosen 
governance structure.27  
Poppo and Zenger (2002) find empirical evidence for the complementarity of formal contracts and 
relational governance in the outsourcing of information services with both organizational forms having 
a positive impact on exchange performance. Woolthuis et al. (2005) investigate the relationship of 
trust and formal contracts based on case study analyses focusing on collaborative innovations 
involving complex transactions, environmental uncertainty, and relationship-specific investments. 
Trust can successfully substitute for contracts (i.e., a very incomplete contract is accompanied by high
inter-organizational trust which results in a successful relationship), or trust and formal contracts may 
be complements in the sense that trust is understood as a precondition for contract negotiations. Gulati 
and Nickerson (2008) confirm empirically the simultaneity of trust inducing a substitution effect on 
                                                   
27 The complementarity view in some cases is also interpreted as trust being a precondition for negotiating a 
complex contract. Pre-existing trust may be necessary for the parties to be willing to invest in the rlationship. 
An alternative view comes from social science. Contracts may also signal distrust and the active use of a c ntract 
may evoke conflict. 
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the optimal choice of governance mode and the comple entarity effect of trust lowering the 
governance costs of all modes of organization whenev r exchange hazards are present. They 
furthermore find that exchange relationships involving inter-organizational trust are more successful 
than those strongly exposed to opportunistic behavior. 
4.3.3 Formalization of the shift parameter framework 
As discussed in Section 2.2, transaction cost economics studies economic organizations from a 
comparative point of view. The choice of the optimal governance mode is determined based on an 
economization of the sum of transaction and production costs. The purpose of this chapter is to 
consider how the equilibrium of optimal governance choice will change in response to disturbances in 
the institutional environment. Changes in exogenous parameters, or shift parameters, will have a 
disproportional impact on the costs of different modes of organization. They may shift the cost curves 
via changes in the intercepts and/or slopes and may be relevant for one or more of the alternative 
modes of governance. Figure 26a illustrates the impact of a shift parameter raising (A+) or decreasing 
(A-) the intercept of the governance costs of market exchange; Figure 26b illustrates the impact of a 
shift parameter raising (B+) or decreasing (B-) its slope (i.e., the effect depends on the level of specific 
investments). These dynamics move the critical values of asset specificity determining the optimal 
governance choice.  
Figure 26: Shift parameter with an impact on a governance cost curve’s intercept (a) and slope (b) 
   (a)      (b) 
 
Source: Own depiction 
 
In analyzing the optimal governance of technology transfer alliances, Oxley (1999) hypothesizes that 
weaker intellectual property protection increases the costs of contracting relative to the costs of equity 
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critical level of appropriability hazards to the left-hand side. More hierarchical governance becomes 
more likely. Henisz and Williamson (1999) discuss the impact of property rights and contract law on 
governance choice. Since vertical integration supports internal conflict settlement, changes in contract 
law will influence only market exchange and hybrid governance modes. A change in contract law that 
improves the quality of enforcement will therefore reduce the governance costs of market and hybrid 
contracting as compared to hierarchy. The intercepts of their governance cost curves decrease; less 
hierarchical governance modes become more likely. Williamson (1991b) discusses property rights 
protection as a possible shift parameter. The fear of expropriation by the government and/or 
expropriation by rivals, suppliers, or customers distorts ex-ante incentives to invest and motivates ex-
post safeguards via protective (hierarchical) governance structures. The governance cost curves for 
market exchange and hybrid modes will shift upwards with decreasing stability of property rights. 
Further, he argues that improved reputation in a network will attenuate incentives to behave 
opportunistically since the immediate gains from opp rtunistic behavior must be traded-off against 
future costs. The governance cost curves for market and hybrid governance forms will decrease 
favoring less hierarchical governance modes. See Figure 29 to 32 in the Appendix for graphical 
illustrations of these applications of the shift parameter framework. 
The following discussion focuses on inter-organizational trust as a shift parameter, in particular, trust 
engendered by past interactions between the same trading partners. As discussed above, prior 
empirical work finds that the presence of inter-organizational trust reduces transaction costs in the 
sense of lowering (re-)negotiation costs, facilitatng adaptation, information exchange and joint 
problem-solving. In the presence of relationship-specific investments, inter-organizational trust will 
decrease the probability and/or extent of post-contractual opportunistic behavior by the non-investing 
party; exchange partners are more likely to avoid disputes or to resolve them quickly.  
Looking at market exchange, trust will have no effect on the governance cost curve when exchange 
hazards are absent, but otherwise will shift the curve downward. The impact of trust on the governance 
costs of hybrid modes of organization is similar. However, the decrease will be less significant than 
for market exchange since complex contracting may limit the effectiveness of trust and may even 
dissipate it. Finally, trust is important in hierarchical exchanges as well. Internal disputes between 
divisions should arise less frequently, and should they occur, they will more often be resolved by the 
partners themselves without recourse to other authorities. The decrease in governance costs will be 
lower than for hybrid modes since high levels of bureaucracy and administrative controls limit the 
ability of exchange partners to make adaptations and agreements independently.  
In summary, pre-existing inter-organizational trust should enhance exchange performance independent 
of the chosen organizational structure with this effect being the higher the less hierarchical the 
respective governance mode. More formal governance modes will be substituted by less formal ones. 
As the level of specific investments deepens, the cost of opportunistic behavior as well as the benefits 
from mechanisms that reduce the likelihood of such be avior will increase.  
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Figure 27 illustrates Williamson’s shift parameter framework applied to the binary decision about 
whether to integrate vertically (VI), or to use less hierarchical governance modes (non-integration, 
or NI). In the absence of pre-existing trust, the choice f the optimal (transaction cost economizing) 
governance form implies using non-integration for s < s* and internal organization otherwise. The 
presence of inter-organizational trust t will decrease the probability and extent of post-contractual 
opportunistic behavior and reduce governance costs in he presence of asset specific investments: 
NI(0, t) = NI(0) and VI(0, t) = VI(0) and the slope of the governance cost curves flatten with 
∂NI(s, t)/∂t < ∂VI(s, t)/∂t < 0 for all s > 0 if t > 0. The critical value of asset specificity shifts from s* to 
s’*  with s* < s’*. The likelihood of organizing a transaction within the own hierarchy therefore should 
decrease with an increase in the level of inter-organizational trust.   
Figure 27: Inter-organizational trust as a shift parameter 
 
Source: Own depiction 
 
4.3.4 Industry-specific propositions 
As discussed in Section 3.2, we distinguish upstream, midstream, and downstream activities in the 
LNG industry. Firms may specialize in one, two, or all three of these segments. First, a number of 
players integrate along several stages of the value chain (e.g., the BG Group will control the whole 
value chain for deliveries from Idku/Egypt to Brindsi/Italy which is expected to start operation in 
2010; GdF Suez owns a fleet of LNG vessels used to transport natural gas amongst other from Algeria 
to France). Second, there are companies investing in a portfolio of export and import positions, 
thereby focusing a strategy of both vertical and horizontal integration (e.g., Exxon Mobil has interests 
in liquefaction facilities in Qatar as well as in Idonesia and holds import capacities in South 
Hook/UK and Rovigo/Italy and recently started investments in Golden Pass/US). Strategic 
Governance 
costs 
Asset 
specificity s 
NI (s) 
NI (s, t) 
VI (s) 
VI (s, t) 
s* s‘* 
 91 
partnerships and joint ventures here play an important role. Third, a number of new non-integrated 
players have entered the LNG market during the last decade (e.g., Cheniere, Excelerate Energy). 
However, we also observe varying strategies of different companies which are active in similar stages 
of the value chain, and one and the same company choosing different positions along alternative value 
chains.  
The definition of asset specificity in the LNG industry is not straightforward. According to Nissen 
(2007a, p. 5), asset specificity is “a property of the transportation links, created by the terms of 
physical and commercial access [to shipping capacities].” In particular, the midstream element of the 
value chain is of crucial importance in an industry with a relatively illiquid shipping market. Post-
contractual opportunism by the counterparty may be hazardous for parties without shipping control, in 
other words, ex-ship/cif buyers and fob sellers.28 However, the natural gas market traditionally has 
been a sellers’ market. The accompanying restructuring and liberalization of downstream natural gas 
(and electricity) markets results in downstream physical asset specificity. A player investing in 
regasification capacity without having secured supplies and access to midstream shipping might be 
caught in a lock-in situation. LNG sellers profit from significant bargaining power since importers 
competed globally for natural gas supplies. Furthermore, competitive downstream markets facilitate 
their access to numerous buyers.  
According to the transaction cost approach, idiosyncratic assets in uncertain environments lead to the 
hazard of post-contractual opportunistic behavior by the counterparty which in turn results in ex-ante 
under-investment and decreasing overall efficiency. Organizing transactions within a firm’s own 
hierarchy will avoid ex-post appropriation of quasi-rents. Based on transaction cost economics’ 
discriminating alignment hypothesis, the first proposition is derived: 
 
Proposition 1: The higher the share of idiosyncratic (downstream) assets in the portfolio of an 
LNG firm in an uncertain environment, the higher will be the probability of vertical integration 
along the LNG value chain. 
 
As discussed above, prior empirical work has found that the presence of inter-organizational trust 
reduces transaction costs. In the presence of relationship-specific investments, inter-organizational 
trust will decrease the probability and/or extent of p st-contractual opportunistic behavior by the non-
investing party; governance costs (i.e., transaction costs) are reduced and overall exchange 
performance increases. Since governance costs change disproportionally between governance modes, 
less hierarchical modes become more attractive, leading to the second proposition:  
 
                                                   
28 Free-on-board (fob): title transfer at the loading port with the buyer being responsible for shipping; cost-
insurance-freight (cif): title transfer during voyage with the seller being responsible for shipping; delivered ex-
ship (des): title transfer at the unloading port with the seller responsible for shipping. 
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Proposition 2: An increase in the level of trust bew en upstream and downstream players in the 
LNG industry will favor less hierarchical modes of g vernance. 
 
It is assumed that the observed governance modes represent efficient choices and that potential 
misalignment will result in a re-positioning or in the company ceasing its activities in the industry due
to entrepreneurial failure. Since transaction-specific performance data (i.e., performance related to 
activities along the LNG value chain) are not publicly available, a possible third proposition 
hypothesizing that the presence of trust will increase exchange performance independent of the chosen 
organizational structure cannot be tested.  
The next section describes the econometric model developed to analyze the propositions. In the first 
step, the determinants that drive players towards vertical integration are investigated; in the second 
step estimation results for a static transaction cost model are compared to those of a model that 
includes trust as a dynamic factor characterizing the institutional environment. 
4.4 Data and methodology 
4.4.1 Data 
The global dataset encompasses corporate investment behavior along LNG value chains from the 
beginning of the industry until today. It was compiled from various publicly available sources such as 
company websites, industry reports, newsletters, and journals, etc., and complemented with interviews 
with industry experts. The dataset includes export and import capacities, ownership structures, 
investment costs, financing structures, and expansion plans for liquefaction and regasification projects, 
data on the global tanker fleet, including vessels currently listed in shipyard order books, and analyses 
of contracting partners, contracted volumes, and contractual durations.  
Using the dataset’s 66 import and 23 export projects (including all of the existing regasification and 
liquefaction plants worldwide and projects under construction and expected to be operational up to 
2012), existing value chains (historical, actual, and planned for the near-term) are identified in a first 
step. In a second step, individual companies’ activities throughout the chains are analyzed. The sample 
consists of 237 corporate-specific value chains, 131 of which are situated in the Atlantic Basin and 
106 correspond to Asia-Pacific trade. Figure 28 summarizes the observations in the sample by export 
and import region. The large share (~ 50%) of identifi d value chains having started operation from 
2000 on indicates the growing importance of natural gas trade in the form of LNG. 
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Figure 28: Number of observed corporate-specific value chains by export and import region 
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Source: Own depiction 
 
The unit of analysis for studying the determinants of vertical integration is a corporate-specific value 
chain. Two alternative measures for integration are sp cified. First, a binary variable indicating 
vertical integration from upstream or downstream into midstream shipping is defined. Both, equity 
relationships and long-term charter contracts are classified as vertical integration. Even though NIE 
considers long-term contracts as a hybrid form of governance, it is appropriate to classify long-term 
charter agreements for LNG vessels as vertical integra ion since the ships traditionally have been 
dedicated to specific companies and transport routes ov r their whole lifetime. The dependent variable 
VI1 is a discrete measure taking the value of one if we observe vertical integration of the player along 
the value chain i, and zero otherwise: 
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In 134 of the 237 observations vertical integration of the respective player into midstream shipping is 
observed. Second, the degree of vertical integration ( .e., no vertical integration versus vertical 
integration from upstream or downstream into midstream shipping versus vertical integration along the 
entire value chain) is defined as VI2: 
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In 103 of the observations there is no integration, in 85 cases integration into midstream shipping takes 
place, and in 49 cases companies control the entire valu  chain. 
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4.4.2 Explanatory variables 
Transaction cost variables. Proposition 1 refers to the impact of idiosyncratic assets and uncertainty 
on the likelihood of vertical integration. Transaction cost economics predicts that asset specificity s 
the strongest determinant of integrating successive stages of the value chain into the corporation’s own
hierarchy. Theory shows that the most efficient soluti n is trade on a short-term market for exchange 
relationships not involving any investment in specific assets. Markets become inefficient as bilateral 
dependencies arise. Specific investments in environments without uncertainty can be secured through 
long-term contracts. In contrast, the existence of uncertainty results in vertical integration being more 
efficient. The relative extent of idiosyncratic assets of a player (SPEC) is defined as the ratio of 
regasification capacity over the sum of regasification and liquefaction capacity the player controls in 
the start-up year of value chain i with SPECi = r i, year / (r i, year + l i, year). The variable increases with the 
share of regasification capacities in a firm’s LNG portfolio, mirroring the lock-in situation of a player 
investing downstream in a sellers’ market. It is continuously distributed between zero and one, 
including these boundaries. 
Due to the high capital-intensity of infrastructure investments and uncertainties about the scope of 
natural gas fields and price developments, investors generally face different risks. In addition, natur l 
gas fields are often located in politically unstable regions.29 Several risks can be hedged via 
diversification (e.g., upstream exploration success), price adaptation and renegotiation clauses or other 
measures (price and quantity risks). Therefore, the political risk associated with upstream investments 
is evaluated as the main driver of uncertainty. Thevariable for political uncertainty (UNC) is based on 
the so-called POLCON-index developed by Henisz (2000). This index measures the degree of 
constraints on policy change in a country averaged for five-year periods since 1960.30 Various studies 
have shown that this measure is a suitable index for political uncertainty testing transaction cost 
economics’ hypotheses. I adjust the POLCON-index so that a high (low) value expresses high (low) 
uncertainty; UNC is defined as (1 – POLCON) with UNCi ∈  [0, 1].  
To account for transaction cost economics’ proposition hat relationship-specific investments in the 
presence of uncertainty drive companies to the internalization of quasi-rents, an interaction term 
(SPEC · UNC) is included.  
Shift parameters: As discussed above, Williamson (1991b) proposes as one potential shift parameter 
reputational effects discussed in the context of social networks; Gulati and Nickerson (2005) employ a 
measure of exogenous trust based on an assessment of the pinion of the buyer about its supplier 
compared to the best alternative partner. Gulati and Sytch (2008) point out that the history of prior 
interaction is the most important factor determining ter-organization trust. Gulati and Nickerson 
                                                   
29 For example, the guerrilla activities of Aceh separatists in Western Sumatra (Indonesia) caused a temporary 
shutdown of the Arun liquefaction facility in 2001.  
30 Henisz (2000) reports the POLCON-index until the period 1990-1994. For observations after 1994 I use the 
most recently reported value which is an appropriate assumption, since the index is very stable over the eported 
period. 
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(2008) employ variables measuring the length of historical exchange; Oxley (1999) quantifies the 
number of prior alliances between the trading partners. For this study, three proxy variables indicating 
inter-organizational trust are defined.  
Prior interactions between the same trading partners thereby are expected to improve exchange 
productivity via diminishing coordination and contracting costs. Furthermore, the potential of future 
interactions deters exchange partners from engaging in opportunistic behavior; short-term gains from a 
deviation of implicit contractual terms have to be traded-off against long-term disadvantages. 
Investments in inter-organizational trust (or reputation) represent relationship-specific investments 
being sunk in nature. The termination of an existing trade relationship will imply an increase in 
exchange costs (i.e., additional costs for searching a new exchange partner and higher contracting 
costs due to a lack in historical bilateral trading experience). 
TRUST1 is a count index of the years of inter-country LNG trade before the initiation of the 
respective value chain indicating the stock of prior interactions between two trading partners. On a 
country level, we very often observe the same players active in LNG exportation and/or importation 
(e.g., Sonatrach is the only exporter in Algeria; Gz de France is the main importer in France), which 
justifies the choice of this variable as a measure of trust resulting from past inter-country (and 
respectively inter-company) trading experiences. TRUST2 indicates whether the value chain is an 
expansion project of an already pre-existing value chain. For example, ENI is vertically integrated 
along the value chain for LNG deliveries from Nigeria’s Bonny Island facility train 3 to the Sines 
import terminal in Portugal where deliveries started in 2003. Three years later, the company entered a 
value chain representing an expansion of this existing value chain including Bonny Island’s trains 4 
and 5. TRUST3 indicates whether trading partners already operate along value chains between the 
same countries since one might argue that due to the limited number of firms active in the industry, the 
same trading partners with a high probability will meet again. 
Control variables. To account for changes in corporate strategies over time a dummy variable 
indicating value chains that came into operation after 1999 (D2000) is included. It is expected that 
players will encounter a changing environment given the industry’s rapid expansion and maturation 
since the end of the 1990s and that they must select or adapt strategies to maintain or gain competitiv  
advantages as discussed above.  
Several dummy variables are used to control for differences in corporate strategies resulting from 
regional factors that vary between the Atlantic Basin market (deliveries to Europe and North America) 
where LNG trading hubs already exist or are developing, and Asia-Pacific trade where buyers depend 
strongly on LNG imports. EXPAB indicates exporters situated in the Atlantic Basin; EXPPB indicates 
exporters situated in the Pacific Basin; suppliers delivering LNG from the Middle East to Europe, 
North America, or Asia (EXPME) are the default category. 
CAPOWN accounts for a company’s market share in the industry, calculated as the ratio of the 
accumulated liquefaction and regasification capacities controlled (owned or contracted) by a global 
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player over the sum of worldwide liquefaction and regasification capacities in operation at the end of 
the respective start-up year of the value chain: (r i, year + l i, year) / (r total, year + l total, year). Companies 
controlling significant LNG capacities may be able to benefit from arbitrage possibilities which in turn 
increases the motivation to integrate into midstream shipping, especially when downstream 
regasification assets account for a significant share in the portfolio.  
Empirical research on the make-or-buy decision building on transaction cost economics often includes 
the size of the transaction or of the exchange partners as a control variable (e.g., Zaheer and 
Venkatraman, 1995; Rosés, 2005; Gulati and Nickerson, 2008; Fernández-Olmos et al., 2008). The 
player’s assets value (ASSETS) is a proxy variable for firm size and financial strength. A positive 
relation between vertical integration and ASSETS is expected since companies endued with a strong 
capital basis face lower barriers to entry in terms of funding capital-intensive LNG projects.  
Finally, the dummy variable STATE identifies state-owned entities, thus allowing fordifferences in 
corporate strategies due to a different ownership structure.  
For a survey of all explanatory variables as well as their descriptive statistics see Table 10. Slightly 
more than half (53%) of the analyzed corporate-specific value chains in the dataset began operations 
after 1999, mirroring this decade’s expanding interational LNG trade. Asset specificity of the 
respective company’s LNG portfolio ranges between zro (no specificity of the investments since the 
portfolio is dominated by upstream capacities; e.g., National Gas Company Trinidad and Tobago) and 
one (very high specificity since the portfolio is dominated by downstream positions; e.g., Korea Gas 
Corporation) with a mean of 0.48. The political uncertainty index of the exporting country lies 
between 0.13 and one with a mean of 0.62. The history of LNG trade between two countries differs 
widely, whereas some value chains represent the first exchange relationships and other value chains 
cover bilateral trading experience of up to 37 years. In 37% of all observations the value chains 
represent expansion projects; 22% represent trading partners already operating along value chains 
between the same countries. Broken out by region, 44% of the observations represent value chains 
originating from Atlantic Basin exporters, 40% reprsent Pacific Basin exporters’ deliveries and 16% 
involve Middle Eastern suppliers. Players control between 0.1% (Union Fenosa in 2000) and 30.3% 
(Osaka Gas in 1972) of worldwide liquefaction and regasification capacities during the observation 
period. Corporate size ranges from USD 358mn (Italian Enel) to USD 279bn (Japanese Nippon Oil 
Corporation).31 Finally, 33% of the observed value chains include state-owned entities.  
                                                   
31 If no data was available the firm’s assets value was set to USD 10 bn (i.e., Pertamina, National Libyan Oil 
Company, and EGPC). 
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Table 10: Explanatory variables and summary statistics 
Characteristic Proxy Unit Denotation Exp. 
sign 
Mean Std. 
dev. 
Min Max N 
Proposition 1 (transaction cost variables) 
Asset specificity Share of downstream capacities in the player’s 
LNG portfolio 
% SPEC + 0.479 0.446 0 1 237 
External uncertainty Political instability in the supplying country  UNC  0.616 0.379 0.13 1 237 
Proposition 2 (shift parameters) 
Inter-organizational trust Years of previous inter-country LNG trade Count TRUST1 - 5.283 8.583 0 37 237 
 Value chain covering an expansion project of an 
already existing value chain 
Dummy TRUST2 - 0.367 0.483 0 1 237 
 Firm already active along a value chain between 
the same export and import countries 
Dummy TRUST3 - 0.219 0.415 0 1 237 
Control variables 
Change in industry structure Start-up of the value chain after 1999 Dummy D2000  0.527 0.500 0 1 237 
Export region Exporter in the Atlantic Basin Dummy EXPAB  0.439 0.497 0 1 237 
 Exporter in the Pacific Basin Dummy EXPPB  0.405 0.492 0 1 237 
 Exporter in the Middle East Dummy EXPME  0.156 0.364 0 1 237 
Market share in the LNG 
industry 
Capacity controlled by the player (% of total 
existing export and import capacity) 
% CAPOWN  0.040 0.052 0 1 237 
Financial resources Company size measured by the assets value bn USD ASSETS  63.476 63.628 0.358 195.265 237 
Company type Company being state-owned Dummy STATE  0.380 0.486 0 1 237 
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Table 11: Correlation matrix 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
VI 1 1 1              
VI 2 2 0.882 1             
SPEC 3 0.159 0.103 1            
UNC 4 -0.205 -0.151 -0.224 1           
TRUST1 5 -0.140 -0.185 0.042 0.104 1          
TRUST2 6 -0.092 -0.105 0.040 0.053 0.634 1         
TRUST2 7 -0.008 0.011 -0.141 0.055 0.467 0.654 1        
D2000 8 0.176 0.336 0.011 -0.068 0.011 -0.033 -0.029 1       
EXPAB 9 -0.065 0.067 -0.059 0.330 -0.142 -0.038 0.024 0.173 1      
EXPPB 10 0.030 -0.113 0.202 -0.230 0.288 0.138 0.103 -0.286 -0.730 1     
EXPME 11 0.049 0.067 -0.192 -0.140 -0.195 -0.135 -0.172 0.151 -0.380 -0.355 1    
CAPOWN 12 0.120 -0.001 0.222 0.004 0.014 0.053 0.090 -0.329 -0.100 0.237 -0.184 1   
STATE 13 -0.051 -0.119 -0.180 0.242 -0.103 -0.001 0.152 -0.148 0.097 -0.150 0.071 0.115 1  
ASSETS 14 0.197 0.225 -0.365 -0.115 -0.041 -0.066 0.006 0.063 -0.141 0.033 0.148 -0.098 -0.491 1 
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4.4.3 Methodology 
In the first step, the probability of observing vertical integration into midstream shipping is explained 
with the dependent variable representing a binary choice. Binary choice models (see e.g. Greene, 
2002, pp. 665 ff., Maddala, 2001, 317 ff.) are a class of qualitative response models. They express th 
occurrence of an event or the choice between two altern tives (i.e., governance choice in this study), 
with the probabilities 
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where X is the (1 x K) vector of exogenous variables j with j∈{1,2,…,K} and β the vector of 
parameters reflecting the impact of changes in X on the probability. The expected value of the 
endogenous variable equals E(Y) = 1 · F(Xβ) + 0 · (1 – F(Xβ)) = F(Xβ). The objective is to estimate the 
effect of exogenous factors on the probability of observing the outcome (Y = 1). 
To estimate regression models with a dichotomous left-hand-side variable, several methods exist. The 
simplest model is the linear probability model, assuming that the probability of the dependent variable 
taking the value of one is a linear function of X with Pr(Y = 1│X) = F(Xβ) = Xβ. One can show that 
Y = E(Y) + (Y – E(Y)) = Pr(Y = 1│X) + (Y – E(Y)) = Xβ + ε. The marginal effect of xj on the probability 
Pr(Y = 1│X) equals the estimated coefficient βj. However, since the explained variable takes only the 
values of zero or one, the error term will be heteroscedastic and depends on β.32 Predicted probabilities 
may lie outside the [0,1] range and coefficient estima es are very sensitive to extreme realizations of 
exogenous variables.  
Nonlinear probability models are alternative estimaon methodologies avoiding the problem of out-of-
range probabilities. F(·) is assumed to be a symmetric cumulative distribution function such that 
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The value of the binary outcome is considered to be sp cified by an unobservable index function 
Y* = Xβ + ε where  
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32 The error term will take the values of (1 – Xβ) and (– Xβ) with the respective probabilities (Xβ) and (1 – Xβ). 
Therefore, E(ε²) = (1 – Xβ)² · Xβ + (– Xβ)² · (1 – Xβ) = (1 – Xβ) · Xβ; observations with a probability of 
observing the outcome close to one or zero have a low variance, whereas for probabilities near 0.5 the variance is 
high.  
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Parameters are estimated using the method of maximum likelihood with each observation i being 
treated as a single draw from a Bernoulli distribution. Since all observations are independent with the 
success probability Pr(Y = 1│X) = F(Xβ), the likelihood function is given by 
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Taking natural logarithms, one gets 
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with the first order conditions  
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where fi is the density function. Marginal effects are calculated by γ = ∂Pr/∂xj = ∂F(Xβ)/ ∂xj = F’β = fβ.  
In this study, a probit model is employed. The dependent variable is specified as an unobserved latent 
variable VI1*. It is assumed that VI1* = Xα + ε where X  is a (1 x K) vector of exogenous variables 
representing asset specificity, uncertainty and further independent and heterogeneous factors, α i  a 
(K x 1) vector of coefficients, and ε is an error term with the cumulative density function F(ε). We will 
observe VI1 = 1 if VI1* > 0 and VI1 = 0 otherwise. Thus, the probability of observing vertical 
integration Pr(VI1 = 1) equals Pr(ε > –Xα) = 1 – F(–Xα) = F(Xα). The probit model assumes F(·) to be 
standard normal. Hence,  
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with the log-likelihood function 
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The level of specific investments is treated as an exogenous variable. An interaction term combining 
specificity and uncertainty is included to account for the impact of specific investments under 
uncertainty on optimal governance choice. To check for a non-linear impact of firm size on the 
integration decision, the asset’s value is included in both linear and quadratic form into the estimation 
model:  
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where i indexes a corporate-specific value chain and εi is the error term. In the second step, inter-
organizational trust as a shift parameter is added. Three models – each including only one of the 
alternative measures of trust to avoid multicollinearity problems with are estimated.33 In order to test 
for diminishing returns to history in the formation f trust, TRUST1 is included in both linear and 
quadratic form. One would not expect exchange partners that already have transacted for a twenty 
years to have twice as much trust as those who have tr nsacted for only one decade. 
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In order to differentiate between different degrees of vertical integration, a second class of models 
following a similar specification is estimated. The variable VI2 shows discrete values (i.e., zero, one, 
or two). Since these outcomes represent a ranking of values on an ordinal scale, ordinary least squares 
is not the suitable methodology. The difference betwe n an outcome of two and one would be treated 
the same as the difference between one and zero. Therefore, an ordered probit model is employed 
                                                   
33 A regression including all three variables at the same time confirms the results presented below but does not 
significantly improve the overall explanatory power of the model. 
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(Greene, 2002, pp. 736 ff.). Similarly to the probit model, the ordered probit model is based on a latent 
regression with VI2* = Xα + ε. With respect to actual governance mode choice, we obs rve  
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where µ1 and µ2 are referred to as break points (i.e., unknown parameters to be estimated with the 
vector of coefficients). The log-likelihood function is given by 
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with the probabilities as defined in (4-11). The following equations excluding and including 
alternative shift parameters are estimated: 
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4.5 Estimation results and interpretation 
The following paragraphs present estimation results of he probit and ordered probit models explaining 
the likelihood and respectively degree of vertical ntegration in the global LNG industry. 
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4.5.1 Probit model 
Table 12 displays estimation results of nested models explaining governance choice based on a probit 
model with i) Model 1 including only transaction cost variables, ii) Model 2 including furthermore 
variables controlling for differences between exporting regions as well as changes in corporate 
behavior over time, iii) Model 3 including additionally company characteristics, and finally, iv) 
Models 4 to 6 accounting for alternative shift parameters.34  
Both industry-specific propositions can be confirmed empirically. Estimation results are robust with 
respect to alternative model specifications. The log-likelihood values as well as different information 
criteria (i.e., Akaike and Bayesian information crite ia) indicate that Model 4 which includes 
transaction cost variables, all above defined control variables, and TRUST1 as a shift parameter has 
the best explanatory power. 
Contrary to transaction cost economics’ predictions, specific investments (SPEC) appear to decrease 
the likelihood of vertical integration into midstream transportation for Models 1 and 2; the coefficient 
for the remaining four models is not significant. Uncertainty (UNC) is negatively related to the 
integration decision which goes in line with Williamson (1971).35 However, as theory hypothesizes, 
investments in relationship-specific assets in the presence of uncertainty result in a strong motivation 
to avoid the appropriability hazards under market organization and to internalize the transaction 
instead. The coefficients of the interaction term are positive and highly statistically significant for all 
specifications. This finding reflects recent efforts of traditional buyers to increasingly integrate 
upstream (e.g., Kyushu Electric and Tokyo Electric established a shipping company in 2005 which 
owns and operates LNG vessels).  
Model 2 including control variables for the export region provides only a slight improvement in 
explanatory power compared to Model 1. The variables EXPAB and EXPPB have no significant 
impact on the decision to integrate vertically and there appears to be no difference in corporate 
strategies between value chains in the Atlantic Basin which are dedicated to more or less competitive 
downstream markets, value chains in the Pacific Basin market where countries typically strongly rely 
upon natural gas imports in the form of LNG, and value chains from the swing producer region of the 
Middle East. An alternative regression accounting for the importing region (deliveries dedicated to 
Atlantic Basin customers instead of to Pacific Basin customers) does not reveal any regional 
differences, too. 
D2000, the variable controlling for the start-up date of the value chain, indicates that vertical 
integration is becoming more common, which reflects global players’ efforts to establish a portfolio of 
export and import positions and shipping capacities o exploit arbitrage potentials. An alternative 
                                                   
34 Probit estimation is preferred to the logit model (assuming a logistic instead of a normal distribution of the 
error term) since the first shows slightly better goodness-of-fit indicators (i.e., Pseudo R², log-likelihood values, 
AIC, BIC). Estimation results are similar for both estimation procedures.  
35 A regression using an alternative measure of politica  instability in the exporting country (i.e., the International 
Country Risk Guide reported by the PRS Group as well as the Political and Economic Risk Report prepared by 
Aon Corporation) produces similar results.  
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model specification including the start-up date of the value chain delivers a similar result. Testing for 
breakpoints in corporate behavior over time, the dummy variable indicating value chains which 
became operational after 1999 shows the highest significance. Access to flexible transport capacities 
(e.g., via integration into midstream shipping) is the key to a successful employment of this strategy. 
Rapid industrial expansion when accompanied by a restructuring process prompts firms to internalize 
risks inherent in the capital-intensive industry via strategic repositioning and reshaping.  
Model 3 which adds variables accounting for corporate specific characteristics shows an improvement 
of the Pseudo R² to 0.212. Players controlling a larger share of world LNG regasification and 
liquefaction capacities (CAPOWN) show a higher likelihood of vertical integration. This can be 
explained by a higher motivation to integrate into midstream shipping to benefit from the portfolio of 
upstream and downstream positions.  
The value of assets positively relates to the likelihood of vertical integration (with a non-linear impact 
as shown by the negative sign of the variable in its quadratic form). This indicates that larger firms 
have the financial capabilities necessary to invest in numerous capital-intensive export and/or import 
and shipping capacities.  
Finally, the variable STATE is significant, too. In contrast to private firms, state-owned entities tend to 
prefer vertical integration as opposed to less hierarchical governance modes. Upstream NOCs aim to 
benefit from downstream margins, several state-owned distribution and power companies moved 
upstream to ensure margins and supply security.  
The type and scope of the transaction explain much of t e variation in governance modes. Dynamics 
in the institutional environment, however, also play n important role. The last three model 
specifications include shift parameters indicating i ter-organizational trust. As expected, the presence 
of trust supports less hierarchical governance. Estimated coefficients of the three variables, TRUST1, 
TRUST2, and TRUST3, show the expected negative sign, although only TRUST1 is statistically 
significant. The impact of trust decreases with its nominal level as is indicated by the positive sign of 
the coefficient of the variable in its quadratic form.  
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Table 12: Estimation results probit model 
Specification Proposition 1 
Transaction cost and control variables 
 
Proposition 2 
Trust as a shift parameter included 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
CONSTANT 0.986 
(0.269) 
*** 0.730 
(0.328) 
** - 0.942 
(0.485) 
* -0.802 
(0.500) 
-0.878 
(0.489) 
* -0.943 
(0.485) 
* 
SPEC -0.779 
(0.368) 
** - 0.802 
(0.375) 
** - 0.317 
(0.459) 
-0.398 
(0.471) 
-0.333 
(0.461) 
-0.317 
(0.458) 
UNC -1.492 
(0.341) 
*** - 1.474 
(0.359) 
*** -1.579 
(0.390) 
***  -1.589 
(0.401) 
*** - 1.579 
(0.391) 
*** -1.579 
(0.390) 
*** 
(SPEC*UNC) 1.847 
(0.521) 
*** 1.906 
(0.524) 
*** 2.022 
(0.580) 
***  2.083 
(0.596) 
*** 2.051 
(0.586) 
*** 2.020 
(0.583) 
*** 
EXPAB   -0.058 
(0.263) 
-0.001 
(0.279) 
0.013 
(0.281) 
-0.019 
(0.279) 
-0.001 
(0.283) 
EXPPB   0.017 
(0.270) 
0.043 
(0.292) 
0.332 
(0.316) 
0.085 
(0.295) 
0.046 
(0.298) 
D2000   0.482 
(0.181) 
*** 0.712 
(0.204) 
***  0.747 
(0.209) 
*** 0.728 
(0.205) 
*** 0.712 
(0.204) 
*** 
CAPOWN     5.476 
(2.244) 
** 6.025 
(2.500) 
** 5.809 
(2.343) 
** 5.486 
(2.258) 
** 
STATE     0.846 
(0.261) 
***  0.826 
(0.270) 
*** 0.837 
(0.263) 
*** 0.848 
(0.264) 
*** 
ASSETS     0.021 
(0.006) 
***  0.019 
(0.006) 
*** 0.020 
(0.006) 
*** 0.021 
(0.006) 
*** 
(ASSETS)²     -0.0001 
(0.000) 
** - 0.0001 
(0.000) 
* -0.0001 
(0.000) 
* -0.0001 
(0.000) 
** 
TRUST1       -0.083 
(0.032) 
***     
(TRUST1)²       0.002 
(0.001) 
**     
TRUST2         -0.246 
(0.194) 
  
TRUST3           -0.010 
(0.242) 
 
             
Pseudo R² 0.080  0.104  0.212  0.239  0.217  0.212  
Log-likelihood -149.23  -145.46  -127.78  -123.50  -126.97  -127.78  
AIC 306.47  304.91  277.56  272.99  277.95  279.56  
BIC 320.34  329.19  315.71  318.08  319.56  321.18  
N 237  237  237  237  237  237  
*** Statistically significant at a 1%-level; ** staistically significant at a 5%-level; * statistically significant at a 10%-level; standard errors in 
parentheses. All levels of statistical significance ar  based on two-sided test statistics. The calculation of the goodness-of-fit indicators is 
explained in the Appendix. Marginal effects are reported in Table 16 in the Appendix. 
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Model 4, the specification with the best explanatory power, predicts the correct parameter value of the 
binary endogenous variable indicating vertical integration for 177 of the observations (75%). 
Differentiating between value chains in which we observe internal organization and those where we do 
not, the predictive power is better for the first with 83% and 64% correct predictions respectively 
(Table 13). 
Table 13: Predictive power probit model (Model 4) 
VI 1_hat = k and VI = k 177 observations (75%) 
VI 1_hat = 1 and VI = 1 
VI 1_hat = 0 and VI = 0 
111 observations (83%) 
66 observations (64%) 
 
4.5.2 Ordered probit model 
Table 14 displays estimation results of nested models explaining the degree of vertical integration 
based on an ordered probit model with again i) Model 1 including only transaction cost variables, ii) 
Model 2 including furthermore variables controlling for differences between exporting regions as well 
as changes in corporate behavior over time, iii) Model 3 including company characteristics, and 
finally, iv) Models 4 to 6 accounting for alternative shift parameters.  
The log-likelihood values and different information criteria indicate again that Model 4, which 
includes transaction cost variables, the control variables defined above, and TRUST1 as a shift 
parameter, is the best suited model. 
Both industry-specific propositions can be confirmed empirically. Estimation results are robust with 
respect to alternative model specifications and are consistent with those found in the probit model 
discussed above. Specific investments in the presenc  of uncertainty lead to a strong motivation to 
integrate vertically; the presence of inter-organiztional trust reduces the need for hierarchical controls 
and supports the choice of a lower degree of vertical integration. Significant control variables also 
provide some interesting findings. Vertical integration along the whole value chain has become more 
common reflecting the players’ attempts to invest in a portfolio of LNG capacities both upstream and 
downstream and to exploit arbitrage potentials. State-owned companies tend to be more integrated 
than private players; e.g., Qatar Petroleum is endud with significant export capacities, a fleet of 27 
ships (together with its partner Exxon Mobil), and recent downstream investments permitting market 
access to the UK or Italy for example. Firm size has as expected a positive and decreasing effect on 
the degree of vertical integration.  
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Table 14: Estimation results ordered probit model 
Specification Proposition 1 
Transaction cost and control variables 
 
Proposition 2 
Trust as a shift parameter included 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
SPEC -0.624 
(0.316) 
** - 0.722 
(0.324) 
** - 0.284 
(0.387) 
-0.388 
(0.392) 
-0.324 
(0.389) 
-0.280 
(0.388) 
UNC -1.122 
(0.301) 
*** - 1.317 
(0.323) 
*** -1.272 
(0.345) 
***  -1.268 
(0.352) 
*** - 1.289 
(0.347) 
*** -1.269 
(0.345) 
*** 
(SPEC*UNC) 1.408 
(0.453) 
*** 1.676 
(0.464) 
*** 1.630 
(0.494) 
***  1.775 
(0.502) 
*** 1.694 
(0.497) 
*** 1.629 
(0.493) 
*** 
EXPAB   0.078 
(0.232) 
0.104 
(0.241) 
0.129 
(0.242) 
 0.126 
(0.242) 
0.098 
(0.245) 
EXPPB   -0.141 
(0.234) 
-0.219 
(0.243) 
 0.029 
(0.257) 
-0.147 
(0.246) 
-0.227 
(0.249) 
 
D2000   0.781 
(0.162) 
*** 0.892 
(0.176) 
***  0.975 
(0.181) 
*** 0.919 
(0.178) 
*** 0.889 
(0.177) 
*** 
CAPOWN     3.113 
(1.672) 
* 3.068 
(1.700) 
* 3.231 
(1.685) 
* 3.095 
(1.675) 
* 
STATE     0.497 
(0.212) 
** 0.456 
(0.215) 
** 0.492 
(0.212) 
** 0.492 
(0.215) 
** 
ASSETS     0.018 
(0.005) 
***  0.017 
(0.005) 
*** 0.017 
(0.005) 
*** 0.018 
(0.005) 
*** 
(ASSETS)²     -0.0001 
(0.000) 
** - 0.0001 
(0.000) 
** - 0.0001 
(0.000) 
** - 0.0001 
(0.000) 
** 
TRUST1       -0.060 
(0.026) 
**     
(TRUST1)²       0.001 
(0.001) 
    
TRUST2         -0.243 
(0.166) 
  
TRUST3           0.031 
(0.200) 
 
             
Breakpoint 1 -0.787  -0.518  0.740  0.634  0.665  0.737  
Breakpoint 2 0.235  0.598  1.950  1.876  1.881  1.948  
             
Pseudo R² 0.034  0.095  0.151  0.172  0.155  0.151  
Log-likelihood -241.72  -226.38  -212.54  -207.30  -211.46  -212.53  
AIC 493.44  468.76  449.08  442.60  448.92  451.06  
BIC 510.78  496.51  490.70  491.15  494.01  496.14  
N 237  237  237  237  237  237  
*** Statistically significant at a 1%-level; ** staistically significant at a 5%-level; * statistically significant at a 10%-level; standard errors in 
parentheses. All levels of statistical significance ar  based on two-sided test statistics. Marginal effects are reported in Table 17 in the 
Appendix. 
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The specified model predicts the correct parameter value of the endogenous variable indicating the 
degree of vertical integration for 133 of the observations (56%). Differentiating between value chains 
in which we observe no internal organization, vertical integration into midstream shipping from 
upstream or downstream, and vertical integration alg the whole value chain, the predictive power is 
63%, 47%, and 60%, respectively (Table 15). 
Table 15: Predictive power ordered probit model (Model 4) 
VI 2_hat = k and VI = k 133 of 237 observations (56%) 
VI 2_hat = 0 and VI = 0 
VI 2_hat = 1 and VI = 1 
VI 2_hat = 2 and VI = 2 
 69 of 110 observations (63%) 
 43 of 92 observations (47%) 
 21 of 35 observations (60%) 
 
4.6 Summary and conclusions 
This study provides empirical evidence for Williamson’s (1991b) shift parameter framework. The 
presence of inter-organizational trust shifts the governance cost curves for alternative modes of 
organization disproportionally. It can be shown that pre-existing trust increases the likelihood of less 
hierarchical governance forms. Hence, the discussion of an optimal alignment of transactions, 
differing in their attributes, with appropriate governance structures should take into account both 
parameters on the transaction level (e.g., specificity of investments, uncertainty) and parameters 
accounting for dynamics in the institutional environment (i.e., shift parameters).  
The ‘LNG rush’ forecasted during the early years of this decade has increased regasification capacity 
by almost 80% compared to 1999 levels. Increasing world ide demand (even though recent 
projections are less enthusiastic due to the economic recession that began in 2007) and the ongoing 
process of deregulation in downstream markets have brought fundamental changes in corporate 
behavior. Many firms are already investing in regionally diversified LNG portfolios and integrate 
vertically to internalize risk factors resulting from investments in capital-intensive infrastructures. 
Control of transport capacities is a key factor in order to benefit from cross-trade opportunities. 
Using probit and ordered probit models, the determinants of vertical integration are analyzed. 
Empirical results confirm the industry-specific proositions and support classical transaction cost 
economics as well as the relevance of shift parameters. The models show that relationship-specific 
investments in the presence of uncertainty favor hie archical modes of governance to safeguard quasi-
rents and avoid the hazard of post-contractual opportunism. However, pre-existing inter-organizational 
trust as determined by the historical relationship between the exchange partners mitigates the need for 
formal controls and favors less hierarchical structures. Trust can also provide a strong, relational 
safeguard against opportunism; as Williamson (1993a, p. 482) highlights, “breach of contract is 
sometimes efficient, even in a commercial contract that is supported by perfect safeguards. By 
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contrast, betrayal of a personal trust can never be efficient. Betrayal is demoralizing.” Summarizing, a 
complete understanding of governance choice requires that both transaction characteristics and the 
institutional environment are considered. The current scarcity of empirical literature testing the shift 
parameter framework suggests fruitful avenues of research into alternative shift parameters. 
This study has some limitations. First, pre-existing i ter-organizational trust should be regarded as an 
endogenous variable being determined by prior experiences between the exchange partners (see also 
Fehr, 2009). As Gulati and Sytch (2008, p. 166) point ut, empirical studies “have focused primarily 
on the consequences and not the antecedents of trust.” Therefore, two-stage regression models that 
explain the level of trust in a first step would sub tantially improve the analysis. However, it is 
difficult to measure inter-organizational trust; all studies explaining trust rely on survey data in which 
the measure of trust derives from indirect question to be answered by key informants. Second, this 
study tests only reduced form equations since transaction costs cannot be measured. Should 
performance data on transaction levels become publicly available, researchers could investigate the 
direct impact of trust on the performance of alternative governance costs. Third, the ability to 
distinguish between pre-existing trust and emerging trust, that is, the relationship that develops during 
an exchange and/or over time is critical. Panel data including a measure of actual trust levels would 
greatly enhance our understanding of the relationship between inter-organizational trust and choice of 
governance.  
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4.7 Appendix 
 
Illustrations of alternative shift parameter applications 
The following figures provide illustrations of alternative shift parameter applications including 
Williamson (1991b), Oxley (1999), and Henisz and Williamson (1999). 
Figure 29: Shift parameter framework (stability of property rights) in Williamson (1991b) 
 
Source: Own depiction 
 
Figure 30: Shift parameter framework (increased reputation) in Williamson (1991b) 
 
Source: Own depiction 
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Figure 31: Shift parameter framework in Oxley (1999) 
 
Source: Own depiction following Oxley (1999) 
 Even though the governance costs associated with equity joint ventures are also likely to rise, they will do so 
at a lower extent. The change in relative governance costs is the relevant factor. 
 
 
Figure 32: Shift parameter framework in Henisz and Williamson (1999) 
 
Source: Own depiction following Henisz and Williamson (1999) 
 This downward shift of the governance cost curves of market and hybrid organization can also be interpreted 
as an improvement in the intellectual property rights, thereby supporting greater inter-firm contracting. 
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Goodness-of-fit indicators 
In order to evaluate the goodness-of-fit of alternative model specifications, different information 
criteria have been proposed. In this thesis, the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian 
information criterion (BIC) are calculated in Chapters 4 and 5. Under the condition that the models to 
be compared use the same underlying dataset and that the dependent variable is equal over all 
specifications, the model with the smallest information criteria represents the best suited specificaton. 
Thereby, information criteria trade-off fit (measured via the log-likelihood value) and complexity of 
the model (measured via the number of exogenous variables). AIC and BIC are defined as: 
 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) kNLBIC
kLAIC
⋅+⋅−=
⋅+⋅−=
lnln2
2ln2
       (A4-1) 
 
with (ln L) being the value of the log-likelihood function, k the number of parameters to be estimated, 
and N the number of observations. The first part of the formulas represents the model fit. The larger 
this value, the worse the model is suited to explain the dependent variable. The second part represents 
a penalty term increasing with the number of regressors. Hence, the risk of biased estimates due to 
omitted exogenous variables is traded-off against the increasing variance of the error term with every 
additional regressor (i.e., with the loss of degrees of freedom).  
 
Another goodness-of-fit indicator is the likelihood ratio index (or Pseudo R²), defined as 
 
 
0ln
ln
1
L
L
LRI −=         (A4-2) 
 
with (ln L)  being the maximized value of the log-likelihood function and (ln L0) being the log-
likelihood value of restricted model assuming that all slope coefficients are equal to zero. The index 
ranges between zero and one. Even though the nominal values have no natural interpretation (Greene, 
2002, p. 683), an increase in the LRI will indicate an improvement in the fit of the model.  
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Marginal effects 
Table 16 reports marginal effects of the alternative probit model specifications. The estimated 
coefficients from the probit model are difficult tointerpret because they measure the change in the 
latent variable VI1* associated with a change in one of the exogenous variables. More useful are 
marginal effects which are calculated via ∂Pr(VI = 1│x)/∂x = f(x’α)α = φ (x’α)α (see e.g., Greene, 
2002, pp. 667 f.). Hence, the marginal effects vary with the values of the exogenous variables. For a 
right-hand-side dummy variable, the marginal effect is determined calculating the difference in 
probabilities for the dummy equaling one versus the dummy equaling zero, all other variables hold at 
their means.  
An infinitesimal change of transaction cost variables (i.e., asset specificity, uncertainty, and the 
interaction term) has a stronger impact on the probability of observing vertical integration than the 
presence of inter-organizational trust. It is furthe more interesting to note, that for value chains which 
began operation from 2000 on, the probability that we observe vertical integration of the respective 
player is more than 25% higher than for the early deca es of the industry (e.g., 28.6% for Model 4). 
Table 16: Marginal effects probit model 
Specification Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
SPEC -0.307  -0.316  -0.124  -0.155  -0.130  -0.124  
UNC -0.587  -0.580  -0.616  -0.619  -0.616  -0.616  
(SPEC*UNC) 0.726  0.750  0.788  0.811  0.800  0.787  
EXPAB   -0.020  -0.001  0.005  0.007  0.000  
EXPPB   0.007  -0.017  0.128  0.033  0.018  
D2000   0.188  0.273  0.286  0.279  0.273  
CAPOWN     2.134  2.346  2.265  2.139  
STATE     0.313  0.305  0.310  0.313  
ASSETS     0.008  0.008  0.008  0.008  
(ASSETS)²     -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  
TRUST1       -0.032      
(TRUST1)²       0.001      
TRUST2         -0.096    
TRUST3           -0.004  
 
The marginal effects of an ordered probit model with an endogenous variable having one of the values         
{0, 1, 2} are calculated as ∂Pr(VI = 0│x)/ ∂x = −φ (µ1 − x’α)α; ∂Pr(VI = 1│x)/ ∂x =[φ (µ1 − x’α) −    
φ (µ2 − x’α)] α; and ∂Pr(VI = 2│x)/ ∂x = φ (µ2 − x’α)α. The marginal effects sum to zero, which follows 
from the requirement that the probabilities sum to one. For a right-hand-side dummy variable, the 
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marginal effect is determined by calculating the difference in probabilities for the dummy equaling 
one versus the dummy equaling zero, all other variables hold at their means.   
Table 17: Marginal effects ordered probit model 
Specification  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
SPEC 
VI 2 = 0 
VI 2 = 1 
VI 2 = 2 
0.246        
-0.074       
-0.172 
0.283     
-0.097              
-0.176 
0.111     
-0.043     
-0.068 
0.152     
-0.063     
-0.089 
0.126     
-0.050     
-0.076 
0.110     
-0.043     
-0.067 
UNC VI2 = 0 
VI 2 = 1 
VI 2 = 2 
0.442     
-0.133    
-0.308 
0.517     
-0.177     
-0.339 
0.498     
-0.194     
-0.303 
0.497     
-0.205     
-0.292 
0.505     
-0.200     
-0.305 
0.497     
-0.194     
-0.303 
(SPEC*UNC) VI2 = 0 
VI 2 = 1 
VI 2 = 2 
-0.555 
0.168 
0.387 
-0.658     
0.226     
0.432 
-0.638     
0.249     
0.389 
-0.695     
0.288     
0.407 
-0.663     
0.263    
0.400 
-0.637     
0.248     
0.489 
EXPAB VI2 = 0 
VI 2 = 1 
VI 2 = 2 
 -0.030     
0.010     
0.020 
-0.041     
0.016      
0.025 
-0.051    
0.021    
0.030 
-0.049     
0.019    
0.030 
-0.038     
0.015     
0.023 
EXPPB VI2 = 0 
VI 2 = 1 
VI 2 = 2 
 0.055     
-0.020     
-0.035 
0.086     
-0.035     
-0.051 
-0.011    
0.005    
0.006 
0.068     
-0.028     
-0.040 
0.089     
-0.036     
-0.053 
D2000 VI2 = 0 
VI 2 = 1 
VI 2 = 2 
 -0.300    
0.103     
0.197 
-0.340    
0.132     
0.208 
-0.369     
0.151     
0.218 
-0.349     
0.137    
0.212 
-0.338    
0.131    
0.207 
CAPOWN VI2 = 0 
VI 2 = 1 
VI 2 = 2 
  -1.218    
0.476    
0.743 
-1.202     
0.497     
0.705 
-1.266     
0.502    
0.764 
-1.211     
0.472    
0.739 
STATE VI2 = 0 
VI 2 = 1 
VI 2 = 2 
  -0.190    
0.064    
0.126 
-0.175     
0.064     
0.111 
-0.188     
0.065     
0.123 
-0.188     
0.064     
0.128 
ASSETS VI2 = 0 
VI 2 = 1 
VI 2 = 2 
  -0.007     
0.003     
0.004 
-0.007    
0.003     
0.004 
-0.007     
0.003     
0.004 
-0.007     
0.003     
0.004 
(ASSETS)² VI2 = 0 
VI 2 = 1 
VI 2 = 2 
  0.000 
-0.000 
-0.000 
0.000 
-0.000 
-0.000 
0.000 
-0.000 
-0.000 
0.000 
-0.000 
-0.000 
TRUST1 VI2 = 0 
VI 2 = 1 
VI 2 = 2 
   0.023     
-0.010    
-0.013 
  
(TRUST1)² VI2 = 0 
VI 2 = 1 
VI 2 = 2 
   -0.0004 
0.0001 
0.0003 
  
TRUST2 VI2 = 0 
VI 2 = 1 
VI 2 = 2 
    0.096     
-0.040     
-0.056 
 
TRUST3 VI2 = 0 
VI 2 = 1 
VI 2 = 2 
     -0.012     
0.005     
0.007 
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5 Linking Transaction Cost Economics and Strategic Management 
5.1 Introduction 
In recent years, theories drawing upon institutional economics (i.e., Williamson’s transaction cost 
economics) and the strategic management literature (i.e., Porter’s strategic positioning framework and 
the resource-based view of the firm) have evolved to exploit the strengths of both disciplines. The key
issue is to determine why different firms within the same industry choose to adopt varying strategies. 
Empirical work provides strong support for transaction cost economics, but “generally does not 
explore how the make or buy decision for a single transaction fits into a firm’s overall strategy” 
(Nickerson, 1997, p. 3). In addition, empirical testing for alternative theories of the firm is rather 
scarce.  
This study contributes to the literature an empirical analysis of corporate strategies in the emerging 
global market for liquefied natural gas linking alternative theories of the firm in order to explain the 
menu of strategic positions recently observed in ths dynamic market. Based on a unique dataset 
including all LNG exporting and importing projects as well as the LNG fleet worldwide, 237 
corporate-specific value chains are identified. In the first step, three alternative target market positions 
are defined, each supported by an underlying resource p ofile. In the second step, determinants that 
move companies towards vertical integration are invstigated. Industry-specific propositions are tested 
by employing a two-step decision making process.  
Estimation results provide broad support for the so-called positioning-economizing perspective of the 
firm; the three strategic choices of target market position, resource profile, and organizational structure 
are interdependent. It can be shown that national oil and gas companies rely on less idiosyncratic 
assets than companies following a flexibility strategy (i.e., investing in a portfolio of export and import 
positions) and that companies following a flexibility strategy rely on less idiosyncratic assets than 
chain optimizers (i.e., investing along a single value chain). Second, transaction cost economics 
predictions can be confirmed. Idiosyncratic investments in uncertain environments have a positive 
impact on the likelihood of vertical integration.36 
5.2 Literature review 
5.2.1 Transaction cost economics versus strategic managemnt 
Theoretical literature provides a number of approaches explaining corporate behavior. All theories of 
the firm have their origin in the seminal article of Ronald Coase published in 1937 explaining the 
emergence of firms by the presence of costs evolving by using the price mechanism and the 
boundaries of the firm by the presence of costs of internal organization. One can distinguish two 
streams of literature discussing organizational structures. Whereas economic approaches are mainly 
                                                   
36 This chapter is an update of Ruester and Neumann (2009). 
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concerned with the performance of markets in the alloc tion and coordination of resources, strategic 
management approaches focus on the coordination and resource allocation inside the firm. Rumelt 
et al. (1991) provide a discussion on the relationship between economics and strategic management. 
They compare the historical development of both disciplines and illuminate the contributions of one 
discipline to the other. See Langlois et al. (2002) for an extensive survey of articles discussing 
alternative theories of the firm. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, transaction cost economics identifies asset specificity, environmental 
uncertainty, and the frequency of transactions as the most significant factors influencing transaction 
costs. The hold-up problem arising from a high level of relationship-specific investments in an 
uncertain environment with players characterized by bounded rationality results in costly ex-post 
bargaining, ex-ante under-investment, and decreasing efficiency. Organizing transactions within a 
corporation’s own hierarchy by internalizing the sub equent quasi-rents avoids these problems.  
Concurrently to traditional economic approaches, the strategic management literature has also 
investigated corporate strategies and organizational forms, with ’strategy’ understood as a firm’s 
selection of a certain position in the market and activities that fit with the firm’s position and with each 
other, both chosen to achieve a competitive advantage.37 However, no one ideal position along the 
value added chain exists for all companies because c tomers and markets differ. Porter (1979) 
develops a model of five competitive forces (i.e., threats from substitute products, threats from new 
entrants, power of suppliers, power of customers, and competition within the industry itself) and their 
impact on corporate strategy. The goal of a competitiv  strategy is to find a position in the industry 
where the company can best defend itself against the e competitive forces or can influence them in its 
favor (Teece, 1984). 
According to the strategic positioning framework, there are cost-based and differentiation-based 
positions. Porter (1996, p. 62) discusses ‘operation l effectiveness’ (performing similar activities 
better than rivals perform them) and ‘strategic positioning’ (performing different activities from rivals 
or performing similar activities in different ways).38 He further argues that for companies to survive, 
they must be both flexible and able to respond to structural changes within their industry. A company 
can outperform rivals only if it can establish a stble competitive advantage.  
The resource-based view of the firm focuses on rents derived from unique and imperfectly imitable or 
substitutable resources. Differences in firm performance are assumed to signal differences in resource 
endowments. Organizational resources (such as managerial ability, firm-specific language, routines, 
knowledge transfer capabilities) are distinguished from technological resources (such as physical 
assets, innovations protected by patents, technological competences) and reputational resources (such 
                                                   
37 Porter (1996) defines strategic positions (the variety of the company’s products and services based on 
customer needs and customer accessibility), activities (functions that create, produce, and deliver products or 
services) and fit (consistency between each activity and the overall strategy as well as reinforcement). 
38 In other work it is often referred to differentiation, cost leadership, and cost focus (e.g. Porter, 1985; Nickerson 
et al., 2001). 
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as consumer trust, brands, established networks, reputational capital). Competitive advantage and 
superior performance are derived from developing, deploying, and protecting these resources. 
Similar to Porter’s strategic positioning framework, the capabilities view is a dynamic concept in 
which firms need to match resources and capabilities to changes in the environment if they wish to 
attain optimum performance.39 The capabilities view suggests that the choice of internalization of 
activities into the firm’s own hierarchy is determined, at least in part, by the relative strengths of 
internal and external capabilities (Langlois, 1992) with capabilities being defined as the knowledge, 
experience and skills of the firm. Some activities may be similar (i.e., draw on the same general 
capabilities) others may be complementary (i.e., connected along the value chain). Where activities ar 
both, similar and complementary, internal organization will be a suitable governance form. 
Dissimilarity in turn will make integration costly. Opportunities for growth from a diversification of
activities are thus limited (see also Teece and Pisano, 1994). Some authors have explicitly examined 
the relationship between relative capabilities and the choice of a governance mode (e.g. Argyres, 
1996). 
Williamson (1991a) already discusses that transaction cost economics can make several contributions 
to the field of strategic management. He distinguishes two branches of strategy: strategizing (mainly in 
the sense of exercising market power) and economizing (adapting efficiently to changing 
environmental conditions and aligning transactions which differ in their attributes to appropriate 
governance modes that differ in their competences). Whereas the market is superior for autonomous 
adaptations, internal organization should be favored in cases where coordinated adaptations are 
necessary. Whereas the strategy view highlights the from a firm’s perspective advantageous 
consequences of integration (such as enhanced bargaining power), transaction cost economics 
explicitly considers both, costs (such as high burea cratic costs) and benefits. Williamson therefore 
argues that “… firms that mindlessly integrate weaken themselves in relation to nonintegrated 
rivals” (p. 83) and concludes that in the long run “…the best strategy is to organize and operate 
efficiently” (p. 75). 
5.2.2 Recent trends toward a synthesis of competing theories 
Empirical work provides strong support for transaction cost economics, but “generally does not 
explore how the make or buy decision for a single transaction fits into a firm’s overall strategy” 
(Nickerson, 1997, p. 3). In recent years, several authors have developed theoretical approaches 
combining economics and strategic management literature. Whereas the economic literature analyzes 
                                                   
39 Winter (2003, p. 991) founds the concept of organiz tional capabilities on the broader concept of 
organizational routine: “An organizational capability s a high-level routine (or collection of routines) that, 
together with its implementing input flows, confers upon an organization’s management a set of decision options 
for producing significant outputs of a particular type.” He further distinguishes ordinary capabilities (i.e., 
permitting a firm to operate in the short-term) and dynamic capabilities (i.e., capabilities necessary to extend, 
modify and create ordinary capabilities).  
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markets in which various firms are active, the strategic management literature examines the behavior 
and the performance of individual firms without any implications for the industry as a whole.  
In an early paper, Day and Klein (1987) discuss the det rminants of cooperations between firms along 
value chains from two perspectives, a market failure approach (i.e., transaction cost economics) and a 
strategic management approach. Whereas the market filure perspective focuses on the formation of 
vertical cooperations as a mean to safeguard firms against opportunistic behavior by the counterparty 
in cases where bilateral dependencies evolve, strategic behavior is largely ignored. The level of ex-
ante competition is taken as given, whereas the strategic perspective focuses on competitive and 
anticompetitive strategies. Day and Klein argue that e creation of relationship-specific assets may be 
a key ingredient of a competitive strategy (e.g., in the case of product differentiation). They conclude 
that “… to fully appreciate vertical linkages, one must understand both the effect of competitive 
markets on strategy formulation and the effect of market failure on strategy realization. To ignore 
either element is to miss the adaptive nature of competitive strategy and cooperative behavior” (p. 62)
They suggest that future research should combine strategic management and transaction cost 
economics.  
Nickerson (1997) develops an extension of the basic transaction cost economics framework in order to 
transform Williamson’s theory from an ‘economizing theory of organization’ focusing on the 
discriminative alignment of transactions to governance forms into an ‘economizing theory of strategy’. 
Pointing out that “a firm’s strategy is more than a collection of independent transactions” and that te 
activities a firm chooses to undertake must somehow be related and reinforcing (p. 2), he combines 
strategic management and transaction cost economics to the so called ‘positioning-economizing 
perspective’ and argues that decisions regarding market position, resource investments, and 
governance mode are interdependent. A target market posi ion is supported by a resource profile that 
in turn determines the organizational choice of a firm. See Section 5.3 for a more detailed discussion 
of this theory.40 
Building on Day and Klein (1987) and Nickerson (1997), Ghosh and John (1999) develop a similar 
model. Their ‘governance value analysis’ starts with Williamson’s model linking transaction attributes 
to governance modes and then adds positioning (i.e., th  target market position) as well as resources 
(i.e., scarce and imperfectly mobile skills, assets, or capabilities). Strategic positioning will determine 
the level of investments in specific assets, the level of adaptation needs, as well as ex-post 
measurement problems. Hence, two firms in the same market may choose varying governance forms 
in order to align these to the respective conditions depending on their strategy.   
                                                   
40 Rumelt et al. (1991) already argue that strategic decisions, such as the products and services offered as well as 
the scope of activities integrated into the firm and the appropriate organizational structure, must be reinforcing, 
hence, are not independent. Nelson (1991, p. 69) likewise argues that “… to be successful in a world that 
requires that firms innovate and change, a firm must have a coherent strategy that enables it to decide what new 
ventures to go into and what to stay out of. And it needs a structure, in the sense of mode of organization and 
governance, that guides and supports the building and sustaining of the core capabilities needed to carry out that 
strategy effectively. “ 
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Empirical literature testing for alternative theories or their combination is still rare. Building on 
Nickerson (1997) and Ghosh and John (1999), Nickerson et al. (2001) link Porter’s strategic 
positioning framework and the transaction cost approach with an application to the international 
courier and small package service in Japan in order to overcome the weaknesses of both approaches, 
since “Porter (1996) fails to call upon Williamson’s insights to inform whether activities should be 
organized internally or outsourced, and Williamson (1991[a]) claims that managers are well advised to 
concentrate on economizing instead of on positioning” (p. 252). Using a dataset 995 parcels shipped 
from Japan to 160 destination cities in 42 countries they test industry-specific predictions relating market 
position to resource investments, the resource profile to organizational form and the resource 
profile/organization pairings to firm performance (i.e., delivery speed). Estimation results of the thr e-
stage, reduced form, endogenous self-selection model provide broad support for all propositions and 
confirm that decisions on a firm’s market position, resource profile and organizational choice are 
interrelated in ways predicted by the positioning-economizing perspective. The authors conclude that 
the heterogeneity in corporate strategies reflects the reality of firms being endowed with different 
feasible resource profile/organization pairings.  
Poppo and Zenger (1998) investigate make-or-buy decisions in information services testing alternative 
theories of the firm (e.g., transaction cost theory, resource-based view, agency theory). These 
approaches offer alternative – in some cases complementary and in other cases contradictory – 
explanations of corporate behavior. By developing a model of comparative institutional performance 
rather than the traditional reduced-form institutional choice model, they test for various theory-specific 
hypotheses. The authors conclude that in order to improve the theory of the firm, competing 
approaches must be integrated.  
This chapter provides an empirical study of the determinants of vertical integration in the global LNG 
industry, accounting for the endogeneity of investments in specific assets. The analysis is based on the 
positioning-economizing approach. First, following Porter, three strategic target market positions in 
this industry are identified: chain optimization versus a flexibility strategy versus national oil and gas 
companies. Each target market position is supported by an underlying resource profile characterized 
by a certain level of idiosyncrasy. Second, following transaction cost economics, it is argued that 
specific investments under uncertainty provide incentiv s to integrate vertically. These economic 
relationships are tested empirically based on a two-step procedure.  
5.3 Theoretical background  
5.3.1 Positioning-economizing perspective 
Assuming that all firms in one industry face the same environmental conditions and the same level of 
transaction attributes, transaction cost economics would predict that all firms choose identical 
governance forms. However, this is not the case in the real world. In the LNG industry for example, 
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we observe vertical integration but at the same time also non-integrated players as well as various 
forms of hybrid governance.  
Transaction cost economics has made several contributions to strategic management; the central 
problem of make-or-buy has been applied to numerous other problems such as lateral integration, joint 
ventures, employment relations, etc. See Williamson (1991a) and Nickerson (1997) for more detailed 
discussions. However, several authors call for a combination of both approaches; Nickerson et al. 
(2001, p. 251) argue that “… if followed in isolation, each theory can lead to inferior performance”. 
The positioning-economizing perspective provides a framework which is able to explain this diversity 
of governance forms.41 Whereas the unit of analysis in transaction cost economics is the single 
transaction, its ability to explain corporate strategies on a firm-level is underdeveloped. Therefore, th  
unit of analysis in the positioning-economizing perspective is the firm-level strategy (i.e., the 
combination of all transactions).  
Nickerson (1997) argues that the decisions regarding targeting a specific set of consumers, choosing a 
production technology, making specific investments or not to support the customer transaction, and 
selecting a governance mode are interdependent. He defines the ‘strategy four-tuple’ as {A, kp, km, γ} 
where A represents the vector of product attributes including features and quality, kp represents a 
vector of production technologies p and the corresponding level of specific investments, km is the 
vector of the nature and level of specific investments m in the consumer transaction and γ represents 
the governance mode. In the following discussions kp and km are jointly referred to as resource 
investments. The firm’s optimal strategy is the four-tuple that generates the greatest net receipts. 
Hence, successful strategic behavior requires taking into consideration various aspects (i.e., demand 
conditions and competitive market structure, production costs as well as transaction costs). A 
formalization of the four-tuple choice problem is provided in the Appendix. 
Figure 33 illustrates the positioning-economizing perspective. A target market position (i.e., products 
and services a firm desires to serve to a specific group of consumers) is supported by an underlying 
resource profile (defined as the set and type of resources and capabilities employed in the vertical 
chain). These resources are of a certain kind (i.e., degree of idiosyncrasy) which in turn determines the 
optimal governance mode. The decisions on target market position, resource investments and 
governance mode are made jointly in t = 0. In the next period, trading takes place and profit are 
realized. Firms will prefer the strategy with the greatest profitability; “combinations that are not 
reinforcing are not feasible in the long-run” (Nickerson et al., 2001, p. 271). Heterogeneity in firm 
strategies reflects that firms occupy different feasible resource profile/organization pairings.  
Hence, three related questions have to be answered: Which resource profiles support different target 
market positions? Which governance forms economize on transaction and production costs given the 
                                                   
41 The term ‘positioning-economizing perspective’ has been introduced by Nickerson et al. (2001). Nickerson 
(1997) talks about an ‘economizing theory of strategy’ based on a four-tuple analysis. Ghosh and John (1999) 
talk about a ‘governance value analyses’. 
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resource profile? Which impact has the resource profile/ rganization pairing on product and service 
attributes (i.e., performance)? 
Figure 33: Positioning-economizing perspective  
 
Source: Own depiction  
 
Nickerson et al. (2001) make an important contribution o this literature responding to three challenges 
present when combining alternative theories of the firm. First, they show that the assumptions 
underlying both approaches are not inconsistent since they focus on unrelated factors. Transaction cost 
economics makes two behavioral assumptions with economic actors being characterized by bounded 
rationality and opportunism. In the strategic positi ning framework, no behavioral assumptions (in the 
sense of bounded rationality) are made. Furthermore, it is explicitly assumed that consumers are 
heterogeneous and that not one single strategy optimally serves all customers. Second, they point out 
that both theories have a consistent unit of analysis – the value chain and transactions (unbundled 
value chain), respectively. Third, they offer a methodology of operationalization of the model (i.e., a 
three-step estimation procedure). 
5.3.2 Industry-specific propositions 
This section introduces alternative corporate strategies observed in the global LNG market and 
develops industry-specific propositions. To investigate the LNG industry from an economic as well as 
from a strategic perspective, it is distinguished btween upstream activities (exploration, production, 
and liquefaction), midstream shipping, and downstream regasification and marketing. Companies may 
be specialized in one, two, or even all three of these segments. However, we also observe varying 
strategies of different companies which are active in similar stages of the value chain, and one and the 
same company choosing different positions along alternative value chains. Strategic positioning is 
understood as performing different activities from rivals’ or performing similar activities in different 
Target market 
position  
(i.e., strategy) 
Resource profile  
(i.e., level of specificity 
of the investments) 
Governance choice  
(i.e., market, hybrid, or 
vertical integration) 
Firm performance 
t = 0 
(Joint decision making) 
t = 1 
(Trading and realization 
of profits) 
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ways. From Porter’s strategic positioning framework, three possible target market positions taken by 
LNG firms can be identified:  
 
• Flexibility strategy: Players following a flexibility strategy (e.g. BG roup, Exxon Mobil) are 
investing in a portfolio of LNG export and import capacities on both sides of the Atlantic or 
even in the Atlantic and Pacific Basins, enabling benefits from arbitraging possibilities. The 
control of midstream transportation capacities is a key factor required for flexible trade.  
• Chain optimizers are typically active in one import country (e.g. Gaz de France, Korea Gas 
Corporation), contracting or integrating along the associated value chain in order to secure 
supplies.  
• National oil and gas companies (NOCs) are upstream state-owned, traditionally producing, 
companies (e.g. Sonatrach in Algeria) with the main objective of generating state revenues. 
 
Each target market position is supported by an underlying resource profile. However, as already 
discussed in Section 4.4, the definition of asset sp cificity in the LNG industry is not straightforward. 
A company investing in downstream capacity without having secured supplies and access to 
midstream shipping is caught in a lock-in situation. LNG sellers traditionally profited from significant 
bargaining power since importers competed globally for natural gas supplies. Competitive downstream 
markets facilitate their access to numerous buyers.  
Whereas NOCs typically invest in the upstream sector and may integrate downstream, chain 
optimizers hold downstream positions contracting or integrating upstream along the associated value 
chain in order to secure supplies. Employing a flexibility strategy leads players to invest in a portflio 
of upstream and downstream capacities. Hence:  
 
Proposition 1: National oil and gas companies rely on less idiosyncratic assets than companies 
following a flexibility strategy; companies following a flexibility strategy rely on less 
idiosyncratic assets than chain optimizers. 
 
According to transaction cost economics, idiosyncrati  ssets in uncertain environments lead to the 
hazard of ex-post opportunistic behavior by the counterparty. Organizing transactions within a firm’s 
own hierarchy will avoid these costs. Asset specificity furthermore is argued to be the strongest 
determinant of vertical integration. Hence: 
 
Proposition 2: Given the presence of environmental uncertainty, a higher share of idiosyncratic 
(downstream) assets in the portfolio of an LNG firm will increase the probability of vertical 
integration along the LNG value chain. 
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For this study, it is assumed that the observed governance modes represent efficient choices and that 
potential misalignment will result in a re-positionng or in the company ceasing its activities in the
industry due to entrepreneurial failure. Unfortunately, transaction-specific performance data (i.e., 
performance related to activities along the LNG value chain) are not publicly available. Therefore, a 
possible third proposition – as proposed theoretically in the positioning-economizing perspective – 
relating feasible resource profile/organization pairings to firm performance cannot be tested.  
An econometric model analyzing the above described two-part decision-making process is developed 
below. In the first step, it is examined how players choose a resource profile supporting their target 
market position. In the second step, the determinants that drive players towards vertical integration are
investigated. 
5.4 Data and methodology 
5.4.1 Data 
This study is based on the same dataset as the analysis carried out in Chapter 4. The unit of analysis 
for studying the determinants of vertical integration is again the corporate-specific value chain with 
vertical integration from upstream or downstream into midstream shipping as the main endogenous 
variable. The dependent variable VIis a discrete measure taking the value of one if we observe 
vertical integration of the player along value chain i, and zero otherwise. In 135 of the 237 
observations we observe vertical integration into midstream shipping: 
 
 



=
     1
    0
iVI  
 
5.4.2 Explanatory variables 
Corporate strategies. Proposition 1 describes the relationship between a target market position and the 
resource profile (i.e., the level of idiosyncrasy of a player’s LNG assets). Dummy variables indicating 
chain optimizers (CHAIN) and national oil and gas companies (NOC) are used as exogenous 
variables. The flexibility strategy (FLEX) is the omitted position. The allocation of the companies 
active in the LNG industry to one of the three target market positions was accomplished based on an 
evaluation of their activities and was verified in i terviews with natural gas market experts. 
Proposition 1 indicates a positive (respectively negative) relationship between the level of specific 
investments and CHAIN (respectively NOC).  
Transaction cost variables. Proposition 2 refers to the impact of idiosyncratic assets and uncertainty 
on the likelihood of vertical integration. Transaction cost economics predicts that asset specificity s 
the strongest determinant of integrating successive stages of the value chain into the corporation’s own
hierarchy. The relative extent of idiosyncratic asset  of a player (SPEC) is defined as the ratio of 
if no vertical integration into midstream shipping 
if vertical integration  
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regasification capacity over the sum of regasification and liquefaction capacity the player controls in 
the start-up year of the value chain with SPECi = r i, year / (r i, year + l i, year). The variable increases with the 
share of regasification capacities in a firm’s LNG portfolio, mirroring the lock-in situation of a player 
investing downstream in a sellers’ market. It is continuously distributed between zero and one, 
including these boundaries. 
Due to the high capital-intensity of infrastructure investments and uncertainties about the scope of 
natural gas fields and price developments, investors generally face different risks. In addition, natur l 
gas fields are often located in politically unstable regions. As discussed in Chapter 4, several riskscan 
be hedged and the political risk associated with upstream investments is evaluated as the main driver 
of uncertainty. The variable for political uncertainty (UNC), based on the so-called POLCON-index 
developed by Henisz (2000), is defined as (1 – POLCN) with UNCi ∈  [0, 1].  
Control variables. To account for changes in corporate strategies over time a dummy variable 
indicating value chains that came into operation after 1999 (D2000) is included. It is expected that 
players will encounter a changing environment given the industry’s rapid expansion and maturation 
since the end of the 1990s and that they must select or adapt strategies to maintain or gain competitiv  
advantages as discussed above.  
Several dummy variables are used to control for differences in corporate strategies resulting from 
regional factors that vary between the Atlantic Basin market (deliveries to Europe and North America) 
where LNG trading hubs already exist or are developing, and Asia-Pacific trade where buyers depend 
strongly on LNG imports. EXPAB indicates exporters situated in the Atlantic Basin, EXPPB indicates 
exporters situated in the Pacific Basin, suppliers delivering LNG from the Middle East to either 
Europe, North America, or Asia (EXPME) are the default category. 
CAPOWN accounts for a company’s market share in the industry, calculated as the ratio of the 
accumulated liquefaction and regasification capacities controlled (owned or contracted) by a global 
player over the sum of worldwide liquefaction and regasification capacities in operation at the end of 
the respective start-up year of the value chain: (r i, year + l i, year) / (r total, year + l total, year). Companies 
controlling significant LNG capacities may be able to benefit from arbitrage possibilities which in turn 
increases the motivation to integrate into midstream shipping, especially when downstream 
regasification assets account for a significant share in the portfolio.  
The player’s assets value (ASSETS) is used as a proxy variable for firm size and financial strength. A 
positive relation between the probability of vertical integration and ASSETS is expected since 
companies endued with a strong capital basis face low r barriers to entry in terms of funding capital-
intensive LNG projects.  
Finally, the dummy variable STATE identifies state-owned entities, thus allowing fordifferences in 
corporate strategies due to a different ownership structure.  
For a survey of all explanatory variables as well as their descriptive statistics see Table 18. More than 
half of the analyzed corporate-specific value chains (53%) began operation after 1999. In 34% of all 
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cases we observe companies following a flexibility s rategy, in 44% chain optimizers and in 22% 
NOCs. Asset specificity of the respective company’s LNG portfolio ranges between zero (i.e., no 
specificity of the investments since the portfolio is dominated by upstream capacities; e.g., National 
Gas Company Trinidad/Tobago) and one (i.e., high specificity since the portfolio is dominated by 
downstream positions; e.g., Korea Gas Corporation) with a mean of 0.48. The political uncertainty 
index of the exporting country lies between 0.13 and o e. Broken up on a regional level, 44% of the 
observations represent value chains originating from Atlantic Basin exporters, 40% represent Pacific 
Basin exporters’ deliveries and in 16% Middle Eastern suppliers are involved. Players control between 
0.1% (Union Fenosa in 2000) and 30.3% (Osaka Gas in 1972) of worldwide LNG capacities during 
the observation period. Corporate size ranges from USD 358mn (Italian Enel) to USD 279bn 
(Japanese Nippon Oil Corp.). Finally, 33% of the observed value chains include state-owned entities. 
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Table 18: Explanatory variables and summary statistics 
Characteristic Proxy Unit Denotation Exp. 
sign 
Mean Std. 
dev. 
Min Max N 
Proposition 1 (dependent variable: SPEC) 
Strategy 1: Flexibility  Company following a flexibility strategy 
investing in a portfolio of export and import 
positions 
Dummy FLEX  0.342 0.475 0 1 237 
Strategy 2: Chain optimizer Company following a chain optimizing strategy 
investing along single value chains 
Dummy CHAIN + 0.439 0.497 0 1 237 
Strategy 3: NOC National oil and gas company Dummy NOC - 0.219 0.415 0 1 237 
Proposition 2 (dependent variable: VI) 
Asset specificity Share of downstream capacities in the player’s 
LNG portfolio 
% SPEC + 0.479 0.446 0 1 237 
External uncertainty Political instability in the supplying country  UNC  0.616 0.379 0.13 1 237 
Control variables 
Change in industry structure Start-up of the value chain after 1999 Dummy D2000  0.527 0.500 0 1 237 
Export region Exporter in the Atlantic Basin Dummy EXPAB  0.439 0.497 0 1 237 
 Exporter in the Pacific Basin Dummy EXPPB  0.405 0.492 0 1 237 
 Exporter in the Middle East Dummy EXPME  0.156 0.364 0 1 237 
Market share in the LNG 
industry 
Capacity controlled by the player (% of total 
existing export and import capacity) 
% CAPOWN  0.040 0.052 0 1 237 
Financial resources Company size measured by the assets value bn USD ASSETS  63.476 63.628 0.358 195.265 237 
Company type Company being state-owned Dummy STATE  0.380 0.486 0 1 237 
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Table 19: Correlation matrix 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
VI 1 1             
FLEX 2 0.213 1            
CHAIN 3 0.082 -0.637 1           
NOC 4 -0.342 -0.382 -0.469 1          
SPEC 5 0.169 -0.299 0.758 -0.565 1         
UNC 6 -0.213 -0.176 -0.096 0.318 -0.224 1        
D2000 7 0.167 0.148 -0.032 -0.131 0.011 -0.068 1       
EXPAB 8 -0.073 -0.010 -0.165 0.209 -0.059 0.330 0.173 1      
EXPPB 9 0.040 -0.160 0.292 -0.168 0.202 -0-230 -0.286 -0.730 1     
EXPME 10 0.032 0.219 -0.153 -0.065 -0.177 -0.150 0.137 -0.386 -0.337 1    
CAPOWN 11 0.124 -0.270 0.183 0.090 0.222 0.004 -0.329 -0.100 0.237 -0.189 1   
ASSETS 12 0.190 0.691 -0.417 -0.292 -0.365 -0.115 0.063 -0.141 0.033 0.140 -0.098 1  
STATE 13 -0.057 -0.454 -0.114 0.657 -0.180 0.242 -0.148 0.097 -0.150 0.061 0.115 -0.491 1 
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5.4.3 Methodology 
To test the above derived propositions, an estimation model with both vertical integration as well as 
the level of specific investments as endogenous variables is defined. The first stage of the regression 
investigates the relationship between a target market position and the level of idiosyncratic assets, the 
second stage analyzes the impact of the firm’s resource profile (with respect to the level of 
idiosyncrasy) on the likelihood of vertical integration 
Since the above developed theoretical discussion is built on a set of relationships with two endogenous 
variables, one has to deal with simultaneous equations (Greene, 2002, pp. 74 ff. and 378 ff.; Maddala, 
2001, pp. 343 ff.). Two-stage estimation procedures sing instrumental variables (IV) are required. An 
independent OLS estimation of the single equations would lead to inconsistent estimators (i.e., 
simultaneous equation bias) since the endogenous variables are correlated with the disturbances. 
Suppose a population model  
 
εββββ +++++= KK xxxy ...22110        (5-1) 
 
with E(ε) = 0 and Cov(xj, ε) = 0 ∀  j∈(1…(k – 1)). The right-hand-side variable xk is an endogenously 
determined variable. Hence, the error distribution ca not be considered independent of the regressor’s 
distribution with E(ε│xk) ≠ 0; the regressor is correlated with the error term:  Cov(xk, ε) ≠ 0. The idea 
is to find a set of instruments Z which is correlated with xk, but orthogonal to the error term. Hence, 
Cov(Z, xk) ≠ 0 and Cov(Z, ε) = 0. However, the identification of suitable instruments is a very 
challenging task. Greene (2002, p. 80) highlights tat “[u]nfortunately, there usually is not much 
choice in the selection of instrumental variables. The choice of Z is often ad hoc. There is a bit of a 
dilemma in this result. It would seem to suggest tha e best choices of instruments are variables that 
are highly correlated with X. But the more highly correlated a variable is with the problematic columns 
of X, the less defensible the claim that these same variables are uncorrelated with the disturbances.” 
Consistent estimates of the parameters can be constructed by using these assumed relationships 
between Z, xk and ε. In the two-stage least squares (2SLS) model, xk is regressed on all system 
exogenous variables as well as on the vector Z in the first stage. The fitted values are used as 
instrument for y in the second stage: 
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Following Proposition 1 that refers to the strategic positioning framework, it has been hypothesized 
that each target market position is supported by an underlying resource profile. To check for a non-
linear impact of firm size on the integration decision, the asset’s value is included both in linear and in 
quadratic form into the estimation model:  
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where the error term vi is expected to follow a normal distribution. For econometric reasons, all control 
variables used in Equation (5-4) are also included in Equation (5-3). In the second step, based on the 
transaction cost approach, the impact of specific investments on a firm’s choice of governance form is 
analyzed. Following Proposition 2, it is expected that idiosyncratic assets relate positively to the 
likelihood of vertical integration:  
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where the error term εi is assumed to follow a normal distribution. Having defined the dependent 
variable as a binary variable, a two-stage probit est mation model with an endogenous right-hand side 
variable (i.e., SPEC) is applied. Similarly to the more general two-stage least squares procedure, the 
observed values of the first-stage dependent variable (estimated using OLS) are replaced by their 
predicted values. Equation (5-4) is then specified as a probit model. See Section 4.4.3 for a technical 
summary on probit estimation. 
5.5 Estimation results and interpretation 
Table 20 provides estimation results of three models with Model 1 including only the main 
explanatory variables (i.e., target market positions as well as the level of specific investments), 
Model 2 including furthermore the transaction cost variable controlling for external uncertainty as well 
as control variables indicating the start-up of thevalue chain and the exporting region, and finally, 
Model 3 including all above defined exogenous variables. Both industry-specific propositions are 
confirmed empirically. Estimation results are robust with respect to the alternative model 
specifications. The log-likelihood values as well as different information criteria (i.e., AIC, BIC) 
indicate that the least parsimonious Model 3 has the best explanatory power.  
Estimation results provide broad support for Proposition 1. As expected, the estimation coefficient of 
the variable indicating chain optimizers (CHAIN) has  positive sign and the estimation coefficient of 
the variable indicating NOCs has a negative sign (both statistically significant at a 1% level for all 
models). Hence, it can be confirmed that national oil and gas companies rely on less idiosyncratic 
assets than companies following a flexibility strategy, and the last rely on less idiosyncratic assets than 
chain optimizers.  
The results of the second-stage estimation provide support for the transaction cost economics’ 
prediction. Asset specificity (SPEC) shows the expected positive sign and is highly significant. Hence, 
the more idiosyncratic (downstream) assets a company h s in its portfolio of LNG export and import 
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positions, the higher will be the likelihood of vertical integration along single value chains. The 
players secure their supplies by investing in midstream shipping and in some cases also in downstream 
production and liquefaction. This goes in line with the recent move towards more flexibility in long-
term LNG supply contracts; destination clauses often are eliminated and we observe an increasing 
importance of fob rather than des/cif contracts, leaving the control of midstream transportation with 
the buyers.  
Even though theory argues that the level of specific investments is itself a decision variable (see also
Masten, 1999), an augmented Durbin-Wu-Hausman test as suggested by Davidson and MacKinnon 
(1993) has been applied to explicitly test for the endogeneity of the variable SPEC. In the case that the 
regressor and the error term are uncorrelated both estimators (i.e., OLS and two-stage estimator) will 
yield consistent estimates, with the two-stage estimator being less efficient. The test statistic applied to 
Model 3 yields a chi-squared value of 16.5 significant at a 1% level. The null hypothesis of specificity 
being an exogenous variable can be rejected. This justifies the use of an instrumental variable 
estimation procedure (i.e., two-stage probit model with an endogenous regressor), since a simple 
probit regression of Equation (5-4) without accounting for the endogeneity of SPEC would lead to 
biased estimates. For a more detailed description of the calculation of this test statistic see the 
Appendix.  
The presence of external uncertainty (UNC), in terms of political instability of the exporting country, 
seems to have a negative impact on the integration decision.42 However, theory predicts that its 
presence intensifies the impact of specific investmnts. Interestingly, the level of specific investments 
decreases with increasing uncertainty (statistically significant at a 1% level). This indicates that 
companies increasingly safeguard investments in downstream assets by respective upstream 
investments the higher the political instability of the exporting country and hence, the higher the 
hazard of ex-post opportunistic (or unforeseeable) ehavior by national agencies or companies.  
Statistically significant control variables provide s veral interesting findings. The variable controlling 
for the start-up date of the value chain (D2000) indicates that vertical integration has become a more 
common organizational mode throughout the industry. This reflects global players’ efforts to establish 
a portfolio of export and import positions in order to benefit from arbitrage potentials. We observe that
access to flexible transport capacities is the key to a successful employment of this strategy. Rapid 
industrial expansion accompanied by a restructuring process prompts firms to internalize risks inherent 
in the capital-intensive industry via strategic repositioning and reshaping. 
The variables EXPAB and EXPPB have no significant impact on the decision to integrate vertically 
and there appears to be no difference in corporate strategies between value chains in the Atlantic Basin 
which are dedicated to more or less competitive downstream markets, value chains in the Pacific Basin 
market where countries typically strongly rely upon natural gas imports in the form of LNG, and value 
                                                   
42 Regressions using alternative measures of political instability in the exporting country (i.e., the International 
Country Risk Guide reported by the PRS Group as well as the Political and Economic Risk Report prepared by 
Aon Corporation) led to similar results.  
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chains from the swing producer region of the Middle East. An alternative regression accounting for the 
importing region (deliveries dedicated to Atlantic Basin customers instead of to Pacific Basin 
customers) does not reveal any regional differences, too. 
Players controlling a larger share of world LNG (regasification and liquefaction) capacities 
(CAPOWN) show a higher extent of investments in specific assets. However, no significant influence 
on the likelihood of vertical integration could be found. 
For the variable measuring a firm’s financial strength (ASSETS) it can be shown that investments in 
specific assets decrease with a higher assets value. A possible explanation is that most capital-
intensive investments are required upstream (exploration, production, and liquefaction). In contrast, 
the value of assets is positively related to the lik lihood of vertical integration (with a non-linear 
impact), an indication that larger firms have the financial capabilities necessary to invest in numerous 
capital-intensive LNG (export and/or import and shipping) facilities. 
In contrast to private firms, state-owned entities (STATE) tend to invest in assets with a higher level of 
idiosyncrasy; the share of regasification capacities in their LNG portfolios is larger on average. This 
can be explained by the fact that in the first decas of the LNG industry, mainly national natural gas 
companies and distributors invested in LNG import capacities, even though we observe the move to 
privatization (e.g. Gaz de France, ENI). Furthermore, the likelihood of vertical integration is on 
average also higher for state-owned entities. 
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Table 20: Estimation results 
Specification Proposition 1 - Dependent variable: SPEC 
First stage regression 
 
Proposition 2 - Dependent variable: VI 
Second stage regression 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
CONSTANT 0.306 
(0.032) 
*** 0.282 
(0.258) 
*** 0.555 
(0.071) 
*** -0.144 
(0.140) 
 0.123 
(0.294) 
-2.285 
(0.452) 
*** 
CHAIN 0.551 
(0.042) 
*** 0.556 
(0.042) 
*** 0.233 
(0.047) 
***       
NOC -0.314 
(0.051) 
*** -0.296 
(0.051) 
*** -0.648 
(0.059) 
***       
SPEC       0.670 
(0.234) 
*** 0.544 
(0.254) 
** 1.917 
(0.307) 
*** 
UNC   -0.151 
(0.050) 
*** -0.112 
(0.043) 
***   -0.505 
(0.248) 
** -0.392 
(0.262) 
 
D2000   -0.021 
(0.036) 
0.034 
(0.043) 
  0.412 
(0.178) 
** 0.482 
(0.197) 
** 
EXPAB   0.196 
(0.052) 
*** 0.185 
(0.047) 
***   -0.175 
(0.263) 
-0.129 
(0.272) 
EXPPB   0.089 
(0.054) 
* 0.121 
(0.049) 
**   -0.089 
(0.271) 
-0.124 
(0.280) 
CAPOWN     1.649 
(0.316) 
***     1.985 
(2.154) 
ASSETS     -0.004 
(0.001) 
***     0.026 
(0.006) 
*** 
(ASSETS)²     0.000 
(0.000) 
*     -0.0001 
(0.000) 
** 
STATE     0.055 
(0.046) 
***     1.220 
(0.265) 
*** 
             
Log-likelihood       -184.37  -167.84  -107.53  
AIC       382.73  365.68  261.05  
BIC       407.01  417.70  340.82  
N 237  237  237  237  237  237  
*** Statistically significant at a 1%-level; ** staistically significant at a 5%-level; * statistically significant at a 10%-level. All levels of 
statistical significance are based on two-tailed test statistics. Corrected standard errors in parentheses. 
 
5.6 Summary and conclusions 
This study provides empirical evidence for combining alternative theories of the firm. Recent 
theoretical literature argues that economic and strategic management approaches should be linked in 
order to explain companies’ behavior in dynamic markets and the emergence of different corporate 
strategies in one and the same industry (see e.g., Nickerson and Bigelow, 2008). The study builds on 
recent theoretical developments which propose the so-called positioning-economizing perspective 
linking Williamson’s transaction cost approach and Porter’s strategic positioning framework. 
During the early years of this decade worldwide regasification capacity has increased significantly, 
even though recent projections are less enthusiastic with regard to the world financial crisis and the 
resulting global demand decrease. Rapidly increasing worldwide demand in the past and the ongoing 
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process of deregulation in downstream markets have brought fundamental changes in corporate 
behavior; many companies are investing in regionally diversified LNG portfolios and integrating 
vertically to internalize risk factors resulting from investments in capital-intensive infrastructures. The 
control of transport capacities is a key factor in order to benefit from cross-trade opportunities. 
Based on a two-step decision-making process, two propositions on corporate strategies in the LNG 
industry are tested. First, based on the strategic positioning framework, three possible target market 
positions are identified: chain optimization (investments in infrastructure along a single value chain) 
versus a flexibility strategy (investments in a portfolio of LNG export and import positions) versus 
national oil and gas companies. Empirical results confirm the industry-specific predictions and support 
the positioning-economizing approach hypothesis of an interrelation between the three strategic 
choices of target market position, resource profile, and organizational structure. It can be shown that 
NOCs rely on less idiosyncratic assets than companies following a flexibility strategy and that those 
companies following a flexibility strategy rely on less idiosyncratic assets than chain optimizers. 
Second, based on transaction cost economics the determinants of vertical integration are investigated. 
Estimation results confirm the theory’s predictions and show that idiosyncratic investments in 
uncertain environments lead to a motivation to organize transactions within a firm’s own hierarchy.   
As Porter (1996, p. 78) argues, “a company may have to change its strategy if there are major 
structural changes in its industry.” Hence, strategic positioning is not a static concept but rather 
requires dynamic adaptations. He further points out tha  “most commonly, new positions open up 
because of change” (p. 65). Market entrants may be more flexible in adopting an innovative strategy 
since they – unlike incumbents – do not have to consider already realized investments. A number of 
new players have entered the LNG market during the last decade. For example, Cheniere Energy has 
invested in two regasification terminals in the US gulf coast, two further projects are planned. 
Excelerate Energy operates offshore on-board regasification facilities in several countries. However, a 
sustainable success of these non-integrated, downstream business models still has to be demonstrated 
in the future.  
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5.7 Appendix 
 
Formalization of the positioning-economizing perspective  
Nickerson (1997, pp. 34 ff.) provides a first formaliz tion of the four-tuple choice problem. Consider 
two vertically related transactions T(i) for product markets i with i = {1, 2}. T(1) is referred to as the 
transaction between the firm and the consumers; T(2) is referred to as the transaction between the firm 
and its own suppliers.  
Consumer preferences are heterogeneously distributed along dimensions A(j) with j being finite. It is 
further assumed that the firm can invest in specific assets k(1) in T(1) at a per unit cost λ and that these 
investments will shift demand. Firm revenue then is a function of k(1), the distribution of A(j) and the 
produced quantity X.  
It is also assumed that the firm chooses a production technology which may range in its characteristic 
between generic and highly specific. The choice of this technology represents the choice of the level 
of asset specificity k(2) in T(2) at a per unit cost ω. Production costs then are a function of the 
produced quantity X, the levels of specific investments k(1) and k(2) and the distribution of A(j). 
T(2) can be organized within the own hierarchy (H) or on the market (M). We define γ = {H, M} with 
governance costs being a function of the exchange conditions in T(1) and T(2). Then the profit 
equation for the observed firm becomes: 
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where A can be understood as the targeted customer group (i.e., strategic market position), k(i) are the 
levels of specific investments and γ represents the chosen governance mode. For a givencustomer 
type, these parameters are chosen such that profit is maximized. The four-tuple {A, k(1), k(2), γ} will 
be a feasible strategy if profits are greater than or equal to zero: 
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Developing implications from this model requires explicit information on production costs, revenues 
and governance costs under alternative forms of organization. The above specified model is dedicated 
to a simplified case with only two transactions. Complexity of the decision analysis will increase when 
multiple investments and multiple supply transactions are considered. Furthermore, exchange 
conditions for customer and supply transactions may be multi-dimensional when a combination of 
different types of specific investments occurs.  
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Augmented Durbin-Wu-Hausman test  
When there is a reasonable suspicion that one of the regressors is not orthogonal to the error term ε 
(i.e., a right-hand-side variable is endogenous and Cov(xi, ε) ≠ 0), an endogeneity test should be 
carried out. In the case that the regressor and the error term are uncorrelated (Cov(xi, ε) = 0) both 
estimators, the ordinary least squares (OLS) and the two-stage IV estimator, will yield consistent 
estimates. However, the IV estimator will be less effici nt.43 If endogeneity is present, IV estimation is 
mandatory since other estimation procedures will deliver biased parameter values.  
The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test involves estimating the model via both OLS and IV approaches and 
comparing the resulting coefficient vectors. For a more detailed description see e.g. Baum et al. 
(2003). Under the null-hypothesis, OLS and IV will deliver consistent estimates with the OLS 
estimator being more efficient. Under the alternative, only an IV procedure will deliver consistent 
estimates. Hence, the rejection of the null hypothesis provides evidence of the endogeneity of the 
right-hand-side variable.  
Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) suggest an augmented Durbin-Wu-Hausman test. In a first step, the 
endogenous variable is regressed on all system exogenous variables. In a second step, the residuals of 
this first regression are included into an augmented r gression investigating the main functional 
relationship. Hence, for Model 3 specified in this chapter, the following steps have been carried out: 
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where the error term εi is assumed to follow a normal distribution. The residuals (RES_SPEC) are 
calculated and included into the probit model explaining the likelihood of vertical integration: 
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The test statistic investigating whether the residual’s parameter is different from zero yields a chi-
squared value of 16.5 (significant at a 1% level). The null hypothesis of specificity being an 
exogenous variable can be rejected supporting the use of two-stage instrumental variable estimation 
procedures.  
                                                   
43 An estimator is consistent if it converges in probability to the true parameter value: ( ) ββ =ˆ plim . An estimator 
is asymptotically efficient if it converges faster than other consistent estimators: ( ) ( )BA ββ ˆvarˆvar < .  
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6 Optimal Contract Duration of Long-term LNG Supply C ontracts: A 
Trade-off  
6.1 Introduction 
The future role of long-term contracts in the global energy sector is a major topic in recent policy 
debates. Whereas long-term agreements support investments in capital-intensive infrastructures and 
are a mean to hedge price and quantity risks, they ma  prevent the development of more competitive 
market structures. The discussion is fostered by the ongoing liberalization process in Continental 
Europe’s natural gas and electricity markets in a period when import countries have encountered 
record-high prices, e.g., crude oil has been traded in the USD 140/bbl range in summer 2008 and 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) spot cargoes delivered to Japan were above USD 19/MBTU in January 
2008. 
Market restructuring has changed contracting practices between importers or domestic producers and 
downstream distribution companies. The German cartel office for example decided in 2005 to confine 
the conclusion of long-term contracts between natural gas transmission companies and regional 
distributors. The IEA (2004, p. 98) points out that whereas long-term contracts are still the dominant 
contractual form between non-European exporters and importing companies, they „will have to hedge 
their long-term minimum pay commitment by having reliable long-term marketing possibilities.” On a 
roundtable on energy security and competition policy organized by the OECD in 2007 it was argued 
that long-term contracts on the one hand facilitate inv stments, but on the other hand mitigate market 
entry. Furthermore, restrictions on resale and volume flexibility reduce the liquidity on secondary 
markets.  
In the view of institutional economics, long-term contracts are considered a hybrid form of governance 
on the continuum between spot markets and full vertical integration. Long-term LNG supply contracts 
are concluded between private oil and gas majors who participate in upstream projects or a consortium 
of the NOC and a private partner and a downstream importer. Contract duration of these agreements 
typically was in the range of 15 to 30 years in the early years of the industry. In the last decade there 
has been an increase in the number of agreements with less than 20 years and even less than ten years 
duration. 
As discussed above, the structure of long-term contracts has changed. Contract duration as well as 
annual contracted volume is decreasing, oil-price indexation is diminishing in importance in favor of 
gas-to-gas competition, and inflexible clauses (e.g., take-or-pay or destination obligations) have been 
relaxed or eliminated. Furthermore, we observe a move from contracts in which the seller is 
responsible for midstream transportation (cif/des) towards contracts in which title transfer occurs at 
the loading port (fob). Under an fob contract, buyers have the possibility to manage variations in 
demand more flexible via cargo re-direction and to benefit from resell options. 
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This chapter analyses the determinants of changes in contract duration in order to investigate the 
impact of market structure (i.e., level of competition on a regional as well as global scale) on optimal 
governance choice. As discussed in Chapter 3, therear  several dynamic factors currently affecting the 
global market for natural gas: realization of large-scale infrastructure investments (LNG as well as 
pipelines), new market entrants, and changes in trade structures. The past five to ten years have seen 
the global LNG industry undergoing rapid maturation. Changes in the institutional framework of 
downstream markets have moved the industry from monop listic structures towards competition, thus 
stimulating fundamental changes in the organizationl behavior of market participants. Hence, 
competitive structures gain in importance in downstream markets at the same time that formerly 
regional markets become linked and importers compete globally for natural gas supplies.  
Theoretical literature discussing the structure of long-term contracts can be classified into three main 
approaches: i) transaction cost economics, assuming bounded rationality of economic actors, argues 
that long-term contracts are a way of minimizing transaction costs in bilateral relationships where 
relationship-specific investments occur with complex contracts functioning to overcome the ex-post 
hold-up problem without integrating vertically (Williamson, 1975, 1985); ii) the property rights 
approach is a theory of incomplete contracts assuming rational agents with symmetric information but 
non-verifiability of actions by third parties. It emphasizes the impact of ex-post opportunism on ex-
ante investment incentives, formalizes the hold-up problem arising from specific investments, and 
discusses the optimal transfer of residual control rights (Grossman and Hart, 1986); and iii) incentive 
theory, assuming rational agents but asymmetric information, formalizes the problems of adverse 
selection and moral hazard and discusses optimal contract design to overcome principal-agent 
problems (Laffont and Martimort, 2002).  
There is a growing body of empirical literature investigating the determinants of contract duration and 
contractual terms. Masten (1999) provides a first categorization of studies analyzing contracting 
structures. Whereas the early literature focusing o the natural gas sector is based on the US market, 
Hirschhausen and Neumann (2008) provide the first study using international trade data. The 
following study contributes to the literature the first empirical assessment focusing on long-term 
liquefied natural gas supply contracts. In contrast to raditional pipeline infrastructures, there is no 
locational specificity of investments resulting from technical characteristics since trades between 
varying players theoretically are feasible. I discuss the determination of optimal contract length as a 
trade-off between the minimization of transaction costs due to repeated bilateral bargaining and the 
risk of being bound by an inflexible agreement in uncertain environments. Furthermore, this study 
adds to the theoretical discussion an analysis of different dimensions of transaction frequency and their 
impact on governance choice.  
Building a simultaneous equation model to account for he endogeneity of a right-hand side variable, I 
empirically test propositions i) on the above mentio ed trade-off with long-term contracts securing 
durable investments but forgoing some flexibility, and ii) on the influence of transaction frequency 
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(within the relationship as well as between the trading partners) on contract duration. Estimation 
results using a unique dataset including information of LNG supply contracts from the beginning of 
the industry until today show that the presence of high asset specificity results in longer contracts, 
confirming the predictions of transaction cost economics whereas the need for flexibility in today’s 
‘second generation’ LNG market supports shorter-term agreements. When firms have experience in 
bilateral trading, contract duration decreases. In addition, countries heavily reliant on natural gas 
imports via LNG are often willing to forgo some flexibility in favor of supply security. Contracts 
dedicated to competitive downstream markets on average are shorter than those concluded with 
customers in non-liberalized importing countries. 
6.2 Literature review 
Most empirical studies testing transaction cost economics’ propositions analyze the make-or-buy 
decision. There is still a relatively small body of literature explaining contract duration or other 
contractual provisions. Nevertheless, existing empirical papers offer broad support for the proposition 
that economic actors choose organizational form and contract terms that promote efficient adaptation 
and minimize transaction costs.  
Several empirical studies, most of which are based on a transaction cost framework, investigate 
contract duration and environmental characteristics. Pirrong’s (1993) analysis on contracting practices 
in bulk shipping markets investigates differences in exogenous factors such as market structure or 
vessel specialization in order to explain the diversity of existing governance forms. Whereas spot 
contracts are chosen in the absence of any bilatera d pendency relationship, forward contracts are 
employed when significant temporal specificity is observed. In a specialized shipping market where 
both temporal and contractual specificities are present, long-term contracts or vertical integration are 
the transaction cost economizing organizational forms. Using data on trading relationships between 
input suppliers and engineering firms, Lyons (1994) shows that the probability of using formal 
contracts increases with the vulnerability to opportunistic behavior whereas it decreases with the 
complexity of the transaction.  
Empirical work on long-term contracts in the energy sector started during the 1980s. Joskow’s (1987) 
seminal work investigating the relationship between specific investments and contract duration in the 
US coal industry shows that contracting parties make longer commitments when site specific, physical 
asset specific or dedicated investments occur. Using a sample of 277 supply contracts between coal 
producers and electric utilities, Joskow estimates different models accounting for nonlinear 
relationships between endogenous and exogenous variables, the truncated nature of the sample, 
alternative measures of asset specificity as well as the endogeneity of the annual contracted volume. 
Whereas Joskow (1987) focuses mainly on the benefits o  contracting, Saussier (1999) provides an 
empirical study based on the European coal industry discussing the trade-off between both the costs 
and benefits of contracting. Using a dataset containing all 70 contracts for the transportation and 
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unloading of coal to Electricité de France’s power plants which have been concluded between 1977 
and 1997, he confirms that contract duration reflects the desire to minimize transaction costs. Whereas 
duration increases with the level of appropriable quasi-rents at stake in the transaction, it decreases 
with the level of uncertainty. These results are also robust to a second model in which he accounts for 
the endogeneity of specific investments. Saussier (2000) adds a new dimension to the discussion via 
testing the influence of transaction parameters on the level of completeness of French coal supply 
contracts, accounting again for the endogeneity of asset specificity. Analyzing a sample of 29 
contracts signed between 1977 and 1997 he shows that the completeness of contracts increases with 
the level of physical-, site-, dedicated-, and human asset specificity and decreases with the level of 
uncertainty. 
Kerkvliet and Shogren (2001), too, confirm transaction cost economics by empirically investigating 89 
coal contracts concluded between producers in the US Powder River Basin and utilities from 1972 to 
1984. They find a positive relationship between physically specific investments and contract duration 
and show that contract duration decreases with rising trading and market experience. However, for 
their measure of dedicated asset specificity they find counterintuitive results.  
Ellman (2006) extends the basic transaction cost economics model by formalizing the contracting 
costs associated with multiple investments (i.e., initial specific investment and adaptation investment). 
In cases where the so called side-compatibility44 is low, long-term contracts preventing hold-up of 
quasi-rents generated by the initial specific investment may induce hold-up of adaptation investments. 
Contracts therefore should be shorter under low side-compatibility when at the same time it is 
important to motivate adaptation investments. Hence, Ellman is able to explain Kerkvliet and 
Shogren’s (2001) counterintuitive result of dedicated asset specificity leading to shorter contracts. 
Dedication lowers side-compatibility and thereby is raising the costs of long-term contracting because 
in the case an adaptation investment will be necessary, there will be less potential trading partners. 
A number of studies investigating the natural gas sector discuss contractual relations in different 
institutional settings: Mulherin (1986) shows that specific investments in the US natural gas industry 
historically have been protected by the use of complex long-term forms of organization. Whereas prior 
to the 1930s vertical integration from production over transportation to distribution has been common, 
governmental regulation (i.e., the Public Utility Holding Act 1935 and the Natural Gas Act 1938) led 
to long-term contracts being the predominant governance form with pipeline companies buying from 
producers and reselling to distributors. Exclusive dealing and take-or-pay provisions served as a mean 
to protect quasi-rents at stake and prevent opportunistic behavior by the non-investing parties.  
Hubbard and Weiner (1986) analyze long-term natural gas supply contracts between producers and 
pipelines following the phased deregulation of wellh ad prices in the US and derive a theoretical 
model on the determination of take-or-pay provision. They show that wellhead price ceilings favor 
                                                   
44 Side-compatibility refers to the possibility that adaptation investments are organized with a third contracting 
partner parallel to the initial contract. Side-trading obviously will be most effective and least expensive when 
adaptation and basic trade are least related. 
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long-term contracts which include non-price contract provisions such as take-or-pay clauses which 
increase the producers’ total compensation. The authors can corroborate these predictions by empirical 
evidence from a sample of 470 contracts concluded between producers and pipelines after 1978 (i.e., 
after the passage of the Natural Gas Policy Act which constituted different classes of price ceilings 
according to natural gas well characteristics). 
Crocker and Masten (1988) discuss and test the impact of regulatory actions on contract duration. 
Using a dataset of 280 contracts between US natural gas producers and their customers concluded 
between 1960 and 1981 they confirm the trade-off betwe n the costs of repeated bargaining in the 
presence of relationship-specific investments and the hazard of being bound by an inflexible long-term 
agreement. They furthermore show theoretically as well as empirically that distortions in performance 
incentives raise the costs of long-term agreements a d therefore shorten contract duration. In the 
presence of binding price ceilings, buyers are unable to compete for scarce resources with higher 
prices and will instead attempt to attract sellers by offering more favorable non-price contract terms. In 
a later paper Masten and Crocker (1991) investigate the choice of alternative price adaptation clauses 
in US natural gas supply contracts. Whereas the presence of uncertainty should favor renegotiation, 
the presence of high quasi-rents at stake should favor redetermination clauses based on pricing 
formulas which reduce the frequency of negotiations a d therewith the hazard of opportunistic 
haggling.  
Doane and Spulber (1994) argue that regulatory reforms in the US natural gas market promoting open 
access to transportation infrastructures have reduced the specificity of investments since bilateral 
dependencies between sellers and buyers decreased which in turn resulted in a lower hold-up risk and 
a substitution of long-term contracts in favor of short-term and spot trade. 
Neuhoff and Hirschhausen (2005) discuss the role of long-term natural gas contracts in markets 
undergoing liberalization. First, they argue that long-term contracts diminish in importance with 
increasing downstream competition. Second, they develop a theoretical model built upon the industrial 
organization literature showing that both producers and consumers benefit from lower prices and a 
higher market volume if long-run demand elasticity is significantly higher than short-run elasticity.  
Hirschhausen and Neumann (2008) provide an empirical analysis of the changing contract structure in 
international natural gas trading. Using a dataset of 311 long-term natural gas supply contracts 
including pipeline as well as LNG deliveries, they find that contract duration decreases as market 
structure evolves to more competitive regimes and provide further empirical support for transaction 
cost economics showing that investments linked to specific infrastructures increase contract duration 
by an average of three years. They also find that mrket entrants tend to sign shorter contracts 
confirming the hypothesis that long-term agreements are mainly relevant during the early stages of 
industry development when large scale infrastructure investments have to be realized and the number 
of potential trading partners is limited.  
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6.3 Theoretical background 
6.3.1 Optimal contract duration: A trade-off 
The trade-off between contracting costs and flexibility s discussed in theory and investigated in a 
number of empirical papers (e.g., Gray, 1978; Crocker and Masten, 1988; Klein, 1989; Klein et al. 
1990; Heide and John, 1990). On the one hand, transaction cost economics predicts that investments in 
idiosyncratic assets result in ex-post bilateral dependency and lead to a lock-in situation where the 
investor faces the hazard of post-contractual opportunism and strategic bargaining by the counterparty. 
In such settings longer-term agreements attenuate those costs by stipulating the terms of trade over th  
life of the contract. On the other hand, contract duration is limited due to uncertainty about the future 
and the hazard of being bound by an agreement that may no longer reflect market realities (e.g., 
demand levels, input and output prices, changes in the institutional environment, technological 
innovations). Obviously, spelling out every continge cy is costly or even impossible. Hence, the trade-
off lies in choosing “terms that maintain incentives for efficient adaptation while minimizing the need 
for costly adjudication and enforcement” (Crocker and Masten, 1988, p. 328).   
The optimal level of contract duration τ* corresponds to a situation where the marginal costs and 
marginal benefits of contracting are equal. The costs f being bound by the contract are determined 
mainly by the level of uncertainty and will increas with duration. Uncertainty about the future of the
environment is higher for more distant time horizons. Parameters that are fixed in the short-term 
become variable in the long-term; stipulated terms may be inefficient in later periods. Marginal costs 
increase with uncertainty and contract duration. Hence, the principal costs as against a shorter contract 
can be traced back to ex-ante information costs and potential ex-post maladaptation and renegotiation 
costs. It has to be noted that the presence of uncertainty also rises the cost of bargaining (i.e., spot 
trade). However, the cost of contracting increase to a greater extent since the party must account for all 
(known) possible contingencies.  
The benefits of avoiding repeated negotiation are chi fly determined by the level of idiosyncratic 
investments dedicated to the trading relationship. Longer-term agreements support the willingness of 
the party to take actions whose values are conditioal upon the counterparty’s post-contractual 
behavior. Longer contracts reduce the exposure to opportunistic behavior by the non-investing 
contractor by defining the distribution of rents ex-ante. Furthermore, the cost of the repeated 
bargaining of shorter trading agreements can be reduced. Marginal benefits decrease with every 
additional period covered by the contract.  
Figure 34 illustrates the optimization problem. An increase in the level of uncertainty (u’ > u) will 
result in an upward shift of the marginal cost curve (MC); an increase in the level of asset specificity 
(s’ > s) will result in an upward shift of the marginal benefits curve (MB). 
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Figure 34: Optimization problem  
 
Source: Own depiction 
 
We can formalize the discussion above by the following optimization problem: 
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with optimal contract duration determined by the setting where marginal benefits equal marginal costs. 
Since it is difficult to observe and measure contracting costs, a reduced form model where marginal 
costs and marginal benefits of contracting are related to observable contracting attributes is 
constructed:  
 
  
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ωβτββωττ
ναταανττ
+++==
+++==
uuMCMC
ssMBMB
210
210
,,*
,,*
    (6-2) 
 
with τ being the length of the agreement, s the level of specific assets dedicated to the trading 
relationship, u the level of uncertainty and v and ω further explaining attributes such as unobserved 
heterogeneity between the parties or environmental ch racteristics. Substituting (6-2) into (6-1) and 
rearranging yields the reduced form 
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with optimal contract duration on the left side of the equation and contracting attributes on the right. 
From the discussion above the following propositions are derived:  
 
Proposition 1a: Contract duration increases with the level of investments in idiosyncratic assets 
in order to avoid repeated bilateral bargaining and mitigate the vulnerability to ex-post hold-
up. 
 
Proposition 1b: Higher environmental uncertainty reduces contract duration in order to 
minimize the risk of being bound by a long-term commit ent that no longer reflects market 
realities.  
 
6.3.2 The impact of transaction frequency 
Transaction cost theory argues that transaction costs increase with the frequency of the transaction 
within the trading relationship due to the repeated hazard of opportunistic behavior and potential 
strategic renegotiation. This will increase incentives to organize the transaction under stronger intenal 
control. An alternative, complementary explanation f r a high frequency resulting in more firm-like 
governance structures is the greater potential for internal specialization and for exploitation of scale 
economies (see e.g., Williamson, 1985). Transaction c sts imposed by specific assets make more 
hierarchical organizational forms more appealing. However, a specialized governance mechanism 
involves significant setup as well as bureaucratic costs. Hence, the net benefits from avoiding post-
contractual hold-up as compared to the fixed costs f a more hierarchical governance form increase 
with transaction frequency. I am only aware of a small number of empirical studies testing transaction 
cost economics predictions and including transaction frequency as explanatory variable (such as 
Anderson and Schmittlein, 1984).  
Another perspective looks at the number of settlements in which similar transactions by the same 
parties occur. First, faithful partners may be rewarded and opportunistic behaviors punished in such 
long-term relationships. Second, there may be a decrease in transaction costs due to learning 
processes, established routines, enhanced efficiency of communication, and reputational effects 
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Langlois, 1992), all of which reduce the need for formal mechanisms to 
enforce bilateral agreements. Transaction frequency therefore should result in shorter contracts. 
Garvey (1995) develops a model investigating the eff ct of reputation on governance choice in settings 
where non-contractible investments occur. He finds that integration is favored for one-shot games 
whereas more hybrid structures like joint ventures are preferred in repeated games. He argues further 
that reputational considerations have an effect on b th the parties’ surplus and the optimal choice of 
asset ownership, supporting less hierarchical governance modes.   
I argue that these two perspectives on transaction frequency complement rather than compete one 
another. With increasing ‘within frequency’ the benefits of contracting will rise due to the repeated 
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hazard of opportunistic bargaining; with increasing ‘between frequency’ the benefits of contracting 
will fall due to lower ex-ante as well as ex-post transaction costs (see Figure 35).  
Figure 35: Extended optimization problem including transaction frequency 
 
Source: Own depiction 
 
The above developed model is expanded by including two frequency measures: fw indicating the 
frequency of the transaction within the relationship and fb indicating the historical frequency of 
transactions between the same trading partners expecting a positive (respectively negative) 
relationship with contract duration: 
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The following propositions are derived: 
 
Proposition 2a: Contract duration increases with the level of frequency of the transactions 
within the trading relationship in order to avoid the repeated hazard of post-contractual 
opportunism by the non-investing party. 
 
Proposition 2b: Contract duration decreases with the frequency of transactions between the 
same trading partners due to learning and reputational effects.  
 
6.4 Data and methodology 
6.4.1 Data  
The global dataset covering long-term agreements from the beginning of the industry until today has 
been compiled from various publicly available information such as periodical reports, newsletters, and 
industry journals. It includes contracting partners, annual and total contracted volumes, the year of 
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contract signature, the start date of deliveries and contract duration. Both, contracts currently in place 
or agreed for with the start of delivery during the coming years and contracts that already have been 
terminated are incorporated. Therefore, this study does not suffer from a truncated dependent variable 
as discussed in several other empirical papers investigating the determinants of contract duration (e.g., 
Joskow, 1987; Crocker and Masten, 1988; Masten and Crocker, 1991). After talking to industry 
experts it can be assumed that the dataset covers at least 80% of all ever existing long-term LNG 
supply contracts.  
Omitting observations including contracts with a duration of less than three years (since these have the 
character of short-term agreements in the LNG industry), the sample consists of 261 LNG supply 
contracts, of which 105 correspond to Atlantic Basin trade and 156 to Asia-Pacific deliveries. Figure 
36 illustrates the duration of all LNG supply contracts included in the estimation sample. Contract 
duration of these agreements varies between three and 36 years and is typically in the range of 15 to 
30 years in the early decades of the industry. During the past decade there has been an increase in th 
number of agreements with less than 20 years and even l ss than ten years duration. Average contract 
length for agreements starting delivery prior to the year 2000 is 20.5 years in the sample; for contracts 
starting delivery from 2000 on it is 16.5 years.45  
Figure 36: Contract duration and start of deliveries of contracts included in the sample 
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Source: Own depiction 
 
The unit of analysis for studying the determinants of contract duration is an LNG supply contract 
concluded between an upstream seller (company or consortium) and a downstream buyer. 
Transactions are defined as cargo deliveries of LNG. The endogenous variable is contract duration in 
years. For the purpose of this study I assume a sample of contracts that holds constant other contract 
provisions, such as price adaptation or renegotiatin clauses. Unfortunately, the existence and 
                                                   
45 Differentiating between importing regions, average contract duration in Continental Europe has been 20.6 
years (16.9 years), in the more competitive natural gas markets of North America and the UK 19.7 years (16 
years), and in Asia 20.5 years (16.9 years) before and from the year 2000 on respectively based on this dataset.  
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utilization of such provisions is held confidentially by the trading partners and cannot be accounted for 
in this analysis.  
Figure 37 summarizes the distribution of regional tr de patterns in the dataset and mirrors that the 
Middle East increasingly functions as a swing supplier. Whereas Atlantic Basin exporters typically 
deliver LNG to European and North American customers, the Pacific Basin exporters deliver mainly 
to Asia with some minor volumes being dedicated to the North American west coast (i.e., Mexico). 
Middle Eastern exporters conclude long-term supply contracts with importers from different regions. 
For example, the Qatargas I project delivers 5.4 bcm of LNG per year to Chubu Electric in Japan over 
a period of 25 years and at the same time additional volumes under mid-term agreements to France. 
Oman LNG has contracted 0.9 bcm/a to Osaka Gas for 25 years and at the same time 2.2 bcm/a to the 
Spanish Union Fenosa for 21 years.  
Figure 37: Distribution of regional trade patterns in the dataset 
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6.4.2 Explanatory variables 
Asset specificity. The benefits of writing a long-term contract should be positively related to the 
vulnerability of the trading partners to ex-post opp rtunistic behavior by the counterparty. Asset 
specificity varies across the transactions in the industry; in this study it refers to the degree to which an 
LNG import terminal is not redeployable. The characteristic of a sellers’ market accompanied by 
restructuring and liberalization of downstream natur l gas (and electricity) markets results in 
downstream asset specificity. A player investing in regasification capacity without having secured 
supplies and access to midstream shipping is caught in a lock-in situation. LNG sellers profit from 
significant bargaining power since importers compete globally for supplies. Furthermore, competitive 
downstream markets provide easy access to numerous buyers. To quantify the level of idiosyncrasy 
(i.e., relationship-specific investments) the ratio to which the contract exploits the nominal capacity of 
the import terminal (RCAPSHARE) is used. A buyer relying on a single supplier for a large volume of 
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deliveries will have difficulties to replace these upplies if they are terminated suddenly in an illiquid 
market such as the LNG market, where only very limited free capacities (upstream supplies as well as 
midstream ships) are available.  
Uncertainty. Uncertainty is a broad concept. Klein (1989) distinguishes between complexity and 
unpredictability. Williamson (1985, p. 57) states that “disturbances… are not all of a kind. Different 
origins are usefully distinguished.” This study focuses on external uncertainty components measuring 
environmental dynamism (i.e., price uncertainty, political instability in the exporting country, and 
general environmental uncertainty). The standard deviation of the WTI crude oil spot prices 
(STDEVOIL) in the year before contract signature, calculated based on daily data, is employed as a 
measure of price uncertainty. Oil prices traditionally influence natural gas prices via oil-linkage in 
pricing formulas. Even though oil-linkage is substituted step by step in favor to gas indexes that reflect 
gas-to-gas competition, this variable still continues to be an adequate measure of natural gas price 
volatility.  
A second variable reflects political uncertainty in the exporting country (UNC). It is based on the 
POLCON index developed by Henisz (2000). As the OECD (2007, p. 28) highlights, “long-term 
contracts do not guarantee supply,” governments may ch nge institutions such as legal rules, parties 
may renegotiate contractual provisions ex-post. For the reasons discussed in Chapter 4, UNC is 
defined as (1 – POLCON) with UNCi ∈  [0, 1].  
Finally, a third variable to account for a firm’s need for flexibility is added. Whereas the early industry 
relied on inflexible, well predictable, bilateral buyer-seller relations, the industry today is 
characterized by significant changes and a specific unpredictability about the future: formerly regional 
markets become linked, new players enter the industry, liquid trading hubs gain in importance, 
numerous companies invest in a portfolio of export and import positions to be able to benefit from 
arbitrage potentials. Therefore, flexibility is of prime importance. A dummy variable indicating LNG 
supply contracts that became operational after 1999 (D2000) is used expecting a negative relationship 
with contract duration. 
Transaction frequency within the relationship. To measure the frequency of transactions within the 
trading relationship (i.e., within the LNG supply contract) the annual contracted volume (VOL) is 
employed. Under the assumption that contracts are fulfilled according to their specifications and with 
respect to the fact that the standard size of LNG vessels ranges from 130,000 to 145,000 m³, the 
annual contracted volume provides a good indicator for the frequency of shipments within the 
contract.  
Transaction frequency between the trading parties. Three alternative variables indicating the historical 
trading experience between the same trading partners ar  defined under the assumption that repeated 
negotiation of LNG supply contracts reduces ex-ante as well as ex-post contracting costs. Theory 
argues that transaction costs diminish due to learning processes. Contracting parties gain information 
about each others behavior; reputational aspects reduce the hazard of post-contractual opportunistic 
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behavior. First, a count index indicating the cumulative number of LNG trade relationships between 
supplier and buyer (BILEXP1) is defined. Thus, if the parties negotiate a contract for the first time the 
variable will be one; if we observe a second contract between the same parties it will be two, and so 
on. Second, I use a similar count index indicating he cumulative number of years of bilateral LNG 
trade (BILEXP2). And finally, a dummy variable equaling one if the contract represents a contract 
renewal (RENEW) instead of the first trade relationship between the same upstream and downstream 
players is included. 
Control variables. To account for varying supply structures, the buyer country’s LNG share in total 
imports (LNGSHARE) is included as a control variable. While countries like the US can import 
natural gas via pipeline and LNG plays only a minor role in total gas supplies, other countries like 
South Korea or Japan rely heavily upon LNG imports. The higher the share of LNG in total imports 
the higher should be the duration of supply contracts. Furthermore, I define a dummy variable 
indicating contracts dedicated to competitive downstream markets (COMP) assuming that only the 
markets in the US and the UK can be regarded as liquid and competitive natural gas markets. This 
variable equals one if the contract became operation l in periods of unbundled transportation 
infrastructures (i.e., from 1992 on for the US and from 1997 on for the UK), since unbundling of the 
monopolistic element of the value added chain is an essential precondition for non-discriminatory 
access to infrastructures and free market entry.  
Instrumental variables. To account for the endogeneity of a right-hand side variable (i.e., contracted 
volume) and conduct two-stage estimation of simultaneous equations, instrumental variables have to 
be included. Therefore, the level of self-sufficiency of the importing country (ratio of domestic natur l 
gas production over total consumption, SELFSUFF), the nominal capacity of the import terminal 
(CAP), and the number of import terminals in the respectiv  country in the year LNG deliveries under 
the respective contract began (TERMINALS) are defined as instruments. These variables should not 
have a systematic impact on contract duration, but one would expect that they are related to the annual 
contracted volume. In order to tests for the instruments’ independence from the error term, the Sargan 
and Hansen-J-statistics are calculated for the 2SLS and GMM models, respectively. Thereby, a 
rejection of the null hypotheses would imply that the instruments are not satisfying the orthogonality 
conditions required for their employment. See Baum et al. (2003, pp. 16 ff.) for further technical 
details. 
For a survey of all exogenous variables as well as their descriptive statistics see Table 21. More than 
half of the contracts of the dataset (60%) started d livery from 2000 on, mirroring the expanding 
international LNG trade during the last decade. Thecontracts account for very small shares of the 
import terminal capacities (0.2%; deliveries from Australia to Japanese customers) as well as for a 
share of up to 100% (deliveries from Nigeria to Italy). The political uncertainty index of the exporting 
countries ranges between zero and one with a mean of 0.62; the standard deviation of the WTI crude 
oil spot price in the year before contract signature varies strongly between 0.87 and 12.85 for recently 
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concluded contracts. Annual contracted volume is betwe n 0.03 (deliveries from Australia to Japan) 
and 6.75 bcm/a (planned deliveries from Iran to India). The negotiating parties in most cases 
bargained for the first time; however, bilateral exp rience for single players shows values of up to nine
(Gaz de France and Algerian Sonatrach) and we observe previous trading experiences of up to 31 
years. 13% of the contracts in the database represent renewals of expired agreements. The dataset 
involves both highly self-sufficient (e.g., US or UK) and LNG import-dependent (e.g., Japan or South 
Korea) countries. In 12% of the observations, deliveries are dedicated to competitive downstream 
markets. The nominal capacity of the import facilities varies between 0.21 (Nippon’s Kagoshima 
terminal) and 75 bcm/a (Tepco’s import portfolio in Japan). The number of import terminals per 
country in the year of the start of deliveries lies between one (e.g., Belgium, Greece, Turkey) and 29 
(Japan). 
 
 
 
Table 21: Explanatory variables and summary statistics  
Characteristic Proxy Unit Denotation Exp. 
sign 
Mean Std. 
dev. 
Min Max N 
Propositions 1a and 1b 
Relationship specificity  
 
Ratio to which the contract exploits the 
nominal capacity of the import terminal  
% RCAPSHARE + 0.214 0.245 0.002 1 261 
External uncertainty and need 
for flexibility 
Political instability in the supplying country  UNC - 0.622 0.387 0 1 261 
 Standard deviation of WTI crude oil spot 
price in the year before contract signature  
 STDEVOIL - 3.778 2.733 0.874 12.853 224 
 Start-up of deliveries after 1999 Dummy D2000 - 0.598 0.491 0 1 261 
Propositions 2a and 2b 
Within frequency Annual contracted volume bcm/a VOL + 1.779 1.496 0.03 6.75 261 
Between frequency Cumulative number of contracts negotiated 
between the two parties 
Count BILEXP1 - 1.678 1.239 1 9 261 
 Cumulative number of years of trading 
relationship between the two parties 
Count  BILEXP2 - 5.755 8.151 1 31 261 
 Contract representing a contract renewal Dummy RENEW - 0.134 0.341 0 1 261 
Control variables 
Dependence on LNG imports LNG share in total natural gas imports % LNGSHARE + 0.718 0.376 0.03 1 261 
Downstream competition Contract dedicated to competitiv  
downstream market (i.e., US from 1992; UK 
from 1997) 
Dummy COMP - 0.126 0.333 0 1 261 
Instruments 
Self-sufficiency import country Domestic production / total consumption % SELFSUFF  0.202 0.367 0 1 261 
Import terminal capacity Nominal capacity of regasification terminal bcm/a CAP  18.076 18.164 0.21 75 261 
Number of import terminals Number of import terminals in import country Count TERMINALS  10.126 9.635 1 29 261 
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Table 22: Correlation matrix 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
CD 1 1              
RCAPSHARE 2 0.223 1             
UNC 3 -0.037 0.159 1            
STDEVOIL 4 -0.208 -0.007 0.003 1           
D2000 5 -0.265 0.088 0.090 0.369 1          
VOL 6 0.227 0.556 0.133 0.032 0.132 1         
BILEXP1 7 -0.269 -0.258 0.066 0.107 0.011 -0.139 1        
BILEXP2 8 -0.263 -0.302 0.028 0.061 -0.039 -0.090 0.844 1       
RENEW 9 -0.321 -0.175 0.060 0.067 -0.010 0.014 0.660 0.775 1      
LNGSHARE 10 0.119 -0.368 -0.273 -0.052 -0.182 -0.209 0.111 0.288 0.138 1     
COMP 11 -0.183 0.212 0.012 0.016 0.247 0.076 -0.185 -0.229 -0.179 -0.594 1    
SELFSUFF 12 -0.008 0.540 0.046 0.163 0.238 0.301 -0.257 -0.314 -0.191 -0.553 0.670 1   
CAP 13 -0.066 -0.469 -0.107 0.036 -0.003 0.079 0.088 0.246 0.149 0.375 -0.235 -0.370 1  
TERMINALS 14 -0.020 -0.392 -0.264 -0.057 -0.057 -0.349 0.218 0.376 0.224 0.642 -0.274 -0.449 0.213 1 
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6.4.3 Methodology 
To test the above derived propositions, the following estimation model with contract duration as the 
endogenous variable is defined:  
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iiiii
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where i indexes contracts and the error term ζi is assumed to be i.i.d. Three models – each including 
only one of the alternative measures of the frequency of transactions between the same trading 
partners (BETWFREQ in Equation (6-6)) at a time in order to avoid multicollinearity problems with: 
a) ln(BILEXP1), b) ln(BILEXP2), and c) RENEW – are estimated.  
However, contract duration and contracted volume are determined simultaneously when an LNG seller 
and buyer agree for a supply arrangement, both repres nt endogenous variables. The error 
distributions cannot be considered independent of these regressors’ distributions. Therefore, the model 
is estimated applying two-stage least squares. As already discussed in Section 5.4.3, the right-hand-
side endogenous variable (VOL) is regressed on all system exogenous variables as well as on the 
vector of instrumental variables in the first stage. The fitted values are used as instrument in the 
second stage. Therefore,  
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is defined as the second equation in the system with ξi again assumed to be i.i.d. Estimation results are 
verified using the generalized method of moments (GMM) procedure. If the error terms are 
heteroscedastic, the two-stage IV estimator will be consistent but inefficient. GMM is a robust 
estimator when facing heteroscedasticity of unknown form; no information on the exact distribution of 
the disturbances is required. In this study the estimation is based on the assumption that the error te ms 
are uncorrelated with the set of instrumental variables. Via the GMM procedure, parameter estimates 
are chosen such that the orthogonality conditions are s tisfied. For further technical details see Greene 
(2002, pp. 525 ff.). However, the GMM estimator can have poor small sample properties (Baum et al. 
2003, p. 11). Therefore, a Pagan-Hall test investigatin  the presence of some form of 
heteroscedasticity is recommended. 
6.5 Estimation results and interpretation  
The following paragraph presents estimation results of the simultaneous equation system. Three 
models (i.e., A, B, and C) are estimated including one of the above defined measures of historical 
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transaction frequency between the same trading partners. Each model furthermore is estimated in two 
versions including STDEVOIL (Table 23) and not including this variable respectively (Table 25 in the 
Appendix) in order to benefit from the whole datase. 2SLS and GMM lead to very similar results. The 
Pagan-Hall test statistics support the use of GMM estimation; the null hypothesis of the disturbances 
being homoscedastic has to be rejected for all model specifications. 
Propositions 1a, 1b and 2b can be confirmed empirically. Estimation results are robust to alternative 
model specifications. The p-values of F-statistics (all < 1%) show that the null hypotheses of all slope 
coefficients equaling zero must be rejected for all estimations. Adjusted (respectively centered) R² of 
2SLS (GMM) for the equations explaining contract duration is between 0.21 and 0.27 (0.24 and 0.30).  
The transaction cost prediction of Proposition 1a is confirmed for the variable indicating the ratio o 
which the contract exploits the nominal capacity of the import terminal (RCAPSHARE). The more 
important the respective contract to the import terminal and therefore the higher asset specificity, the 
longer the contract’s duration in order to mitigate th  hazard of ex-post hold-up. Buyers relying 
strongly on one supplier prefer longer-term contracts.46 In addition, since the level of the coefficient is 
one of the highest of all exogenous variables it supports the theory’s prediction that asset specificity is 
the strongest determinant of transaction costs.  
The coefficient of the measure of political instability (UNC), testing for Proposition 1b, lacks any 
statistical significance. Regressions using alternative measures of political instability in the exporting 
country (i.e., the International Country Risk Guide reported by the PRS Group as well as the Political 
and Economic Risk Report prepared by Aon Corporation) led to similar results. This type of 
uncertainty does not appear to be the relevant dimension of uncertainty for the unit of analysis in this 
study and has no impact on the choice of contract duration. Joint ventures of private oil and gas majors 
with national companies as well as the in many cases very high dependence of exporting countries on 
revenues from oil and natural gas deliveries may mitigate the hazard of opportunistic behavior of 
upstream states. The variable indicating price uncertainty (STDEVOIL) shows the expected sign and 
is statistically significant for the 2SLS models. Contract duration appears to decrease with the risk of 
being bound by an agreement that no longer reflects the actual market situation with respect to the 
price level, which determines the profitability of the capital-intensive LNG value chain.  
The variable controlling for the need for flexibility as measured by the start-up date of the contract 
(D2000) indicates as expected that contract duration has decreased over time. Whereas in the ‘first 
generation’ LNG market inflexible bilateral long-term supply agreements typically lasted 20 to 30 
years, the ‘second generation’ market is characterized by a considerable expansion of capacities, 
changing trading conditions due to restructuring processes in downstream markets favoring 
competition, and trading places gaining in liquidity. Market liquidity promotes the use of flexible 
trades that helps parties to benefit from arbitrage pot ntials in the global gas market.  
                                                   
46 This result goes in line with the findings of Lyons (1994) who shows a positive relationship between 
vulnerability to ex-post opportunism and the choice of more hierarchical governance modes with vulnerability 
measured as the share of output of a component supplier dedicated to the customer firm. 
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Proposition 2a refers to the impact of transaction frequency within the relationship. No statistical 
significance of the coefficient of the annual contrac ed volume (VOL), indicating the number of 
transactions (i.e., cargo deliveries) within the trading relationship, was found for the models 
accounting for the endogeneity of the variable. In co trast, a positive and significant impact of VOL 
on CD is found in the simple OLS model. This shows that ignoring the endogeneity of right-hand-side 
variables can produce misleading estimation results. An alternative estimation testing for a non-linear 
impact of the contracted volume, as has been found for example in Joskow (1987), does not change 
the presented result. Real-world LNG contracts contain numerous clauses that specify potential 
adaptations to changing environmental conditions. Unfortunately for research purposes, most 
agreements are confidential, so I am not able to acc unt for the impact of provisions such as pricing or 
volume flexibility clauses that would be very valuable to empirical analyses.  
Empirical results provide broad support for Propositi n 2b. The estimation coefficients of all three 
variables (ln(BILEXP1), ln(BILEXP2), RENEW) have the expected negative signs and are highly 
statistically significant. LNG supply contracts decr ase in contract duration as bilateral trading 
experience between the contracting parties (i.e., historical transaction frequency between the trading 
partners) increases. For contracts representing the ren wal of a matured agreement, duration will be 
more than five years shorter. This can be explained by a decrease in contracting costs. LNG supplier 
and buyer gain information about each others’ characte istics with every negotiation process, 
economies of communication develop, reputational effects may diminish the hazard of opportunistic 
behavior, and the partners benefit from a body of informal institutions that evolve over repeated 
bargaining.  
The statistically significant control variables also provide interesting findings. Countries with a greater 
dependence on imports in the form of LNG (LNGSHARE) tend to negotiate longer agreements and 
forgo some flexibility in favor of supply security. Even in the present economic downturn it is 
expected that new importers with demand growth wellabove average like China and India will further 
tighten global supply. Committing to one supplier dcreases the risk that the supplier may seek another 
destination market with more attractive provisions when a shorter-term contract ends. Furthermore, 
deliveries to a competitive downstream market (COMP) are realized via contracts with about 2.5 to 
three years shorter duration, confirming the findings of Hirschhausen and Neumann (2008) analyzing 
a dataset including pipeline as well as LNG contracts. Competition favors diversification of suppliers, 
supply sources, and supply routes and hence is condu ive to supply security; long-term contracts lose 
in importance.  
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Table 23: Estimation results explaining CD including STDEVOIL 
Specification OLS 
(VOL as exogenous variable) 
 
2SLS 
(VOL as endogenous variable) 
System GMM 
(VOL as endogenous variable) 
 Model A Model B Model C Model A Model B Model C Model A Model B Model C 
CONSTANT 18.98 
(1.60) 
***  18.67 
(1.58) 
***  18.45 
(1.52) 
***  19.59 
(1.68) 
***  19.17 
(1.66) 
***  19.05 
(1.60) 
*** 19.69 
(1.53) 
*** 19.29 
(1.51) 
***  18.99 
(1.54) 
*** 
RCAPSHARE 3.52 
(1.85) 
* 3.24 
(1.85) 
* 3.29 
(1.77) 
* 5.69 
(2.51) 
** 5.18 
(2.54) 
** 5.64 
(2.44) 
** 5.64 
(2.37) 
** 5.02 
(2.38) 
** 5.50 
(2.30) 
** 
UNC -0.36 
(0.97) 
-0.37 
(0.97) 
 -0.23 
(0.94) 
 -0.29 
(0.98) 
 -0.32 
(0.98) 
 -0.18 
(0.95) 
 -0.41 
(1.00) 
 -0.50 
(0.99) 
 -0.35 
(0.93) 
 
STDEVOIL -0.24 
(0.14) 
* -0.25 
(0.14) 
* -0.23 
(0.13) 
* -0.24 
(0.14) 
* -0.25 
(0.14) 
* -0.24 
(0.14) 
* -0.22 
(0.16) 
 -0.23 
(0.16) 
 -0.22 
(0.15) 
 
D2000 -2.67 
(0.86) 
***  -2.81 
(0.86) 
***  -2.70 
(0.83) 
***  -2.47 
(0.89) 
***  -2.63 
(0.88) 
***  -2.49 
(0.86) 
*** -2.45 
(0.75) 
*** -2.63 
(0.74) 
***  -2.42 
(0.74) 
*** 
VOL 0.72 
(0.29) 
** 0.80 
(0.29) 
***  0.92 
(0.28) 
***  0.05 
(0.59) 
 0.22 
(0.59) 
 0.22 
(0.57) 
 0.08 
(0.57) 
 0.28 
(0.56) 
 0.28 
(0.56) 
 
ln(BILEXP1) -2.77 
(0.70) 
***      -2.77 
(0.71) 
***      -2.83 
(0.68) 
***     
ln(BILEXP2)   -1.23 
(0.29) 
***      -1.19 
(0.30) 
***      -1.23 
(0.29) 
***    
RENEW     -5.63 
(0.97) 
***      -5.33 
(1.01) 
***     -5.53 
(0.85) 
*** 
LNGSHARE 1.76 
(1.27) 
2.41 
(1.28) 
* 1.83 
(1.23) 
 1.68 
(1.29) 
 2.32 
(1.30) 
* 1.73 
(1.25) 
 1.57 
(1.15) 
 2.19 
(1.14) 
* 1.70 
(1.18) 
 
COMP -2.70 
(1.30) 
** -2.35 
(1.29) 
* -2.85 
(1.25) 
** -2.93 
(1.33) 
** -2.54 
(1.31) 
* -3.05 
(1.28) 
** -3.14 
(1.37) 
** -2.75 
(1.36) 
** -3.20 
(1.41) 
** 
                   
Pagan-Hall  
 
      31.595 
(0.000) 
32.772 
(0.000) 
35.156 
(0.000) 
      
Adjusted R² 
Centered R² 
N 
0.234 
 
224 
0.239 
 
224 
0.288 
 
224 
 0.214 
 
224 
0.225 
 
224 
0.267 
 
224 
  
0.243 
224 
 
0.255 
224 
 
0.296 
224 
 
*** Statistically significant at a 1%-level; ** staistically significant at a 5%-level; * statistically significant at a 10%-level. All levels of 
statistical significance are based on two-tailed test statistics. Corrected standard errors in parentheses.  
 
 
Table 24 shows the estimation results of the first-stage regression which explains annual contracted 
volume adding a set of instrumental variables. For econometric reasons all system exogenous variables 
must be included in this regression, even though their explanatory power is very low. The Sargan and 
Hansen-J statistics for all three models are calculted in order to test whether the instruments are 
uncorrelated with the error terms. The null hypotheses of the instruments satisfying orthogonality 
conditions cannot be rejected for any specification, supporting the choice of these instruments.  
The level of self-sufficiency (SELFSUFF) in natural g s supply of the importing country has no major 
impact on the contracted volume. The higher the nomi al capacity (CAP) of the import terminal the 
higher will be the contracted volume. There is a negative relationship between the number of import 
facilities (TERMINALS) in the buying country and the annual contracted volume. This result for 
example reflects the situation in Japan, where numerous (also small scale) terminals near all major 
demand centers substitute for the nonexistent gas transmission network, whereas countries such as 
Belgium receive all deliveries via a single import facility.  
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Table 24: Estimation results 1st stage explaining VOL including STDEVOIL 
Specification 2SLS 
 
System GMM 
 
 Model A Model B Model C Model A Model B Model C 
CONSTANT 0.38 
(0.33) 
 0.38 
(0.33) 
0.38 
(0.32) 
 0.38 
(0.31) 
 0.38 
(0.31) 
 0.38 
(0.30) 
 
RCAPSHARE 4.04 
(0.39) 
***  4.05 
(0.39) 
*** 4.04 
(0.39) 
*** 4.04 
(0.41) 
***  4.05 
(0.41) 
*** 4.04 
(0.41) 
*** 
UNC 0.05 
(0.20) 
 0.04 
(0.20) 
0.02 
(0.20) 
 0.05 
(0.17) 
 0.04 
(0.17) 
 0.02 
(0.17) 
 
STDEVOIL -0.02 
(0.03) 
 -0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
 -0.02 
(0.03) 
 -0.02 
(0.03) 
 -0.02 
(0.03) 
 
D2000 0.24 
(0.18) 
 0.25 
(0.18) 
0.24 
(0.18) 
 0.24 
(0.19) 
 0.25 
(0.19) 
 0.24 
(0.18) 
 
ln(BILEXP1) 0.11 
(0.15) 
    0.11 
(0.13) 
     
ln(BILEXP2)   0.08 
(0.06) 
    0.08 
(0.06) 
   
RENEW    0.46 
(0.21) 
**     0.46 
(0.22) 
 
LNGSHARE -0.09 
(0.32) 
 -0.10 
(0.32) 
-0.04 
(0.32) 
 -0.09 
(0.34) 
 -0.10 
(0.34) 
 -0.04 
(0.34) 
 
COMP -0.29 
(0.32) 
 -0.29 
(0.33) 
-0.23 
(0.33) 
 -0.29 
(0.29) 
 -0.29 
(0.29) 
 -0.23 
(0.30) 
 
SELFSUFF 0.23 
(0.33) 
 0.23 
(0.33) 
0.21 
(0.33) 
 0.23 
(0.31) 
 0.23 
(0.31) 
 0.21 
(0.32) 
 
CAP 0.03 
(0.004) 
***  0.03 
(0.004) 
*** 0.03 
(0.005) 
*** 0.03 
(0.01) 
***  0.03 
(0.01) 
*** 0.03 
(0.01) 
*** 
TERMINALS -0.02 
(0.01) 
**  -0.03 
(0.01) 
** -0.03 
(0.01) 
** -0.02 
(0.01) 
** -0.03 
(0.01) 
** -0.03 
(0.01) 
** 
            
Sargan stat. 0.770 
(0.68) 
 1.249 
(0.54) 
1.718 
(0.42) 
       
Hansen-J stat.      0.846 
(0.66) 
 1.361 
(0.51) 
1.592 
(0.45) 
            
Adjusted R² 
Centered R² 
N 
0.466 
 
224 
 0.469 
 
224 
0.477 
 
224 
  
0.490 
224 
  
0.493 
224 
  
0.500 
224 
 
*** Statistically significant at a 1%-level; ** staistically significant at a 5%-level; * statistically 
significant at a 10%-level. All levels of statistical significance are based on two-tailed test statistics. 
Corrected standard errors in parentheses.  
 
Predicted values of contract duration are plotted in Figure 38. As can be seen, they typically are in the 
range between ten and 25 years, with significant deviations from the observed contract duration for 
data points with very low and very high levels of the dependent variable. Error terms do not follow a 
random scatter but rather depend on the observed contra t duration. Short agreements covering less 
than ten years as well as very long-term agreements covering more than 25 years cannot be explained 
by the model. Non-observable factors – not included in the estimation system – therefore seem to have 
an important impact on contract design. On the one hand, it can be assumed that contract provisions 
such as price adaptation clauses, rules governing regular renegotiations or actions in the case of force 
majeure, play a very important role in real world long-term contracts. As Saussier (2000) highlights, 
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the level of completeness of a contract is itself a decision variable and contracts may be left explicitly 
incomplete in order to safe on transaction costs. On the other hand, exporters as well as importers in 
general contract for a portfolio of supply agreements, where large scale contracts may be accompanied 
by more flexible shorter-term agreements and different kinds of risks can actively be hedged.  
Figure 38: Predicted values CD using 2SLS including STDEVOIL 
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6.6 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter provides an empirical assessment of LNG supply contracts in order to determine optimal 
duration. Testable hypotheses are derived from theoretical approaches on contracting. The trade-off 
between contracting costs due to repeated bilateral bargaining versus the need for flexibility in 
uncertain environments is discussed. Furthermore, I add to the theoretical discussion an analysis of 
different dimensions of transaction frequency and their impact on governance choice. 
Estimation results of a model of simultaneous equations show that the presence of high dedicated asset
specificity in LNG contracts results in longer contract duration, which confirms the predictions of 
transaction cost economics. We observe, however, that the increasing need for flexibility in today’s 
‘second generation’ LNG industry reduces contract duration, as does the presence of a high price 
uncertainty. Concerning transaction frequency one has to distinguish between a ‘within’ perspective 
(i.e., transaction cost economics view) and a ‘betwe n’ perspective (i.e., organizational learning and
reputational effects view). Firms experienced in bilateral trading generally are able to negotiate shorter 
contracts. Countries that rely heavily on LNG imports are often willing to forgo some flexibility in 
favor of supply security. Deliveries to competitive downstream markets take place under shorter-term 
agreements. 
Unfortunately, not all uncertainty variables produce significant results. Numerous empirical studies 
investigating the effect of environmental uncertainty on governance choice present non-significant and 
even ambiguous results (e.g., Crocker and Masten, 1988; Klein et al. 1990; Heide and John, 1990; 
Including 
STDEVOIL 
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Masten and Crocker, 1991; Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995). As Klein (1989, p. 256) states: “It 
appears that uncertainty is a too broad concept and that different facets of it lead to both a desire for 
flexibility and a motivation to reduce transaction costs.” He argues further that the effect depends on 
the dimension of uncertainty and shows that whereas unpredictability should have a negative impact 
on vertical control, complexity should have a positive impact. Therefore, it is suggested that empirical 
studies should split external uncertainty into its components, investigate the opposing effects and 
determine which dimensions of uncertainty are relevant for the respective transaction.  
In addition, contractual provisions (such as price adaptation clauses) – which unfortunately are 
confidential and cannot be incorporated in this analysis – are an important measure to react to 
changing environmental conditions and to decrease the inflexibility of long-term agreements. Masten 
and Crocker (1991, p. 5) point out that “where uncertainty about what will constitute optimal behavior 
at the time of performance is great, it may be better to leave aspects of that performance open to 
negotiation rather than to constrain parties to specific but potentially inappropriate actions.” The main 
objective is to define contract terms that encourage rent-increasing adjustments but at the same time 
discourage rent-dissipating efforts to redistribute existing surpluses by opportunistic behavior. It is 
commonly known, that price adaptation clauses typically are included in long-term LNG supply 
contracts. The recent move towards more volume flexibility, the drop of destination clauses as well as 
the increasing importance of fob rather than cif/des contracts further reduce the risk of being bound by 
an inflexible agreement not reflecting market realities.  
Future empirical work should address several issues. Fir t, researchers need to identify better proxies 
of theoretical constructs (such as transaction costs, asset specificity, uncertainty, transaction 
frequency, etc.) that will improve empirical testing. If it would be possible to find a valid proxy for 
transaction costs, models in the structural form as defined in Equation (6-2) could be estimated and 
one could draw conclusions on the impact of transaction ost variables and other exogenous factors on 
costs and benefits of contracting for one more period. Second, the concept of uncertainty should be 
discussed with respect to various dimensions as argued above. Third, although empirical studies 
should account for the simultaneous choice of contract provisions like contract duration or the level of 
completeness of contracts, there are huge challenges due to very limited data availability.  
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6.7 Appendix 
The following tables and figure present estimation results for the whole sample excluding the variable 
STDEVOIL for which only 224 out of 261 observations are available. OLS, 2SLS, and GMM 
estimations produce qualitatively similar results. 
Table 25: Estimation results explaining CD excluding STDEVOIL 
Specification OLS 
(VOL as exogenous variable) 
 
2SLS 
(VOL as endogenous variable) 
System GMM 
(VOL as endogenous variable) 
 Model A Model B Model C Model A Model B Model C Model A Model B Model C 
CONSTANT 17.73 
(1.45) 
***  17.39 
(1.44) 
***  17.16 
(1.39) 
***  18.49 
(1.54) 
***  18.05 
(1.53) 
***  17.89 
(1.49) 
*** 18.44 
(1.49) 
*** 17.97 
(1.46) 
***  17.66 
(1.49) 
*** 
RCAPSHARE 3.53 
(1.73) 
** 3.28 
(1.74) 
* 3.27 
(1.68) 
* 6.18 
(2.42) 
** 5.69 
(2.44) 
** 5.97 
(2.39) 
** 6.12 
(2.28) 
*** 5.52 
(2.29) 
** 5.87 
(2.25) 
*** 
UNC 0.28 
(0.90) 
0.18 
(0.90) 
 0.21 
(0.88) 
 0.31 
(0.92) 
 0.20 
(0.91) 
 0.23 
(0.89) 
 0.26 
(0.92) 
 0.10 
(0.91) 
 0.16 
(0.87) 
 
D2000 -3.02 
(0.71) 
***  -3.06 
(0.71) 
***  -2.84 
(0.69) 
***  -2.87 
(0.72) 
***  -2.94 
(0.72) 
***  -2.72 
(0.71) 
*** -2.87 
(0.65) 
*** -2.94 
(0.65) 
***  -2.66 
(0.65) 
*** 
VOL 0.67 
(0.27) 
** 0.72 
(0.27) 
***  0.82 
(0.26) 
***  -0.10 
(0.56) 
 0.03 
(0.56) 
 0.04 
(0.54) 
 -0.07 
(0.53) 
 0.11 
(0.53) 
 0.12 
(0.53) 
 
ln(BILEXP1) -2.92 
(0.66) 
***      -2.90 
(0.67) 
***      -2.92 
(0.65) 
***     
ln(BILEXP2)   -1.24 
(0.28) 
***      -1.20 
(0.28) 
***      -1.22 
(0.28) 
***    
RENEW     -5.61 
(0.98) 
***      -5.32 
(1.00) 
***     -5.43 
(0.89) 
*** 
LNGSHARE 2.11 
(1.16) 
* 2.64 
(1.16) 
** 2.17 
(1.13) 
* 2.07 
(1.18) 
* 2.59 
(1.18) 
** 2.13 
(1.15) 
* 2.11 
(1.13) 
* 2.67 
(1.12) 
** 2.30 
(1.15) 
** 
COMP -2.36 
(1.27) 
* -2.03 
(1.26) 
 -2.45 
(1.23) 
** -2.61 
(1.30) 
** -2.24 
(1.28) 
* -2.65 
(1.26) 
** -2.57 
(1.40) 
* -2.14 
(1.39) 
 -2.57 
(1.42) 
* 
                   
Pagan-Hall  
 
 
      21.303 
(0.011) 
22.181 
(0.008) 
25.665 
(0.002) 
      
Adjusted R² 
Centered R² 
N 
0.236 
 
261 
0.236 
 
261 
0.272 
 
261 
 0.211 
 
261 
0.216 
 
261 
 0.247 
 
261 
  
0.234 
261 
 
0.241 
261 
 
0.271 
261 
 
*** Statistically significant at a 1%-level; ** staistically significant at a 5%-level; * statistically significant at a 10%-level. All levels of 
statistical significance are based on two-tailed test statistics. Corrected standard errors in parentheses.  
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Table 26: Estimation results 1st stage explaining VOL excluding STDEVOIL 
Specification 2SLS 
 
System GMM 
 
 Model A Model B Model C Model A Model B Model C 
CONSTANT 0.44 
(0.31) 
 0.45 
(0.31) 
0.45 
(0.31) 
 0.44 
(0.28) 
 0.45 
(0.28) 
 0.45 
(0.28) 
 
RCAPSHARE 4.29 
(0.36) 
***  4.29 
(0.36) 
*** 4.29 
(0.35) 
*** 4.29 
(0.36) 
***  4.29 
(0.36) 
*** 4.29 
(0.36) 
*** 
UNC -0.03 
(0.19) 
 -0.03 
(0.19) 
-0.04 
(0.19) 
 -0.03 
(0.17) 
 -0.03 
(0.17) 
 -0.04 
(0.17) 
 
D2000 0.11 
(0.15) 
 0.12 
(0.15) 
0.10 
(0.15) 
 0.11 
(0.16) 
 0.12 
(0.16) 
 0.10 
(0.16) 
 
ln(BILEXP1) 0.12 
(0.14) 
    0.12 
(0.13) 
     
ln(BILEXP2)   0.07 
(0.06) 
    0.07 
(0.06) 
   
RENEW    0.43 
(0.21) 
**     0.43 
(0.22) 
** 
LNGSHARE 0.02 
(0.29) 
 0.01 
(0.06) 
0.05 
(0.28) 
 0.02 
(0.29) 
 0.01 
(0.29) 
 0.05 
(0.29) 
 
 COMP -0.11 
(0.29) 
 -0.11 
(0.30) 
-0.06 
(0.30) 
 -0.11 
(0.25) 
 -0.11 
(0.25) 
 -0.06 
(0.25) 
 
SELFSUFF -0.03 
(0.29) 
 -0.04 
(0.29) 
-0.06 
(0.29) 
 -0.03 
(0.25) 
 -0.04 
(0.25) 
 -0.06 
(0.25) 
 
CAP 0.04 
(0.00) 
***  0.03 
(0.00) 
*** 0.03 
(0.00) 
*** 0.04 
(0.01) 
***  0.03 
(0.01) 
*** 0.03 
(0.01) 
*** 
TERMINALS -0.03 
(0.01) 
***  -0.03 
(0.01) 
*** -0.03 
(0.01) 
*** -0.03 
(0.01) 
***  -0.03 
(0.01) 
*** -0.03 
(0.01) 
*** 
            
Sargan stat. 0.200 
(0.90) 
 0.743 
(0.69) 
0.899 
(0.64) 
       
Hansen-J stat.      0.192 
(091) 
 0.777 
(0.67) 
0.796 
(0.67) 
            
Adjusted R² 
Centered R² 
N 
0.455 
 
261 
 0.456 
 
261 
0.462 
 
261 
  
0.473 
261 
  
0.475 
261 
  
0.481 
261 
 
*** Statistically significant at a 1%-level; ** staistically significant at a 5%-level; * statistically 
significant at a 10%-level. All levels of statistical significance are based on two-tailed test statistics. 
Corrected standard errors in parentheses.  
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Figure 39: Predicted values CD using 2SLS excluding STDEVOIL 
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7 Conclusions 
This thesis investigates vertical structures in the global market for liquefied natural gas, an industry 
which is changing both in quantity and quality. Natur l gas hubs gain in liquidity. Long- and 
short-term contracts co-exist. On the one hand, joint ventures, strategic partnerships, and vertical and 
horizontal integration become common practice and enable arbitrage trades and the realization of swap 
agreements; on the other hand, some new entrants inve t in non-integrated commercial LNG import 
facilities.  
The market structure has changed substantially during the past decade. The survival of incumbents and 
new entrants strongly depends on their ability to act economically; strategic decisions (of private 
sector players) are driven by cost minimization. The heterogeneity of transactions in terms of varying 
levels of relationship-specific investments, external uncertainty, downstream competition, or 
dependence on natural gas imports in the form of LNG of natural gas importing countries should be 
matched by diversity in forms of governance (varying levels of vertical integration, varying 
characteristics and duration of supply contracts, ec.). For these reasons, the LNG industry is 
particularly well-suited to test transaction cost economics’ propositions. 
Based on transaction cost economics and recent developm nts thereof, it is analyzed which 
motivations drive companies towards vertical integration along successive stages of the value chain 
and which external factors determine optimal contract duration of long-term supply agreements. First, 
the impact of inter-organizational trust as a shift parameter on the choice of more hierarchical 
governance modes is investigated. Second, an empirical test of the positioning-economizing 
perspective, linking transaction cost economics and strategic positioning, is provided. Third, optimal 
contract duration of long-term LNG supply contracts is analyzed accounting for the trade-off between 
contracting costs and flexibility in uncertain environments with both contract duration and contracted 
volume being considered as endogenous variables.   
These analyses have some limitations: i) pre-existing inter-organizational trust should be treated as an 
endogenous variable determined by prior experiences between the exchange partners. A two-stage 
regression model explaining the level of trust in a first step would improve the analysis; ii) since no 
performance data on the transaction-level are availble, it is not possible to test for the direct impact of 
the presence of inter-organizational trust on exchange performance; iii) similarly, transaction-specific 
performance data would allow to relate feasible resource-profile/organization pairings to firm 
performance and to estimate structural form instead of reduced form models as is suggested within the 
positioning-economizing perspective; and finally, iv) contractual provisions such as price adaptation 
clauses or volume flexibilities are an important measure to react to changing environmental 
conditions. However, these are confidential information. Nevertheless, the recent move towards more 
volume flexibility, the drop of destination clauses, and the increasing importance of fob rather than 
cif/des contracts reduce the risk of being bound by an inflexible agreement not reflecting market 
realities.  
 163 
Even though transaction cost economics often is referr d to be an empirical success story with about 
900 empirical contributions providing considerable support for its central propositions, “the field 
continues to offer many opportunities to plant, grow, and harvest new and value-creating research” 
(Nickerson and Bigelow, 2008, p. 208). In recent years, transaction cost economics has become more 
interdisciplinary. Researchers increasingly combine predictions derived from transaction cost 
economics with those from other theoretical perspectiv s such as strategic management or the 
resource-based view of the firm.  
Future empirical work should address several issues: i) more precise proxies for theoretical constructs 
such as transaction costs, asset specificity, uncertainty, or transaction frequency will improve 
empirical testing. If researchers succeed in measuring governance costs, structural form models can be 
estimated allowing for the confrontation of propositi ns derived from rival theories of the firm and to 
evaluate the costs associated with failing to align tra sactions and governance forms; ii) as discussed 
above, the concept of uncertainty should be considered with respect to a variety of dimensions and a 
more intensive theoretical and empirical treatment of transaction frequency is required; iii) more 
empirical tests investigating governance choice in a more comprehensive way are desirable (e.g., 
studies analyzing the trichotomous choice between market, hybrids, and hierarchy, or studies 
investigating a set of alternative hybrid governance forms such as different forms of joint ventures and
inter-firm alliances); iv) analyses going beyond the single transaction as the unit of analysis but 
instead regarding constellations of interdependent transactions would improve the understanding of 
overall firm strategy; and finally, v) accounting for the simultaneous choice of contract provisions 
such as contract duration and the level of completeness would provide important insights on their 
interactions. For this purpose, case studies are a suit ble tool. Even though often criticized because of 
a lack of generality, case studies are able to focus n institutional and transactional details and provide, 
as a complement to econometric tests, a richer perspective.  
Summarizing, transaction cost economics, assuming bounded rationality of economic actors and 
discussing the ex-post hold-up problem, once relationship-specific investments have been realized, is 
an appropriate approach to analyze firm boundaries nd the choice of alternative governance forms. A 
number of empirical studies reveal that boundary choice matters and that misalignment increases 
governance costs (e.g., Masten et al., 1991; Leiblein et al., 2002). However, also motivations other 
than efficiency such as strategic reasons, the establishment of a portfolio of activities, or market 
foreclosure might drive company behavior.  
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